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LECTURES

ON

ORATORY

AND

CRITICISM.

A COURSE OF LECTURES ON ORATORY AND CRITICISM.

By JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL.D. F.R.S.

Et rerum causas, et quid natura docebat. OVID.

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LONDON:

Printed for J. JOHNSON, No. 72, St. Paul's Church-yard.

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TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

LORD VISCOUNT

FITZMAURICE.

MY DEAR LORD,

AS your Lordſhip is now of a proper age to underſtand many particulars in the following Lectures, and will ſoon be capable of a regular ſtudy and a thorough comprehenſion of the whole ſubject, I was ambitious to dedicate the work to you; as a mark of my attachment, and of my earneſt

wiſh

wiſh to contribute whatever may be in my power, towards your improvement in every thing that is uſeful or ornamental, and thereby to the diſtinguiſhed figure that, I flatter myſelf, your Lordſhip will one day make in this country.

To act an uſeful and honourable part in the community to which we belong, is an object of laudable ambition to every man, in proportion to the rank which he holds in it; and your Lordſhip cannot but be fully apprized, that the only foundations for a reſpectable figure in life, are *good principles* and *good diſpoſitions*, joined to a *cultivated underſtanding*. Eminence in theſe reſpects is what, in ſtricteſt right, may be expected of thoſe whom their fellow-citizens, naturally their equals, are, by the conſtitution of their country, made to look up to, as their ſuperiors. It is a *debt* due for that diſtinction. For it is univerſally true, that the *obligation* to do good is of the very ſame extent with the *power* and *opportunity* of doing it.

This, my young Lord, is an age in which every thing begins to be eſtimated by its real *uſe* and *value*.

The

The ſame maxims of good ſenſe which regulate all other things, will finally new-arrange whatever belongs to the affairs of ſociety and government; and thoſe diſtinctions which mere *force*, mere *ſuperſtition*, or mere *accident* will be found to have eſtabliſhed, and to which *public utility* does not give its ſanction, will gradually ſink into *public diſeſteem*: and this, long continued, will make part of that *ſpirit of men*, of *nations*, and of *times*, which muſt finally bear down every thing that oppoſes it. Conſequently the only method of *perpetuating* any order of men whatever, is to make it truly *reſpectable* and *uſeful*: This was the original foundation of honour, and it cannot finally ſtand upon any other.

I muſt add, that the world will expect the more from your Lordſhip, on account of your relation to a nobleman who is eminently diſtinguiſhed for his *private*, as well as his *public virtues*, and for nothing more than his attention to the *education of his children*, and his liberality of ſentiment in the conduct of it.

That

THE DEDICATION.

That your Lordſhip may, in riper years, fully reward the care and attention that have been beſtowed upon you, confirm the hopes which your friends have formed from your preſent improvements and diſpoſitions, and eminently contribute to ſupport the dignity of the rank to which you were born, by adding to the real *luſtre* and *value* of it, is the ſincere prayer of,

My LORD,

Your LORDSHIP's

Moſt devoted

Humble Servant,

Nov. 20, 1776. J. PRIESTLEY.

THE

THE PREFACE.

THIS Courſe of Lectures was compoſed when I was Tutor in the *Languages* and *Belles Lettres* in the Academy at Warrington, and was firſt delivered in the year 1762. The *plan* is rather more comprehenſive than any thing that I have ſeen upon the ſubject, the *arrangement* of the materials, as a ſyſtem, is new, and the *theory*, in ſeveral reſpects, more ſo.

For this reaſon I have been frequently urged to make the Lectures public; and having poſtponed it ſo long, I have been induced to do it at this time, partly with a view to the illuſtration of the doctrine of the *aſſociation of ideas*, to which there is a conſtant reference through the whole work (in order to explain facts relating to the influence of Oratory, and the ſtriking effect of Excellencies in Compoſition, upon the genuine principles of human nature) in conſequence of having of late endeavoured to draw

ſome degree of attention to thoſe principles, as advanced by Dr. Hartley. Another reaſon for publiſhing theſe Lectures at this time is, for the ſake of the young Nobleman to whom they are dedicated, to whoſe improvement my beſt ſervices are, on many accounts, due.

Conſidering the nature of the work, it will not be expected, by the candid and judicious, that every thing in it ſhould be original. It is, on the contrary, the buſineſs of a *Lecturer*, to bring into an eaſy and comprehenſive view whatever has been obſerved by others: and in this reſpect I hope it will be thought that I have not acquitted myſelf ill; few works of criticiſm, of any value, having eſcaped my attention, at the time that I was engaged in thoſe ſtudies. But I own, that of the later publications of this kind I can give leſs account than might have been wiſhed; having been generally engaged in purſuits of a different nature. But, notwithſtanding there may be ſome things in common between this work and other publications of the kind, it is probable that many of the obſervations will be peculiar to myſelf, becauſe my general theory of human nature is very much ſo. I have ſhewn myſelf willing to contribute what I may be

be able to the illuſtration of my ſubject. If my endeavours have been attended with ſucceſs, the friends of literature will not be diſpleaſed; and if, in their opinion, I have contributed nothing to the common ſtock of uſeful obſervations, this work, they will conclude, will not ſtand long in the way of better.

The moſt conſiderable work on the ſubject of criticiſm, that was extant at the time of my compoſing theſe Lectures, was that of *Lord Kaims*, to whom I am indebted for a very great number of my examples, eſpecially thoſe from the dramatic writers, and ſometimes for the obſervations too; but with reſpect to this ſubject, on which ſo many able men have written, it is hardly poſſible to ſay to whom we are *ultimately* obliged for any very valuable remark.

Several of the examples in the firſt part of this work are borrowed from Dr. *Ward's Oratory*, and ſome from other works of the ſame nature; but many of the inſtances are of my own collecting. I would have been more particular in making my acknowledgments, if I had been better able to recollect them, and had thought it at all neceſſary. Let my reader conſider this work as a ſuccinct and ſyſtematical view of the obſervations of others, interſperſed with ori-

ginal ones of my own; and he will not, I hope, think that the peruſal of it has been time ill-beſtowed.

A conſiderable part of what I had compoſed for the uſe of my pupils in the *firſt part* of this work, which is, in its own nature, more trite than the reſt, I have here omitted; retaining only as much as was neceſſary to preſerve the appearance of an uniform *ſyſtem* in the whole, and thoſe parts which were the moſt original.

The laſt part of the work, relating to *elocution*, I never compoſed, though I ſhould have done it, if I had continued longer in that employment. The reaſon of this omiſſion was, that it was my cuſtom (as I believe it is ſtill that of my ſucceſſors in that department of the academy, and it is certainly a moſt uſeful one) to have lectures appropriated ſolely to the buſineſs of elocution, which all the ſtudents who were deſigned for public ſpeakers conſtantly attended, at leaſt once a week. At theſe lectures great pains were taken to form the pupils to a habit of juſt and graceful delivery; and the inſtructions were given as occaſion required; ſo that the reducing of them to writing was by no means neceſſary.

It

It may be thought by ſome, that theſe lectures are much too *ſhort*, and too conciſely written, for the purpoſe of public inſtruction: but they ſhould be apprized, that it was my cuſtom to write down only the *outlines* of what I delivered in the claſs; that, for the benefit of my pupils, I uſed to attend them provided with more copious *illuſtrations*, and a greater variety of *examples*; and, beſides, always ſpent a conſiderable part of the time appropriated to every lecture in examining them on the ſubject of the preceding lecture, hearing their remarks or objections, and explaining more diſtinctly what they appeared not to have clearly underſtood.

Upon this plan (which I found by experience to be a very uſeful one, and which I mention ſo particularly here, with a view to recommend it to other tutors) it was not neceſſary for me to write out more than a ſhort, though connected *text*, from which to diſcourſe *extempore*; a method which engages the attention unſpeakably more than formally reading every thing from notes. It was my cuſtom alſo to leave a fair copy of what I wrote in the lecture-room, that the pupils might have recourſe to it, and ſtudy it at their leiſure, ſo as to be

better prepared for examination at the enſuing lecture. What I now publiſh is the *text* above mentioned, with ſome improvements which have ſince occurred to me.

The ſame method I took with reſpect to every other ſubject on which I gave lectures; with this difference, that thoſe on the *Theory of Languages* and *Univerſal Grammar* were *printed* for the uſe of the pupils. This work I have promiſed, in the preface to my *Engliſh Grammar*, to reviſe, and publiſh at my leiſure; and if theſe ſhould have the good fortune to give ſatisfaction, I may, in due time, proceed to publiſh another Courſe of Lectures, viz. on the *Study of Hiſtory* and *General Policy*; which, indeed, I have promiſed to publiſh, in the preface to my *Eſſay on the firſt Principles of Government*. The public may be aſſured, that, as I have not hitherto, I ſhall not, in future, obtrude upon them any work, that ſhall not appear to myſelf, however miſtaken I may be in my judgment, both conſiderably *original* and *uſeful*.

THE

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LECTURE

LECTURE I.

The INTRODUCTION, *and the* DISTRIBUTION *of the Subject.*

THE uſe of ſpeech is common to all mankind. For we find none of the human race but who are capable of expreſſing their ideas, ſentiments, and intentions to others, in a more or leſs adequate manner, by words: and this capacity was neceſſary to that mutual *intercourſe*, and free communication, without which beings of our ſocial nature could not be happy.

It is the province of *art* to improve upon *nature*, by adding to her powers and advantages: and, for the exerciſe of our intellectual and active powers, all the gifts of nature are little more than the bare unwrought materials of thoſe accompliſhments, from which reſult the dignity and refined happineſs of ſocial life.

Thus ORATORY is the natural faculty of ſpeech improved by art; whereby the uſe of it is perfected, facilitated, and extended; and conſequently its *value* and *influence* greatly increaſed. And the excellence of this art is the more generally acknowledged, and its effects the more admired, becauſe, language being common to us all, all men can the more eaſily conceive both

 the

the importance, and the difficulty of the improvements of which it is capable.

Very few perſons ever find themſelves at a loſs to deliver a ſingle ſentence or two at a time; becauſe they are able to ſee at one view the whole of what they intend to ſay. But it is not common to find a perſon able to acquit himſelf with propriety in a ſpeech of conſiderable length, even though he prepare himſelf by digeſting beforehand all that he intends to ſay; becauſe the *order* and *connexion of ſentiment*, and variety of *diction*, neceſſary in a continued ſpeech, are not eaſily carried in memory: and it requires a very extraordinary invention and recollection to ſpeak long, in a proper and graceful manner, quite *extempore*. Nor can a perſon, without the aſſiſtance of art and inſtruction, even *compoſe* a ſet diſcourſe upon any ſubject; becauſe it requires greater exactneſs in the uſe of words, more accuracy of method, and variety of tranſition than perſons uninſtructed and unuſed to *compoſition* can be maſters of. For this reaſon we ſee many perſons who make a good figure in converſation, by no means able to make a ſpeech, or a compoſition of any conſiderable length. It is in this reſpect, where the powers of nature fail us, in expreſſing our ſentiments to advantage, that we have recourſe to the *art of Oratory*.

It may not be amiſs, at the entrance upon theſe Lectures upon Oratory and Criticiſm, to premiſe one caution; which is, that we muſt not expect too much from the *art*; ſince this can do little for us in compariſon of what muſt be the fruit of our own previous application to *ſcience*. The art of oratory can only conſiſt of rules for the proper uſe of thoſe materials which muſt be acquired from various ſtudy and obſervation, of which, therefore,

fore, unleſs a perſon be poſſeſſed, no art of oratory can make him an orator.

In order to ſpeak, or write well upon any ſubject, it is neceſſary that that ſubject be thoroughly underſtood, that every argument which is to be uſed be previouſly collected, and the value of it aſcertained. How abſurd, for inſtance, would it be to imagine that a perſon, who had never ſtudied law, government, and hiſtory, ſhould be enabled, by the art of oratory, to make a political harangue, or write a diſſertation upon the conſtitution of a ſtate? With what ſucceſs would an orator, who had not ſtudied the Law, undertake the defence of a client? or a perſon wholly unacquainted with morals or theology, attempt to ſpeak from the pulpit? Whatever ſubject, therefore, any perſon intends to write or ſpeak upon, he muſt, by applying to the proper ſources, acquire a perfect knowledge of it, before he can expect any aſſiſtance from the art of oratory, as ſuch.

Moreover, let a perſon be ever ſo perfect a maſter of his ſubject, he could not be taught to ſpeak or write about it with propriety and good effect, without being previouſly inſtructed in the principles of GRAMMAR, i. e. without a knowledge of the inflection of words, and of the ſtructure of ſentences, in the language he makes uſe of.

It is neceſſary, likewiſe, as far as *reaſoning* is concerned, that a perſon be, in ſome ſenſe, a *logician* before he be an orator; ſince it is by the rules of LOGIC that we judge of every thing relating to *arguments*, their perſpicuity or confuſion, their fallacy or their force. More eſpecially is it of conſequence to every orator whoſe buſineſs is with *men*, to be well acquainted with *human nature*; that knowing the paſſions, prejudices, intereſts,

and views of thoſe he hath to do with, he may know how to addreſs them accordingly.

But notwithſtanding this be treated of in many books written on the ſubject of oratory, and particularly by Ariſtotle; there is no more reaſon why we ſhould encumber a ſyſtem of oratory with it, than that we croud into it the elements of any other ſcience, or branch of knowledge, that the orator may have occaſion for. Beſides, thoſe plain principles of human actions with which the orator hath to do, are obvious to common reflection, and muſt have occurred to every perſon before he hath lived to the age in which he has any occaſion for the art of oratory. For this part of the furniture of an orator, therefore, let the ſtudent have recourſe to *Ethical treatiſes*, as far as they unfold the principles of human nature; let him ſtudy authentic hiſtories of human characters and conduct; and let him principally attend to the emotions of his own heart. However, that knowledge of human nature, which is neceſſary to underſtand the *rationale* of the ornaments of ſtyle will not be excluded a place in theſe Lectures, but will be explained pretty much at large in the third part of the courſe.

Suppoſing a man, therefore, to be perfectly acquainted with the ſubject on which he propoſes to ſpeak or write, that he is not deficient in the knowledge of grammatical propriety, and that by logic, natural or artificial, he can judge of the force or fallacy of any argument that occurs, or is propoſed to him; it is aſked what aſſiſtance he may expect from the art of oratory, in carrying his deſign into execution in the moſt advantageous manner? In this caſe, all that remains to be done is,

First,

First, to assist him in the habit of *recollection*, or to direct him which way to turn his thoughts, in order to find the arguments and illustrations with which his mind is already furnished; and likewise, when a general topic, or head of discourse, is found, in what manner to confirm or illustrate it, in order to have materials for the bulk or body of the discourse. In this manner oratory may assist the *invention*; but it is not in finding things with which the mind was wholly unacquainted, but in readily recollecting, and judiciously selecting, what is proper for his purpose, out of the materials with which the mind was previously furnished.

Secondly, the art of oratory teaches in what *order* to dispose of those topics. It shews what disposition of the materials of a discourse will give them the greatest force, and contribute the most to produce the effect intended by it.

Thirdly, to contribute still farther to the effect of a discourse, the art of oratory teaches what *style*, or manner of expression, will best become, adorn, and recommend it.

Fourthly, if the discourse is to be pronounced, the art of oratory teaches what tone of voice, or what gestures of the body, will best become, and add grace to the delivery of it.

The four great objects, therefore, that fall within the province of the orator are RECOLLECTION, METHOD, STYLE, and ELOCUTION. Of these I shall treat in the order in which they are here mentioned.

LECTURE

LECTURE II.

Of the Nature and Uſe of TOPICS.

ALL the kinds of compoſition may be reduced to two, viz. NARRATION and ARGUMENTATION. For either we propoſe ſimply to relate *facts*, with a view to communicate information, as in *Hiſtory*, natural or civil, *Travels*, &c. or we lay down ſome *propoſition*, and endeavour to prove or explain it.

With reſpect to *Narration* of any kind, it is ſuperfluous to ſay much about it under the firſt head of *Recollection*, or *Invention*, except ſo far as facts are wanted for the purpoſe of *argumentative diſcourſes*. The chief aſſiſtance that thoſe who compoſe only in the narrative ſtyle can expect from the art of oratory, is in *digeſting* and *adorning* their compoſitions; and theſe articles will be conſidered in the ſecond and third parts of theſe lectures.

The whole buſineſs, therefore, of artificial recollection muſt, in a manner, be confined to the uſe of thoſe who compoſe *argumentative diſcourſes*, whoſe minds are previouſly furniſhed with every argument and obſervation proper to be introduced into them; but who may not be able to find them ſo readily as they could wiſh. To ſuch perſons the following directions and obſervations may not be unuſeful.

RECOL-

RECOLLECTION comprehends whatever is proper to be ſaid upon any ſubject; that is, all the thoughts or ſentiments that make up the body of a diſcourſe. Theſe, which may be called the nerves and ſinews of a compoſition, may all be conſidered as *arguments* in proof of what is advanced. Now every argument that can with propriety be brought as a proof of a propoſition, ſhould bear ſome kind of *relation* to both the terms of it. For, according to logicians, every propoſition aſſerts the agreement or diſagreement of two ideas, or things, which are called the *ſubject* and *predicate*, or *attribute* of the propoſition. If the agreement or diſagreement of theſe do not appear at firſt view, we make uſe of another idea, called a *middle term*, which, being ſeverally applied to them both, will, by informing us of the relation they both bear to it, enable us to judge of the relation they both bear to one another. But unleſs this third idea bear ſome relation to both the others, it will be impoſſible to compare them together by the help of it.

I ſhall illuſtrate theſe obſervations by the example of the following propoſition: *Every good man is a wiſe man.* It may not be apparent, at firſt view, that the *ſubject* and *attribute* of this propoſition do really coincide, as is aſſerted in it. In order to ſhow that, notwithſtanding this, they really do agree, I introduce another idea, viz. *the making uſe of the means of happineſs*; and by conſidering that a good man is one who lives and acts in ſuch a manner as will ſecure his *greateſt happineſs*, which is alſo the object of the trueſt wiſdom; I ſee that the deſcription of a *good man* intirely agrees with that of a *wiſe man*, and that they are *the ſame perſon*, which the propoſition aſſerts. But I could not have made uſe of this *intermediate idea*, in order to ſhew the relation of the terms to one another, unleſs it had borne ſome re-

lation to them both, and had thereby been capable of being compared with them.

In this caſe, the relation that *means of happineſs* bears to *goodneſs* is that of *effect*; goodneſs being the ſource of thoſe actions which tend to produce true happineſs; as the relation that the idea of the means of happineſs bears to *wiſdom* is that of *means*, or *inſtrument*, which wiſdom employs to effect her purpoſe. And it is not improbable but that if a perſon had conſidered the natural *effects* of virtue and goodneſs, and what cauſe of actions a wiſe man would be led to adopt, he would have hit upon this idea, which furniſhes ſo clear an argument in proof of the propoſition in queſtion. Or again, the ſame idea might have occurred to a perſon who had carefully conſidered the *definitions* of the terms of his propoſitions; ſince he would have found that property of goodneſs connected with thoſe ideas which form the characteriſtic of wiſdom. So that either the relation of *cauſe and effect*, that of *means and end*, or the *definition of terms* might have led the mind of the compoſer to the idea he wanted. Theſe are called COMMON PLACES, TOPICS, or GENERAL HEADS, under which arguments of all kinds may be claſſed, and an attention to them may ſuggeſt the arguments that fall under them.

It belongs to the art of oratory to point out theſe topics, common places, or general heads to which all arguments may be reduced; that, whenever we undertake to prove any thing, by running over the titles of them in our minds, our thoughts may be directed to what ſuits our purpoſe. To make the uſe of theſe topics ſtill more intelligible and eaſy, I ſhall illuſtrate each of them by an example or two.

All

All propoſitions, or things to be proved, metaphyſically conſidered, may be reduced to the ſame form; as being a declaration of the coincidence of the ſubject and attribute of them. Thus if I ſay, that *man is mortal*, I mean that my idea of *man* coincides with my idea of a *mortal being*, or a being *ſubject to death*; or if I ſay, *Alexander conquered Darius*, I mean that my idea of Alexander, and of the perſon who conquered Darius, are the ſame. We ſhall, however, find it moſt convenient, in the buſineſs of popular oratory, to quit this general idea, and conſider all propoſitions, or ſubjects of diſcourſe, as ſubdivided into two kinds, viz. *univerſal*, and *particular* propoſitions.

Univerſal propoſitions are thoſe which have no relation to particular perſons, times, or places, but are at all times, in all places, and with regard to all perſons, true or falſe; as theſe, *man is mortal*; *virtue makes the happineſs of man*; *the three angles of every right-lined triangle are equal to two rectangles.* This head includes all *metaphyſical* and *mathematical* ſubjects.

Particular propoſitions are thoſe which have relation to, and are limited by, particular perſons, times, or places; as *Alexander conquered Darius*; *France is larger than England*; *Carthage was founded before Rome*, &c. This head comprehends all hiſtorical debates, geographical, and chronological knowledge, conſultations about the intereſt of particular ſtates at particular times, judicial inquiries into the actions of particular perſons, and all perſonal panegyric, or invective.

I divide all ſubjects of diſcourſe into theſe two kinds, becauſe the topics of argument ſuited to each are very conſiderably diſtinct; though things which relate to particular perſons, times, or places, may often, with propriety, be introduced into a diſcourſe upon a propoſition that is univerſally true, or univerſally falſe,

without reſpect to any particular perſon, time, or place; and, ſince every thing that is *particular* is comprehended in that which is *univerſal*, arguments relating to particular perſons, places, and times, may be fetched from thoſe topics, which are peculiarly adapted to univerſal propoſitions.

Convenient topics for univerſal propoſitions are the following: *Definition*, *Adjuncts*, *Antecedents*, *Conſequents*, *Means*, *Analogy*, *Contrariety*, *Example* and *Authority*.

Before I explain theſe topics, I would obſerve, that it is not very material, with reſpect to the real uſe of them, whether the diſtribution be metaphyſically exact; particularly, whether ſome of them, ſtrictly ſpeaking, be not ſuperfluous, as being compriſed under others; as, for example, whether it might not have been ſufficient to have compriſed *example* under the head of *conſequents*. It is ſufficient if, by attending to them, the mind be led to proper arguments. The table may be too ſcanty, but can hardly be too full. Notwithſtanding this, a great deal of the redundancy of other tables is retrenched in this.

LECTURE

LECTURE III.

Of UNIVERSAL TOPICS.

I. *Of* DEFINITION.

DEFINITION ſuggeſts arguments in all caſes in which a controverſy reſts upon aſcertaining the preciſe *meaning of words*. Thus in order to prove a perſon, whoſe actions are well known, to be guilty of any particular crime; as *ſacrilege*, *burglary*, &c. we merely define what thoſe particular crimes are. If the definition be allowed, the proof is complete; as it ſhews that the action in queſtion and the crime are the ſame.

In a great number of metaphyſical, moral, and religious controverſies, the diſputants appeal to the definition of *terms*; and could theſe be agreed upon, the controverſies would be at an end. The unhappineſs is, that, in things of an abſtruſe nature, few perſons affix preciſely the ſame ideas to the ſame terms: from whence it often happens that they fancy they differ, when, in reality, they are agreed, and all the diſpute is, at the bottom, about *words*, and not *things*.

The greateſt attention is neceſſary to be paid to this topic by thoſe who write treatiſes upon any intire art or ſcience; as *Grammar*, *Logic*, *Oratory*, &c. ſince definition comprehends the

diſtribution of things into their parts, which muſt be diſcuſſed in their order. Thus a perſon who writes a grammar muſt conſider that grammar conſiſts of *Orthography*, *Etymology*, *Syntax*, and *Proſody*; and diſcuſs what relates to each of them in their order.

II. *Of* ADJUNCTS, *or the* properties *of either of the terms of a propoſition.*

Divines and moraliſts argue from this topic when, demonſtrating that *man ought to obey* GOD, they urge that man is an *intelligent*, *dependent*, and *obliged* creature; that GOD is his *maker*, *governor*, and *judge*; and that his *laws are reaſonable*, founded on wiſdom and goodneſs: becauſe each of theſe adjuncts, or properties of the terms of the propoſition, ſuggeſts an argument for the truth of it.

Moraliſts likewiſe argue from this ſame topic, that *the rich ought to relieve the poor*; becauſe they are both *fellow-creatures*, liable to a reverſe of fortune, and that the one hath to ſpare what the other is in want of.

In a very ſtrict ſenſe, every argument might be referred to the topic of *Adjuncts*; becauſe every argument we can uſe muſt be ſuggeſted by ſome property, or adjunct, of one or other of the terms of the propoſition. But the examples above given ſhow that the term need not be taken in ſo ſtrict a ſenſe, and that an attention to this topic in a looſer ſenſe, may afford a diſtinct and uſeful head of arguments; eſpecially to divines and moraliſts.

III. *Of*

III. *Of* ANTECEDENTS.

It is of ſervice ſometimes to look back into what, in the order of nature, preceded either the ſubject or attribute of the propoſition we are demonſtrating.

Thus divines prove that *Chriſtianity is probable*, becauſe the circumſtances of mankind previous to the publication of it, were ſuch as made a revelation highly expedient and deſirable.

Upon this principle Hiſtorians argue that the hiſtory of Greece, prior to the times of Cyrus the Great, is not much to be depended upon, becauſe writing and records of any kind were not common in Greece before that time.

In political and civil affairs, a people are more eaſily perſuaded to commit an important truſt to a perſon, when his advocate can ſhow that, in former ſituations, he behaved with ability and integrity. And political writers argue againſt any ſcheme by ſhowing that it was engaged in from bad principles, that the advocates for it had been bribed, and that their particular previous connexions and ſituations obliged them to enter into it: as it is a great argument in favour of any ſcheme, that the views with which it was undertaken were upright and honourable.

To this topic is alſo to be referred whatever is ſaid in praiſe of a perſon, on the ſubject of his birth, family, &c.

This topic alſo includes all corollaries or inferences from truths before demonſtrated: for a propoſition muſt be admitted as true, if it can be ſhown to be a neceſſary conſequence of another acknowledged truth.

IV. *Of*

IV. *Of* CONSEQUENTS.

Moraliſts argue from this topic when, demonſtrating the *excellence of virtue*, they diſplay the many happy conſequences of it on a man's *frame*, *connections* and *expectations*; or when, aſſerting the evil of vice and wickedneſs, they paint the frightful conſequences of it, both in this, and a future world.

Divines make uſe of this topic when they prove the *being and perfections of God from the frame of nature*, and the admirable proportion and uſes of its ſeveral parts; when they prove that *chriſtianity is true*, from the *miracles* that were wrought to prove it, and from the numbers that were actually thereby converted to the faith of Chriſt; and who adhered to it under very conſiderable temporal diſadvantages.

In like manner, mathematicians refute a propoſition, by ſhowing that the conſequences of it are abſurd.

On this topic, likewiſe, we declaim againſt a *law*, or ſcheme of policy, by ſhowing the conſequences of it to be prejudicial to the ſtate; or plead for it, if the conſequences of it be beneficial.

V. *Of* MEANS.

As arguments may be ſuggeſted by conſidering what is *antecedent* or *conſequent* to things, or the *cauſes* and *effects* of them, ſo it is poſſible that the topic of the *means* whereby cauſes produce their effects, may be of ſome uſe to the ſame purpoſe.

Thus a divine, demonſtrating the regard that the Supreme Being hath for virtue, might expatiate upon the means he hath

uſed

uſed to bring men back to the practice of it after they had apoſtatiſed from it, in his various interpoſitions in the ſtate of the world in favour of virtue and religion, in his commiſſion to the prophets to be preachers of righteouſneſs, and in ſending Chriſt to redeem mankind by his precepts, example, and obedience unto death.

In conſidering the nature and uſefulneſs of any ſcheme of policy, it is of uſe to examine the means that muſt be uſed to bring it about; and from the nature of the means, arguments may be fetched for or againſt the ſcheme propoſed.

It is an argument againſt *popery*, that it is obliged to have recourſe to *perſecution*, and the horrid inquiſition, as the means of bringing men back to the profeſſion of that faith, and of keeping them in it.

VI. *Of* ANALOGY.

This head compriſes every thing that is *ſimilar* to what is advanced in a propoſition.

Writers in defence of chriſtianity make excellent uſe of this topic when, anſwering objections againſt any thing that appears difficult or myſterious in revealed religion, they ſhow that the ſame difficulty occurs on the ſubject of natural religion. For example, when it is objected that, in the ſcriptures, we meet with frequent inſtances of innocent perſons ſuffering with the guilty, and ſometimes on the account of the guilty, they reply, that the like frequently happens in the courſe of *common providence*; as when children ſuffer through the extravagance of their parents, who, by more œconomy, might have made a better proviſion for them; and when tempeſts and earthquakes overwhelm, in undiſtinguiſhed

diſtinguiſhed deſtruction, perſons of all conditions and characters, &c.

In all branches of ſcience it is of the greateſt importance to ſhow the *analogy*, or mutual correſpondence, of the ſeveral propoſitions; and it is always deemed an argument in favour of a new diſcovery, if it be analogous to others already made, and if that analogy be wanting, we require much ſtronger evidence of other kinds.

Lawyers argue from this topic when they urge, in favour of their client, *precedents* of the determination of other cauſes. Since the uniformity of the proceedings in law, and the *ſameneſs of right* in the ſame circumſtances, require that every perſon be intitled to the ſame juſtice that another had done him, in a caſe nearly like, or analogous to his own. *Compariſons* alſo belong to this head.

VII. *Of* CONTRARIES.

It is, upon many ſubjects, no leſs uſeful to conſider what things are *contrary*, or *oppoſite* to the terms of the propoſition, than what are connected with them. As when moraliſts, in order to demonſtrate the *advantages of a virtuous life*, deſcribe the fatal effects of vicious courſes upon the minds, the bodies, the reputation and fortunes of men; or, on the contrary, in order to ſet the hatefulneſs of vice in a ſtronger light, they contraſt it with a view of the amiableneſs of virtue. In all ſuch caſes as theſe this argument concludes in a very ſtrong manner: for virtue and vice, being directly oppoſite to one another, it is very obvious to reflect, that all their effects and influences muſt be the very reverſe of one another.

VIII. *Of*

VIII. *Of* EXAMPLE.

It greatly illuſtrates and confirms even moral maxims to ſhow them exemplified in real hiſtory, in the characters and lives of men. Thus the fatal effects of *ambition* will be made much more ſenſible, if, after examining the nature and tendency of that paſſion in general, the writer ſubjoin the example of *Alexander*, *Julius Cæſar*, *Charles of Sweden*, &c.; and the value of *wiſe and good princes* will be greatly enhanced by a view of the amiable characters, and uſeful lives of *Titus*, *Trajan*, *Antoninus*, &c.; and it is of particular uſe to divines, to ſupport all their maxims by examples from the ſcriptures.

It is likewiſe a happy confirmation of a principle in mechanics, mathematics, and philoſophy, if it can be brought to an *experiment*, be ſubjected to the *ſenſes*, and *reduced to practice*.

IX. *Of* AUTHORITY.

It is a great confirmation of our belief of even univerſal propoſitions, which have no connexion with particular perſons, places, or times, to have a *teſtimony* in favour of them from perſons whoſe opinions are generally allowed to be juſt.

A conſiderable part of that ſtrong aſſent which we give to truths of an abſtract nature, as to mathematical theorems, and philoſophical diſcoveries, which may be even our own inveſtigating, and much more if they be not, is derived from the authority of others, who concur with us in profeſſing an aſſent to them; which may help us to account for a ſeeming pa-

radox, viz. why the diſciples of ſome Greek maſters of philoſophy uſually, in a courſe of time, grew more zealouſly attached to the tenets of their reſpective ſchools, than the founders themſelves originally were.

Cicero argues from this topic, when, in proof of a future ſtate, he alledges, not only the natural arguments for it; but, what he ſeems to lay the chief ſtreſs upon, the concurrent teſtimony of all the wiſe ancients.

Lawyers argue from this, when, in favour of a determination, not fixed by cuſtom and precedent, they alledge the opinions of perſons learned in the law, given without any view to the caſe in hand.

Argumenta ad hominem, or thoſe in which we appeal to a man's known principles and profeſſion, belong to this head. If the authority of others have any weight with a man, much more may it be preſumed that his own opinion, that is, his own authority, will weigh with him.

LECTURE

LECTURE IV.

Of Particular TOPICS; *and Objections to the Uſe of* TOPICS *anſwered.*

PARTICULAR topics are thoſe which furniſh arguments for *particular propoſitions*; or thoſe which relate to particular *perſons*, *times*, and *places*. Of theſe I ſhall do little more than give diſtinct tables. The tables will, likewiſe, be very *general*; ſo that each article may be ſubdivided again and again, without end. But what is here done is abundantly ſufficient for a treatiſe on the art in general, and it will be very eaſy for any perſon to carry the diviſion as far as he pleaſes for his own uſe.

Topics of arguments for limited propoſitions, viz. ſuch as relate to particular FACTS. With reſpect to theſe we may conſider

The Perſon,
The Time,
The Place,
The Motive,
The Manner,
The Inſtrument,
The Evidence,
The Law concerning it,
&c. &c. &c.

I ſhall

I ſhall give an example of the ſubdiviſion of one or two of theſe heads. With reſpect to *perſon* we may conſider

The Sex,
The Age,
The perſonal Qualifications,
The Fortune, as rich or poor,
The Education,
The Capacity or Ability; as Senſe, Learning, &c.
The Profeſſion, or Employment in Life,
The Nation, Tribe, Family, &c.
The Offices of public Life,
The Relations of private Life,
The Connexion, Company, Party, &c.
The general Character, &c.

Laws may be conſidered as to

Their Preciſion or Ambiguity,
Their Intention,
Their cuſtomary Forms, &c. &c.

It is obvious that it may be convenient to have recourſe to theſe topics in any kind of diſcourſe or compoſition in which any particular fact or perſon is introduced; as, whether a fact be *proved*, or *diſproved*; whether a perſon be *accuſed*, or *defended*; whether a writer make a *panegyric*, or an *invective*; or ſimply compoſe a *hiſtory*.

To give an idea of the uſe of a few of theſe topics, it may be obſerved, with regard to *ſex*, that a *woman* is not ſo likely to be guilty

guilty of *robbery* as a *man*; but perhaps more likely to be concerned in *poiſon*. With reſpect to *age*, that an *old man* would moſt naturally have recourſe to *fraud*, a *young man* to *violence*: with reſpect to *nation*, that *drunkenneſs* would not ſo eaſily be believed of a *Spaniard*, as of a *German*; and that an *Italian* would more eaſily be actuated by outrageous *jealouſy* than a *Frenchman*. With reſpect to *fortune or condition* in life, that it is natural to believe that a *rich man* is the moſt likely to be the aggreſſor in a quarrel with a *poor man*; and laſtly, with reſpect to *education*, that a perſon educated at *St. Omer's* would be much more juſtly ſuſpected of being diſaffected to the Engliſh government, than a perſon educated at *Oxford* or *Cambridge*.

But I would refer the perſon who is deſirous of ſeeing a ſpecimen of the moſt excellent declamation upon a great variety of theſe topics, to *Cicero's accuſation of Varres*, and *defence of Milo*; alſo to his invectives againſt Cataline and Antony, and to *Pliny's panegyric upon the emperor Trajan*.

As materials for diſcourſe may occur to us from conſidering the general heads to which they may be referred, ſo it is poſſible, likewiſe, that we may take hints of arguments from the *manner* in which they are generally introduced, or the *form* into which they are thrown. One form of argument, for inſtance, is from *greater to leſs*, or from *leſs to greater*. Thus a perſon will be more eaſily believed to have committed a *leſs* infamous action, who is known to have committed a *more* infamous one; as, on the other hand, if a perſon have never been known to be guilty of a ſmall tranſgreſſion, it will not eaſily be believed that he hath, all at once, been guilty of a great and flagrant one.

Matter

Matter for diſcourſe may alſo occur to a perſon who conſiders what may be ſaid by way of *objection* to what he hath advanced, and what *conceſſions* he may make to his opponent. His invention may alſo be aſſiſted by conſidering whether he can, with propriety, introduce any thing in the form of *irony*, of a *queſtion*, of an *exclamation*, and of every other poſſible form of addreſs. Moreover, what will be advanced in theſe lectures upon the ſubject of *method*, will tend greatly to help the invention.

I am aware that this whole buſineſs of topics is objected to by ſome as altogether uſeleſs, and what no perſons, who are capable of compoſing at all, ever ſtand in need of, or have recourſe to. To this I reply, that, in fact, no perſon ever did, or ever can compoſe at all without having recourſe to ſomething of a ſimilar nature. What is *recollection* but the introduction of one idea into the mind by means of another with which it was previouſly aſſociated? Are not ideas aſſociated by means of their connection with, and relation to one another? And is it not very poſſible that *particular ideas* may be recollected by means of *general ideas*, which include them?

It is impoſſible to endeavour to *recollect* (or, as we generally ſay, *invent*) materials for a diſcourſe, without running over in our minds ſuch general heads of diſcourſe as we have found by experience to aſſiſt us in that operation. It is even impoſſible to conceive in what other manner a *voluntary effort* to invent, or recollect, can be directed. A perſon may not have recourſe to any particular liſt, or enumeration, of topics; or he may never have heard of the artificial diſtribution of them by rhetoricians; but if he compoſe at all, though he may be ignorant of the *name*, he muſt be poſſeſſed of the *thing*. And if a perſon have any *regular method* in his compoſitions, he muſt, moreover, have ar-

ranged thoſe topics in his mind in ſome kind of order; the ſeveral particulars of which, being attended to ſucceſſively, furniſhes him with *a plan for compoſition*. Now is it not better to ſit down to compoſition provided with a tolerably complete liſt of thoſe topics, digeſted with care and preciſion, than make uſe of ſuch an one as we caſually and without any deſign form to ourſelves from general reading only, or a little practice in compoſition, which cannot but be very imperfect, and inadequate to the purpoſe to which it is applied?

After previouſly running over ſuch a table, a perſon would be much better able to form an idea of the *extent* of his ſubject, and might conduct his compoſition accordingly; or peruſing it after reading the compoſition of another, he might with much greater certainty know whether any thing of importance had been left unſaid upon the ſubject; or whether, if the diſcourſe were neceſſarily limited to a few arguments, the writer had ſelected the beſt.

I cannot help being of opinion that thoſe perſons, in particular, whoſe profeſſion obliges them frequently to compoſe *moral eſſays* and *ſermons*, in which the thoughts are not expected to be *original* (in which, therefore, their chief buſineſs is merely to *recollect*, and *digeſt* the moſt valuable materials upon each ſubject) would ſpend a few minutes to good purpoſe in purſuing a well-digeſted table of topics, before they ſat down to write. By this means they could ſeldom be at a loſs for matter; they would more eaſily ſelect what was moſt important; and with leſs trouble arrange it in the moſt advantageous manner. For want, or through neglect of this, as well as for other reaſons, we often hear noble and copious ſubjects treated in a jejune and trifling manner, ſome parts exceſſively overdone, others of equal importance

portance wholly omitted, and the whole put together in a moſt perplexed order; which exhibits the appearance rather of random indigeſted thoughts, than of a compoſition which was the reſult of a previous ſtudy of the ſubject, and an acquaintance with the whole extent of it. And this previous acquaintance with the whole extent of a ſubject can be acquired no other way ſo eaſily as by the peruſal of a judicious ſet of rhetorical topics.

If we pay any regard to the practice of the famous orators of antiquity, we cannot but be diſpoſed to think favourably of topics; for it is certain that they made great uſe of topics, as appears in the writings of Cicero and Quintilian. Too much may be expected from any thing, and an improper uſe may be made of any thing; but this is no argument againſt the judicious and proper uſe of it.

It were abſurd for any perſon ſlaviſhly to oblige himſelf to borrow ſomething from every topic of diſcourſe; much more to ſet it down in the order in which they may happen to be enumerated; but, having glanced the whole, let him take what is moſt to his purpoſe, and omit every thing that would appear far-fetched, or to be introduced for the ſake of ſwelling the bulk of a diſcourſe.

I am very ready, however, to acknowledge, that rhetorical topics are more uſeful in the compoſition of *ſet declamations on trite ſubjects*, and to *young perſons*, than in the communication of original matter, and to perſons much uſed to compoſition. Original thoughts cannot but ſuggeſt themſelves, ſo that all the aſſiſtance any perſon can want in this caſe, is a proper manner of *arranging* them. And a perſon much uſed to compoſition will have acquired a habit of recollection, without any expreſs attention to topics; juſt as a perſon uſed to the harpſichord, or

any other inſtrument of muſic, will be able to perform without an *expreſs attention* to rules, or even to the manner of placing his fingers. His idea of the tune in general, is ſo cloſely aſſociated with all the motions of his fingers neceſſary to the playing of it, and theſe motions are alſo ſo cloſely aſſociated together, that they follow one another mechanically, in what Dr. Hartley calls a *ſecondarily automatic manner*, which is almoſt as certain as a motion *originally* and *properly automatic*.

LECTURE V.

Of AMPLIFICATION.

HAVING conſidered the proper *topics of argument* for the proof of any propoſition, it remains that I conſider what makes the bulk of a diſcourſe, under the head of *Amplification.*

In general, whatever may with propriety be ſaid upon any topic, ſhould tend to *confirm*, or *illuſtrate* that topic; and be longer or ſhorter as the caſe requires: and, ſince any particular argument may require *proof* or *confirmation*, it muſt be conſidered in every reſpect as the original propoſition itſelf, and be ſupported by arguments fetched from the topics which are proper to it. In a regular diſcourſe, the amplification, or enlargement, is nothing more than a collection of ſuch arguments and obſervations as tend to confirm or illuſtrate the ſubject of it; and therefore not a ſentence, or a word, ſhould be inſerted that doth not improve the ſenſe, and tend to make the apprehenſion of the reader, or hearer, either more *juſt*, or more *ſtrong* and lively.

More particularly, the preciſe nature of amplification, with reſpect to argumentative diſcourſes, conſiſts either in ſupplying ſuch *intermediate arguments* as might have been ſuppreſſed, or in a more copious *induction of particulars.*

A demon-

A demonſtration may be given in ſuch a manner as may be ſufficiently full and concluſive to a perſon who is pretty well verſed in the ſcience to which it belongs, or ſuch as are ſimilar to it, and yet may want a great many intermediate ſteps, and mediums of proof, neceſſary to make it intelligible to a perſon who is not ſo well prepared. When a perſon writes for the *learned*, it is ſuperfluous to uſe more words than will enable them to ſee the force of what he advances, and it is impertinent to mention thoſe intermediate ideas which he knows are quite familiar to their minds. But if this diſcourſe be made intelligible to the *bulk of mankind*, and eſpecially if it muſt be adapted to the capacities of *children* and *young perſons*, it muſt be *amplified*, by inſerting in it thoſe intermediate ſteps, and mediums of proof, which before were omitted as unneceſſary. Becauſe it would be abſurd in any writer, and would defeat the purpoſe of his diſcourſe, to take any thing for granted that his reader was not acquainted with, or to omit any thing that he was not able to ſupply.

Newton's Principia is a remarkable inſtance to the preſent purpoſe. The demonſtrations in that treatiſe are extremely conciſe, a great number of intermediate ſteps being omitted; and therefore but few, even of mathematicians, are capable of underſtanding it without a comment. The commentary *amplifies*, by ſupplying the ſteps that were ſuppreſſed by the author; and thus the book may be fitted for more general uſe.

When the proof of a general propoſition conſiſts of the *induction of particulars*, it may be ſufficient in ſome caſes, to mention only a few of the particulars. In other caſes, it may be convenient to amplify, or ſwell the demonſtration by a more copious enumeration.

A *narration* or *deſcription* is conciſe, when only a few of the moſt important particulars are mentioned, and amplified and enlarged by a more minute detail. The former is ſufficient, where it anſwers a writer's purpoſe barely to inform his reader of the *reality* of an event; the latter is neceſſary, if he be deſirous that the reader be *intereſted* in it, and *affected* with it.

Addiſon (Spectator, No. 519.) obſerving how full of life are thoſe parts of nature which are ſubject to our obſervation, amplifies it in the following beautiful manner: "Every part of "matter is peopled, every green leaf ſwarms with inhabitants. "There is ſcarce a ſingle humour in the body of a man, or of "any other animal, in which our glaſſes do not diſcover myriads "of living creatures. The ſurface of animals is alſo covered "with other animals, which are, in the ſame manner, the baſis "of other animals, that live upon it. Nay, we find in the moſt "ſolid bodies, as in marble itſelf, innumerable cells and cavities, "that are crouded with ſuch imperceptible inhabitants, as are "too little for the naked eye to diſcover. On the other hand, "if we look into the more bulky parts of nature, we ſee the "ſeas, lakes, and rivers, teeming with numberleſs kinds of liv-"ing creatures. We find every mountain and marſh, wilderneſs "and wood, plentifully ſtocked with birds and beaſts; and every "part of matter affording proper neceſſaries and conveniencies "for the livelihood of multitudes which inhabit it."

It is likewiſe uſual to amplify narration and deſcription by *obſervations* or *reflections* intermixed. By this means Polybius greatly ſwelled the bulk of his hiſtory, and for want of this kind of amplification, hiſtorical abſtracts are generally very dull and inſipid. All books of *meditation*, as Mr. Hervey's, contain a mixture of narration and reflection; and the pleaſure with

which ſuch books are univerſally read, demonſtrates the propriety and happineſs of ſuch a mixture.

Theſe two kinds of amplification are uſed in the *body of a diſcourſe*; but it is often requiſite that, previous to the confirmation of a topic by arguments, it ſhould be explained very minutely, and the parts of which it conſiſts be expreſſed in more, or plainer terms, and miſtakes concerning it be pointed out, and guarded againſt, to prevent miſconſtruction. This very uſefully enlarges a diſcourſe.

It may happen that the nature and concluſiveneſs of an argument may not be evident at the firſt view. In this caſe, it may anſwer a very good purpoſe to amplify, by ſhewing, either before or after the proof of the propoſition, the nature and ſtrength of the arguments brought in ſupport of it, and by ſtating with ſome exactneſs the degree of influence they are intitled to.

Laſtly, it contributes to ſwell a diſcourſe, to point out the *connexion of the ſentences* that compoſe it more particularly than by ſingle conjunctives, in the manner explained in the *Lectures upon Grammar* *.

Theſe are the principal ſources from whence materials for amplification are drawn. It will be to the advantage of a compoſition that they do not ſucceed one another in the ſame order, but that they be introduced with great variety. This will give the diſcourſe the greater appearance of *eaſe*. It will be more pleaſing, and in every reſpect better adapted to anſwer the end propoſed by it.

All the *faults* which properly belong to amplification, are the following. It is abſurd to introduce any thing under any topic

* This is a work which has been printed for private uſe, and will in due time be laid before the public.

which

which has no relation to it, not tending either to confirm or illuſtrate it. It is, likewiſe, a fault to attempt to illuſtrate what is too plain to need any illuſtration. In this, regard muſt be had to the hearers or readers: for, to a mixed multitude, or to a ſet of pupils, a *copious illuſtration*, a *diverſified expreſſion*, or a mere *repetition*, may be proper, which would be abſurd before a learned aſſembly. But it is a greater fault not to advance what is ſufficient to confirm or illuſtrate any argument; ſince without that, the end of the diſcourſe, which was conviction or perſuaſion, cannot be attained.

Other faults in the body of a diſcourſe belong to other heads than that of amplification.

It is of ſome importance to obſerve, on the ſubject of amplification, that perſons of a very exact judgment are generally the leaſt copious in compoſition, and notwithſtanding they have the greateſt knowledge, compoſe with peculiar difficulty; their nicer diſcernment, which makes them attend to all the relations and connexions of things, rejecting every thing that doth not in every reſpect ſuit their purpoſe. Whereas thoſe perſons who are unattentive to the minuter properties of things, find no difficulty in admitting a great variety of thoughts that offer themſelves in compoſition; a ſlight aſſociation of any ideas with the ſubject in hand being ſufficient to introduce them. In general, the latter are more proper for public ſpeakers, and the former for writers. The want of cloſe connexion, ſmall improprieties, or even inconſiſtencies, paſs unnoticed with moſt perſons when they hear a diſcourſe. Beſides, no perſon can ſo well depend upon his memory in comparing one part of a diſcourſe that he has only *heard*, with another. But all theſe little inaccuracies are expoſed to obſervation,

tion, when a good judge of compoſition hath the whole diſcourſe before him in *writing*.

It may, likewiſe, be of ſervice to add, that it is very poſſible a writer may cramp his faculties, and injure his productions, by too great a *ſcrupuloſity* in the firſt compoſition. That cloſe attention to a ſubject which compoſition requires, unavoidably warms the imagination: then ideas crowd upon us, the mind haſtens, as it were, into the midſt of things, and is impatient till thoſe ſtrong conceptions be expreſſed. In ſuch a ſituation, to reject the firſt, perhaps looſe and incorrect thoughts, is to reject a train of juſt and valuable thoughts, that would follow by their connexion with them, and to embarraſs and impoveriſh the whole work. Whenever, therefore, we begin to feel the ardour of compoſition, it is moſt adviſeable to indulge it freely, and leave little proprieties to be adjuſted at our leiſure.

Beſides, if we would wiſh to communicate to our readers thoſe ſtrong ſenſations that we feel in the ardour of compoſition, we muſt endeavour to expreſs the whole of our ſentiments and ſenſations, in the very *order* and *connexion* in which they actually preſented themſelves to us at that time. For, ſuch is the ſimilarity of all human minds, that when the ſame appearances are preſented to another perſon, his mind will, in general, be equally ſtruck and affected with them, and the compoſition will appear to him to be natural and animated. Whereas, if, in conſequence of an ill-judged ſcrupuloſity and delay, we once loſe ſight of any part of that train of ideas with which our own minds were ſo warmed and intereſted, it may be impoſſible to recover it: and perhaps no other train of ideas, though, ſeparately taken, they may appear to be better adapted to the ſubject, may have the ſame power to excite thoſe ſenſations with which we would wiſh

the compoſition might be read. Whatever theſe ſenſations be, they will be the ſame with thoſe with which the compoſition was written; it being almoſt impoſſible to *counterfeit* ſucceſsfully in ſuch a caſe as this. As, therefore, we wiſh to affect and intereſt the minds of our readers, we ſhould endeavour, without loſing time in examining every thing with a minute exactneſs, to expreſs the *whole ſtate of our own minds* while they are thus affected and intereſted. Correction will be employed with more advantage afterwards.

PART

PART II.

OF

METHOD.

LECTURE VI.

Of METHOD *in* Narrative Diſcourſes.

THE orator being furniſhed with proper materials for his diſcourſe, from the topics of argumentation and amplification, explained under the laſt general head of *recollection*, his next care is to diſpoſe of them to the beſt advantage, in the moſt regular and convenient METHOD; the rules of which I now proceed to lay down. This I ſhall do with reſpect to both the kinds to which every compoſition may be reduced, viz. the *Narrative* and *Argumentative*.

If the view of the hiſtorian be ſimply to communicate *information*, and he be deſirous to do it in ſuch a manner as to give it the

eaſieſt admiſſion into the mind, and leave the moſt laſting impreſſion upon the memory, his general endeavour muſt be to give as clear and juſt an idea as poſſible of the moſt ſtriking relations that the ideas he exhibits bear to one another; ſince it is by means of their *mutual relations* that ideas introduce one another, and *cohere*, as it were, in the mind.

In general, the *order of nature*, or of their *real exiſtence*, will be found to be, at the ſame time, both the eaſieſt, and, in every reſpect, the beſt manner of reciting them, viz. the order of *time* for *events*, and that of *place*, for the ſubjects of what is called *natural hiſtory*.

Thus the chronological ſucceſſion of events hath generally ſupplied the writers of civil hiſtory, biography, and travels, with the moſt natural and uſeful method of communicating information. The *geographer*, having finiſhed one country, naturally thinks of paſſing into a neighbouring one; and, in natural hiſtory, we always expect an intire and unbroken account of ſome one of the animal, vegetable, or mineral kingdoms, before we be led to another.

This is making thoſe tranſitions which our minds are moſt accuſtomed to, and therefore make with the moſt eaſe. It is taking advantage of the ſtrongeſt aſſociations by which the ideas of things cohere in our minds; on account of which every particular of the narration both gains the eaſieſt admiſſion into our minds, and is beſt retained when admitted: whereas the mind is greatly diſguſted with unuſual, and conſequently unexpected, and, to us, unnatural connexions of things. Such connexions not being analogous to any other pre-exiſting and eſtabliſhed in the mind, the things ſo connected will not coaleſce, and recal one another, ſo as to be remembered in their order.

How-

However, these very same reasons, drawn from the nature of things, and the state of the human mind, to which these relations are addressed, will often dictate particular deviations from the general order of narration; will admonish the historian to quit the order of time for a while, and the geographer that of proximity of situation. The relations of events to one another, by way of *cause and effect*, will sometimes unavoidably, and very justifiably, oblige an historian to trace an important event back to the *causes* that gave birth to it; and again to pursue it through its distant *consequences*, far beyond the æra in which it commenced. In *biography*, the consideration of the effects of education, the influence of a ruling passion, the consequences of an extraordinary and critical incident, and the like, may render an occasional transition from a man's birth to his death, or from his death to his birth, to be by no means a disagreeable or unprofitable digression. And if the relation of similarity, or even of contrariety, in natural productions, customs, climates, &c. give occasion to it, we willingly follow the geographer and natural historian in their most sudden and rapid excursions, to parts of the world the most distant from those they are professedly describing.

In all these and the like cases, a writer can never be blamed if he dispose the materials of his composition by an attention to the strongest and most usual *associations of ideas* in the human mind. We are not fond of pursuing any uniform track long without interruption: so that the natural connexions of ideas not quite foreign to the subject, with others which occur in the course of a narration, may, in the hands of a judicious historian, give occasion to *digressions* from his principal subject, which shall greatly relieve the attention, please the imagination, refresh and assist the memory.

The danger is, leſt theſe excurſions from the principal ſubject, which are ſo inviting to a writer, and often agreeable to the reader, ſhould lead them too far: ſince it is very poſſible to purſue a natural and proper digreſſion, till we find ourſelves at a loſs for tranſitions equally eaſy and natural, by which to return to the principal ſubject: and no digreſſion can be ſaid to be unexceptionable, that doth not connect equally well at both ends with the piece in which it is introduced.

If a digreſſion be continued till we quite loſe ſight of the principal ſubject, the uniformity of the whole piece is broken, and at the end of ſuch digreſſion the reader hath, as it were, to begin again; and he may be under a neceſſity of looking a conſiderable way back, before he can recover the train of ideas he had loſt, and without which he cannot proceed with the work. For no chain of events can be underſtood, unleſs they be ſeen in their connexion with others on which they depend. Every writer, therefore, ſhould, by all means, take care, if poſſible, ſo to diſpoſe of his materials, as that nothing interrupt or keep out of ſight, any train of ideas, till the perception of them be of little or no conſequence to any thing that is to follow. If ſuch digreſſions, however, be unavoidable, it is abſolutely neceſſary that, after ſuch digreſſion, the writer *repeat*, or recapitulate, which is by no means graceful.

I ſhall exemplify theſe obſervations on the excellencies and faults of methodical narration, by an account of the manner of ſome of the moſt conſiderable writers in that way, ancient and modern.

The generality of hiſtorians, with *Xenophon*, *Livy*, *Salluſt*, *Tacitus*, and ſome others, aim at the moſt agreeable method of writing hiſtory, viz. by obſerving the order of *time* in general; but

but by no means ſuffering a regard to it to interrupt the account of any *intire tranſaction*, or prevent their looking either backward or forward for an incident that would throw light upon any character or event.

This method all writers of *fiction* and *romance*, without exception, aim at, as the moſt agreeable and perfect: and ſuch writers are the more at liberty to follow it, as they are under no conſtraint from ſuch a variety of conſiderations as the writers of true hiſtory muſt attend to, and which do not always leave them the maſters of their own choice. If the matter, or manner, of a true hiſtorian do not pleaſe us, it may be the *ſubject* that is in fault; if a romance do not pleaſe us, we juſtly blame either the invention, or judgment of the *writer*.

Thucydides, out of his extreme regard to truth, hath adhered too ſcrupulouſly to chronological order; ſo as frequently to paſs, in a very abrupt and diſpleaſing manner, from the midſt of an important and intereſting tranſaction, to a very diſtant and trivial one; and he never begins or completes any tranſaction but in its proper year. Being the firſt among the Greeks who paid much attention to *exactneſs in chronology*, he is the more excuſable in following it ſo cloſely as he did; ſince he could have no example of any inconvenience attending it.

Herodotus rambles from his ſubject much more frequently than Thucydides, but on a very different, and leſs juſtifiable account: for his digreſſions from an intereſting narration are ſo far from being intended to keep us nearer to chronological order, that they throw us farther from it; when frequently, upon barely naming a perſon or nation, in the midſt of an event, of which we are impatient to know the iſſue, he ſtops to give an account of, perhaps, the whole hiſtory of that nation or perſon, or ſome parti-

cular relating to them quite foreign to the action that is depending, and without the leaſt regard to the time in which what he thus digreſſes to relate happened. But to the *father of hiſtory*, and an *old man*, every indulgence ought to be made. With all his defects of method, there are few hiſtorians more pleaſing upon the whole.

Xenophon, though, in general, an excellent hiſtorian, yet in his *expedition of the ten thouſand*, when he comes to relate the death of *Cyrus*, in the battle with his brother, goes back to relate at large the intire hiſtory of his private life, manners, and ſchemes, &c. leaving the minds of his readers in a ſtate of the moſt anxious ſuſpenſe, to know what was the fate of the *Greeks*, who were the proper heroes of his hiſtory. The only inducement that one could imagine a writer could have to make ſuch digreſſions as theſe, muſt have been to give the hiſtory of the ſame perſon in the ſame place, though at the expence both of the *order of time*, and of the *unity of action*.

The digreſſions of *Tacitus*, to give an account of the origin, and early hiſtory of any people or country, immediately before an account of the wars the Romans had with them, have the beſt effect; as they both tend to intereſt us in the progreſs and event of the war, and, conſidering the ſubject of his hiſtory, contribute to relieve the mind, in the moſt agreeable manner, from an attention to a ſcene which was in itſelf too uniform and diſguſting. The ſubject of the *Annals of Tacitus* was of ſuch a nature as to occaſion little or no inconvenience from ſtrict chronological order; the unity of action being no where broken in upon by it, as it is by the annals of Thucydides.

The writer of a *ſingle hiſtory* hath no embarraſſment in compariſon of a perſon who undertakes to give an account of two or

more nations, whoſe hiſtories are intermixed with one another. The former is at liberty to take as much of any foreign hiſtory as he hath occaſion for to illuſtrate his own; the other is in a manner under a neceſſity, either of making repetitions, or of leaving chaſms in one or other of the hiſtories. The former expedient is tedious and ungraceful, the latter makes one of the hiſtories very imperfect and unintereſting.

The writers of the *Univerſal Hiſtory* found themſelves in this dilemma, and their very valuable work bears too many marks of it. To avoid *repetitions*, they have left almoſt all the hiſtories imperfect, which obliges a reader to look into ſeveral, before he can find a perfect account of any. They have likewiſe made the modern hiſtory of the *Arabians* and *Turks*, in particular, unneceſſarily and exceſſively tedious, by inſerting in the text ſeveral different accounts of the ſame event; when it would have occaſioned no more trouble to the writer, and have been vaſtly more agreeable to the reader, to have retained only the moſt approved account of any event in the *text*, and have left the other accounts to the *notes*.

By the uſe of *notes* the moderns have a conſiderable advantage over the ancients, who had no idea of ſuch a convenience. By the help of notes a hiſtory may go on without interruption, and yet a great variety of *incidental things*, worth recording, and which cannot be introduced with eaſe into the body of a work, may have a place aſſigned to them, where they may be attended to at the reader's leiſure.

Bayle hath made the greateſt uſe of notes of any of the moderns. Indeed, the text of his *Biographical Dictionary* ſeems to have been compoſed for the ſake of the notes; which were ſuch *miſcellaneous remarks* upon men and opinions, as could not have been

been incorporated into any regular work, or have been publiſhed conveniently in any other form.

What Bayle did, in a manner, through neceſſity, ſome others (and particularly *Harris*) have adopted through choice; and have thereby made their works nothing more than *unconnected anecdotes*, to which the text only ſerves as an index. Whereas the moſt proper uſe of the notes in biographical writings, is to ſerve as a repoſitory for the more *minute particulars* of a perſon's life, which, though of great uſe to illuſtrate the character, are yet too inconſiderable to make a figure in the body of the work.

The lives of *Suetonius* conſiſt, chiefly, of ſuch curious and uſeful particulars as tend to give us an idea of the real *characters* of the *Twelve Cæſars*, and were by no means deſigned to be a complete hiſtory of their lives and actions.

Tacitus's life of Agricola, and *Quintus Curtius's life of Alexander the Great*, are works of a very different nature, being regular hiſtories of the actions of thoſe great men. *Plutarch's lives* are a moſt judicious mixture both of private characterſtic incidents, and of public tranſactions.

Tacitus's tract concerning the *manners of the Germans* is an excellent model for that kind of narrative; giving a moſt diſtinct account both of the general policy and particular inſtitutions of that people.

All *didactic treatiſes* belong chiefly to this head of narration; the writer having little to do with argumentation, and being concerned chiefly to give as intelligible and diſtinct an account as poſſible of all the *precepts of the art*, or of every thing that is requiſite to be done in order to ſucceed in it.

Whether

Whether a writer diſcourſe of the *mechanic*, or the *liberal arts*, ſuch as *grammar*, *oratory*, &c. the nature of the thing will direct him, in general, to divide the ſubject into its proper diſtinct parts, and to give an account of what is moſt eſſential in the firſt place, and what is only ornamental afterwards.

LECTURE VII.

Of METHOD *in* Argumentative *diſcourſes*; *of* ANALYSIS *and* SYNTHESIS; *and of* GEOMETRICAL DEMONSTRATION.

THE greateſt difficulty, in point of method, is found in properly arranging the parts of an *argument*, ſo as to give them the moſt weight, and encreaſe the degree of evidence reſulting from the whole, by the aptneſs of their order and connexion.

Logicians ſpeak of two kinds of method in argumentative diſcourſes, the *analytic* and the *ſynthetic*; and the diſtribution is complete and accurate. For, in all ſcience, we either proceed from particular obſervations to more general concluſions, which is *analyſis*; or, beginning with more general and comprehenſive propoſitions, we deſcend to the particular propoſitions which are contained in them, which is *ſyntheſis*.

In the former method we are obliged to proceed in our *inveſtigation of truth:* for it is only by comparing a number of particular obſervations which are ſelf-evident, that we perceive any analogy in effects, which leads us to apprehend an uniformity in their cauſe, in the knowledge of which all ſcience conſiſts. In the latter method it is generally more convenient to explain a ſyſtem of ſcience to others. For, in general, thoſe truths which

were the reſult of our own inquiry, may be made as intelligible to others as thoſe by which we arrived at the knowledge of them; and it is eaſier to ſhow how one general principle comprehends the particulars comprized under it, than to trace all thoſe particulars to one that comprehends them all.

On the other hand, the analytic method is properly to communicate truth to others in the very manner in which it was diſcovered; and firſt diſcoveries are generally the reſult of ſuch a laborious and minute examination, as is, in its own nature, a ſlow and tedious procedure. Is it not much readier to take the right key at firſt, and open a number of locks, than begin with examining the locks, and after trying ſeveral keys that will open one or two of them only, at laſt to produce that which will open them all?

Notwithſtanding this, in theories not perfectly aſcertained, or with regard to ſentiments not generally admitted, it may be adviſeable to inform others in the method of analyſis; becauſe then, beginning with no principles or poſitions but what are common, and univerſally allowed, we may lead others inſenſibly, and without ſhocking their prejudices, to the right concluſion. It is as if the perſons we are inſtructing did themſelves make all the obſervations, and, after trying every hypotheſis, find that none would anſwer except that which we point out to them. This method is more tedious, but perhaps more ſure. Before we admit any hypotheſis, we naturally conſider whether it will agree with every obſervation previouſly made, and every propoſition previouſly admitted; and therefore in a method of communication borrowed from that cautious method of inquiry, we are of courſe led diſtinctly to conſider, and very particularly to obviate all kinds of objections.

In fact, almoſt every branch of ſcience (except ſome parts of pure mathematics, capable of the ſtricteſt demonſtration) hath been delivered at firſt by the inveſtigators of it in this method of analyſis; and it hath not been till after ſome time that the patrons of it have digeſted it into a ſynthetic, or ſyſtematic form.

This latter method, however, is abſolutely neceſſary when any branch of ſcience is introduced into *ſchools*, where there is occaſion for the moſt conciſe and compendious methods of inſtruction. It is only the elements of ſcience that can be learned in ſchools, and it would take up too much of the little time that youth can give to their ſtudies, to lead them through all the ſlow proceſſes of analyſis in every thing they learn. Analytical diſcourſes are, therefore, more properly addreſſed to thoſe perſons who have gone through their preparatory ſtudies, and who have leiſure for *new ſpeculations*.

Theſe two methods are ſeldom uſed abſolutely unmixed in any work of conſiderable length, except by mathematicians; and for the greater variety, in *long diſcourſes*, a method ſometimes partaking more of the analytic, and ſometimes leaning more to the ſynthetic, is adopted, as beſt ſuits the taſte of the writer.

A method the moſt properly analytic is purſued by mathematicians in all kinds of algebraic inveſtigations, in approximations, and in experimental philoſophy: whereas the geometric method of propoſition and demonſtration is of the ſynthetic kind.

A great variety of modern treatiſes upon moral ſubjects, in which mankind are far from being agreed, have lately been written in the analytic method, as beſt ſuited to the infant ſtate of the ſcience. The ſcience of theology hath been, perhaps, too precipitately handled in the method of ſyntheſis, or ſyſtematically; and

and ſeveral ingenious perſons, being aware of it, have gone back, and have begun again in the more cautious method of analytical inquiry.

Having thus given a general idea of the nature of the methods of ſynthesis and analyſis, and of the proper uſe of both, I proceed to conſider them ſeparately and more particularly.

Since the ſubject of every ſynthetic diſcourſe is ſome *propoſition*, or *theorem*, which is to be proved, and the bulk of the diſcourſe a kind of *demonſtration*, it may be of conſiderable ſervice to a compoſer to have in view the methods of demonſtration uſed by mathematicians.

Truth, whether geometrical, metaphyſical, moral, or theological, is of the ſame nature, and the evidence of it is perceived in a ſimilar manner by the ſame human minds. Now it is univerſally allowed that the form in which evidence is preſented by *Euclid*, and other geometricians of reputation, is that in which it gains the readieſt and moſt irreſiſtible admiſſion into the mind; and their method of conducting a demonſtration, and diſpoſing of every thing preceding it, and ſubſequent to it, hath been ſo generally approved, that it is eſtabliſhed and invariable. Such a ſucceſsful method of procedure with reſpect to mathematical truth, certainly deſerves the attention and imitation of all who are deſirous to promote the intereſts of any kind of truth.

In order, therefore, to give the moſt perfect rules of ſynthetic demonſtration, I ſhall explain the method of geometricians, and endeavour to ſhow how far it may be adopted, or imitated with advantage, by writers in general, and particularly by divines and moraliſts.

Every

Every propoſition is, by geometricians, demonſtrated either from *axioms*, that is, ſelf-evident truths; or ſuch as have been elſewhere demonſtrated from thoſe which are ſelf-evident.

In like manner, whatever we propoſe to demonſtrate, the laſt appeal lies to *ſelf-evident truths*; in moral ſubjects, to conſciouſneſs, or internal feelings; and in matters of revelation, to the plain ſenſe of ſcripture: and it is very expedient and adviſeable, in diſcourſes upon important ſubjects of any kind, after the manner of geometricians, to premiſe theſe ſelf-evident truths, beyond which no appeal can be admitted.

Moreover, leſt there ſhould be any diſagreement or diſpute about the uſe of the words employed in the argument, it is, likewiſe, convenient that, after their manner, theſe axioms be preceded by *definitions* explaining the ſenſe in which all the important words which repreſent complex ideas are uſed. When, in this manner, it is determined in what ſenſe words are to be uſed, and what are the allowed uncontroverted principles we are to go upon, they may be applied with great eaſe and certainty in the remainder of the diſcourſe; and the demonſtration in which they are introduced, will be freed from that confuſion and embarraſſment which would otherwiſe attend it.

Beſides, this method is, in a manner, the very *touchſtone of truth*; and therefore, if our views really be to promote the intereſt of *truth* (and ſooner would I teach the art of poiſoning than that of *ſophiſtry*) this method hath another great advantage to recommend it. For if theſe definitions and axioms be laid down with due accuracy and circumſpection, they not only introduce the eaſieſt, the moſt natural, and cogent method of demonſtrating any propoſition, but lead to an eaſy method of examining the ſtrength or weakneſs of the enſuing arguments. If the

the argument in ſuch a methodical diſcourſe be not concluſive, it contains within itſelf the principles of its own confutation. Such a diſcourſe muſt be evidently *inconſiſtent with itſelf*. On the other hand, if the definitions and axioms be admitted, the propoſitions that are demonſtrated from them, by the ſimple rules of reaſoning, muſt be next to ſelf-evident, and carry the ſtrongeſt poſſible conviction along with them.

I am not, in theſe and the following obſervations, pleading for the geometrical TERMS, *axiom* and *definition*, or for the very exact and preciſe method in which geometricians place them. It is not the *name*, but the *thing* that I recommend; and only ſo far as reaſon directs to ſimilar methods in ſimilar caſes. A regard to *perſpicuity* would direct us (if we would be underſtood) to explain diſtinctly the meaning of every word we uſe, that is of the leaſt doubtful ſignification, and to introduce the definitions, if not formally, at the entrance of a diſcourſe, yet as ſoon as they become neceſſary. It is manifeſtly convenient likewiſe, upon ſeveral occaſions, to refer expreſsly to maxims which are univerſally allowed or ſelf-evident, in order to ſhow diſtinctly upon what foundation an argument reſts. The more diſtinct we keep our own propoſitions, or thoſe which, in any diſcourſe, we profeſs to maintain, from thoſe, by the help or medium of which, we prove them, the better. We can much more eaſily examine any ſentiments when we ſee in what place to begin, and are ſhown their mutual connexion, and the dependance that one part hath upon another.

LECTURE

LECTURE VIII.

Of the ſeveral parts of a proper DEMONSTRATION.

AFTER theſe uſeful preliminaries, viz. aſcertaining the uſe of terms, and premiſing what is univerſally known, or taken for granted, with reſpect to a ſubject, the geometrician proceeds to his *propoſition*, in which he lays down, in the plaineſt terms, what he hath farther to advance. This either conſtitutes a ſingle propoſition, or is reſolvable into ſeveral heads, each of which are diſtinct propoſitions, and muſt be demonſtrated ſeparately. Moreover, the principal propoſition is ſometimes preceded by one, or ſeveral others, which are called *lemmas*, and are deſigned to prepare the way for the principal propoſition, by proving the truth of ſuch other propoſitions as may be made uſe of to demonſtrate it.

In like manner, if, when we have taken a view of the whole of a ſubject, in all its extent, and have conſidered every argument which we intend to bring in proof of it, we ſuſpect that any of the intermediate propoſitions, upon which the demonſtration principally depends, may themſelves want proof, or illuſtration, it may be extremely convenient to diſpatch it in the introduction, previous to our naming the principal propoſition; becauſe it may prevent its occaſioning any interruption in the courſe

of the demonſtration. Such doubtful poſitions muſt otherwiſe be propoſed by way of anſwering *objections*, after the demonſtration, which may not always be quite convenient; becauſe the difficulty may have occurred to the mind of the hearer, or reader, from the firſt; and his keeping it in view through the whole of the demonſtration, may have prevented the arguments from being heard with that attention, and freedom from prejudice, with which they would have been heard, if that objection had been obviated by way of lemma, in the introduction. The geometrician wiſely anticipates all *objection*.

In ſome caſes, indeed, it may be impoſſible to anticipate all objections; as they may be of ſuch a nature as that they could not be *underſtood* till the demonſtration had been heard. In that caſe the objections not only may come after the demonſtration (as of neceſſity they muſt, if they be mentioned at all) but alſo may do ſo without any inconvenience. Becauſe if the objection could not be underſtood before the demonſtration, it could not have occurred to the hearer or reader before, ſo as to lay any bias upon his mind in the courſe of it.

Objections being thus, as far as poſſible, anticipated, and the truth of every intermediate propoſition that we ſhall have occaſion for, proved, the way is properly cleared for the *principal propoſition*, which muſt be propoſed without any ornament, in the moſt intelligible terms. If the propoſition be complex, the whole extent of it muſt be ſhown in the moſt commodious diviſion of it into its proper parts: alſo the order in which each part will be diſcuſſed muſt be pointed out diſtinctly, that the whole proceſs of the demonſtration may lie with the greateſt clearneſs before the minds of thoſe to whom it is addreſſed; and that, in the progreſs of the diſcourſe, they may perceive the connexion of all the

parts, and may ſee all along what progreſs the ſpeaker or writer hath made in his argument.

In caſes relating to matters of *fact*, it may require a long and circumſtantial *narration* before the point to be proved can be underſtood. Whatever narration, therefore, is requiſite to ſet a queſtion in diſpute in a clear light, belongs to this part of a diſcourſe, and is properly referred to the propoſition.

The geometrician, when he hath laid down his propoſition, proceeds, by a ſeries of ſteps which terminate in a ſingle proof, to ſhow the agreement or coincidence of the terms of it: and as one demonſtration, in ſubjects that will admit of it, is deciſive, a multiplicity and redundancy of proofs is ſeldom affected by mathematicians. But in this the moraliſt and divine muſt content themſelves with following them at a great and very humble diſtance. As the ſubjects they treat of are not always capable of ſtrict *demonſtration*, they are obliged to have recourſe to a variety of arguments, each of which may add ſomething to *probability*, (which in its own nature admits of degrees) till the united ſtrength of them all be ſufficient to determine the aſſent.

In this caſe, it is of ſome conſequence that attention be paid to the *order of the proofs*, ſuppoſing them to be of different natures, and different degrees of ſtrength. Arguments of a ſimilar nature, that is, drawn from ſimilar conſiderations, as from reaſon or ſcripture, obſervation or experience, &c. ſhould be ranged together; becauſe in that poſition they confirm, and throw light upon one another. And though arguments which have no weight ought by no means to be uſed at all, and one that hath but little weight had better be ſpared, where there are a ſufficient number of ſubſtantial and ſtriking arguments, yet in ſome caſes it may be

be requiſite to take notice of every circumſtance that may tend to throw light and evidence upon a doubtful ſpeculation.

In ſuch an enumeration of arguments, it is not adviſeable to place a ſlight probability in the ſame rank with arguments which are much ſtronger and more concluſive. Rather, ſince there are ſo many ways in which, with a little addreſs, it may be introduced to more advantage, in an *indirect manner*, let it be hinted at in ſome other place. Very often an argument, diſguiſed in the form of an epithet, a metaphor, a compariſon or illuſtration, &c. is more pleaſing, looks more like a redundancy of argument, and in every reſpect hath a better effect, than if it were placed in an equal rank with arguments of more weight. Indeed, in ſuch a ſituation, it might be conſtrued to look like a diffidence of our cauſe, and a ſolicitude to make the moſt of every argument favourable to it.

If the arguments be nearly equal in weight, no order drawn from their *comparative ſtrength* is to be preferred to that *natural order* which is ſuggeſted by the ſubjects from which they are derived.

After the demonſtration of the propoſition, the geometrician, if there be occaſion, makes miſcellaneous remarks, ſerving to throw light upon the ſubject, under the name of *ſcholia*. And ſuch like obſervations, particularly ſuch as illuſtrate the nature and force of the evidence, or point out ſimilar proceſſes in other ſubjects, throw an agreeable variety into a compoſition, and tend, in an indirect manner, to ſtrengthen the preceding arguments.

Laſtly, in the form of *Corollaries*, the geometrican deduces from his propoſition, now fully proved, other truths which flow from it, if the dependance be ſo ſtrict that it would have appeared trifling to make them formal propoſitions.

In like manner, when there is no danger of too greatly multiplying the objects of attention, it may have a good effect to ſhow the extenſive and happy influence of the principle we have been maintaining, by tracing its beneficial conſequences, and ſhowing the connexion it hath with other acknowledged truths; particularly when thoſe conſequences, and thoſe connexions with other truths, are of ſuch a nature, that they could not conveniently be introduced into the body of the diſcourſe, by way of arguments in favour of the propoſition we maintain.

Having explained pretty much at large how all the proper parts of an argumentative diſcourſe, calculated to inform the underſtanding, ſhould be diſpoſed, in order to produce their proper effect, I ſhall ſubjoin the following brief ſummary of the proceſs.

The meaning of the terms of the propoſition ſhould be accurately fixed, principles made uſe of in the demonſtration diſtinctly noted, and, if there be occaſion, proved; the queſtion ſtated in the moſt intelligible manner, with a circumſtantial relation of every fact that may contribute to ſet it in the cleareſt point of light, and the ſubject divided into the diſtinct parts of which it conſiſts. The order of nature muſt chiefly be conſulted in arranging the arguments brought to ſupport each of them, and ſlight probabilities ſhould be introduced in an indirect manner. Obſervations relating to the nature of the proof that is made uſe of, with the connexion and mutual influence of the ſeveral arguments, and other miſcellaneous remarks that may naturally occur, come next; and the whole diſcourſe cloſes with a view of the extent of the doctrine, in all the valuable inferences and uſes that may be drawn from it.

The

The principal *faults* in the ſeveral parts of this kind of diſpoſition, may be ſeen in the following brief enumeration of them.

As it is highly requiſite to define ſtrictly every term in the propoſition, when the meaning of it is in danger of being miſtaken; ſo it is affected and trifling to define thoſe that, it is morally certain, will not be miſunderſtood.

We cannot be too cautious what principles we take for granted in order to argue from. Theſe *axioms* are the foundation of our whole ſuperſtructure. We ought, therefore, very rarely, and not without the moſt urgent neceſſity, to have recourſe to *argumenta ad hominem*; being ſenſible that though ſuch arguments may lead ſome particular perſons into a right way of thinking, the connexion between *truth* and *falſehood* cannot be natural, and promiſes but ill to be laſting; and that whenever ſuch perſons begin to be aware that the principles from which you argued with them were falſe, they of courſe give up the ſentiments which were deduced from them.

Diſtribution is the moſt faulty when the parts are not of the ſame nature and order, and not ſufficiently diſtinct; and by no means ſhould any one of them comprehend any of the reſt. Rather ſubdivide the principal heads of a diſcourſe into ſubordinate ones.

It is a capital fault in the diſpoſition of an argumentative diſcourſe, to divide the ſubject in ſuch a manner, as that the writer ſhall have occaſion for the ſame amplification in different parts of it. This is the conſequence of making the heads of diſcourſe too much ſimilar to one another. It is more adviſeable to make fewer heads, and thoſe more diſtinct.

In

In a diſcourſe, in which a great variety of arguments are uſed, it hath a good effect both to give a general view of them before they be ſeparately enlarged upon, and to give a diſtinct recapitulation of them after the amplification; as it makes the evidence more intelligible, and unites the force of all the arguments.

Introductions to diſcourſes admit of great variety, according to the nature of the ſubject, the circumſtances of the ſpeaker, and of the perſons he addreſſes. Since the end that is propoſed by every thing that is ſaid, previous to our entering upon any ſubject, is to procure us a more favourable hearing, and thereby prepare the way for the arguments that we intend to advance, we may, with advantage, introduce a ſubject by a variety of general remarks concerning it, particularly ſuch as tend to ſhow the *uſe* and *importance* of it; or by ſhewing the propriety of treating it at that particular time, in that particular place, in that particular manner, &c. It may alſo be very expedient to introduce an obnoxious ſubject, by removing preconceived prejudices, and anſwering popular objections.

Introductions may likewiſe be ſuggeſted by a variety of temporary circumſtances, impoſſible to be deſcribed beforehand, but which naturally occur to a ſpeaker, or writer, in the circumſtances proper for them. See Cicero's introductions to his philoſophical and rhetorical diſcourſes, and alſo thoſe to his orations. In the latter there is generally the greateſt propriety; but the former have no peculiar relation to the pieces to which they are prefixed. Indeed, he acknowledges that they were compoſed before he knew what uſe he ſhould make of them. The introductions to the two hiſtories of Salluſt are juſtly to be found fault with on the ſame account.

LECTURE IX.

Of the ANALYTIC METHOD. *Of Locke's Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding, and Hutcheſon's Moral Philoſophy.*

THE regular and unmixed ſyntheſis is beſt adapted (as was obſerved above) to ſubjects, the theories of which are aſcertained, or ſyſtems for the uſe of learners; who, in general, have occaſion to be taught in the moſt expeditious manner. In fact, we find very few treatiſes drawn up in this method, except *elementary* ones, for the uſe of ſtudents, and particularly in pure mathematics and philoſophy.

The generality of writers deliver their ſentiments to the public upon ſubjects of ſpeculation in a looſer and very different method. Far from always laying down propoſitions, and then entering upon the proof of them, they as frequently begin with obſervations or experiments, and ſhow how they lead to the principles they intend to eſtabliſh: or, in a treatiſe of a conſiderable extent, they uſe ſometimes the one, and ſometimes the other method, naming the propoſition before the proof, or the proof before the propoſition, as they imagine the one or the other will introduce their ſentiments with the moſt advantage, and make their performance the moſt agreeable to their readers.

As

As the *analytic* method of communicating any truth is, properly ſpeaking, nothing more than a copy of the method of its *inveſtigation*, the more minute delineation of this proceſs is beſt referred to logic, which treats profeſſedly of the nature of thoſe inveſtigations. Little, therefore, needs to be added here to what was ſaid in the compariſon of the two methods, and the caſes in which they are each of them beſt applied. A few obſervations in this place ſhall ſuffice.

Notwithſtanding the analytic method of communicating truth be properly a copy of the method of inveſtigation, it is manifeſtly ſuperfluous to relate every ſtep of any *actual proceſs*. As it could not but happen that, in the courſe of every inquiry, a variety of obſervations muſt have occurred which were foreign to the purpoſe, and many hypotheſes have ſuggeſted themſelves which ſubſequent obſervations obliged us to reject. Theſe abortive notions, contributing nothing to the illuſtration of the ſubject, it is moſt adviſeable, in general, to omit; unleſs, in conſequence of conſiderable ſtreſs having been previouſly laid upon them, it be requiſite to ſhow that ſuch ſtreſs was unreaſonable; that particular facts and obſervations, which had been urged in treating upon that ſubject, had no relation to it, and that particular hypotheſes, advanced and contended for by others, were ill founded. Much more, therefore, may often, with advantage, be introduced into an analytic inquiry, which is made after other unſucceſsful inquiries, and particularly when popular prejudices have been adopted upon any ſubject, than would be neceſſary or proper, in a diſcuſſion intirely new, and with reſpect to which there were, conſequently, few prejudices to obviate, and few objections to anſwer.

In

In this latter caſe, that ſet of obſervations is the beſt choſen which leads moſt directly to that only hypotheſis which we have in view, and intend to eſtabliſh; and the moſt pleaſing, as well as the moſt ſatisfactory method of conducting ſuch an inquiry is, that which is as near an imitation as poſſible of the method of *approximation*, in ſeveral of the mathematical ſciences. Let the final diſcovery be opened by degrees, by advancing, in the firſt place, ſuch obſervations as make our hypotheſis only probable, or which conclude equally in favour of it and ſome others. Let the probability grow ſtronger by degrees, by ſubſequent obſervations excluding, in their turns, more and more of the remaining hypotheſes; and let the *experimenta crucis*, which abſolutely exclude all others whatever, be reſerved for the laſt.

When writers do not diſpoſe their arguments in this manner, "they loſe," as Dr. Hartley well obſerves, "much of their clear-"neſs and force. *Sir Iſaac Newton's Optics*, *Chronology*, and "*Comment on Daniel*," he ſays, "abound with inſtances to this "purpoſe; and it is probable that his great abilities and practice "in algebraic inveſtigations led him to it inſenſibly."

Since *example* contributes as much to inſtruction as precept, I ſhall, for the farther illuſtration of theſe rules, ſubjoin an account of the method in which ſome of our moſt celebrated and approved writers have conducted their argumentative diſcourſes upon ſome important ſubjects.

I ſhall only premiſe one general obſervation, which is, that treatiſes written profeſſedly upon the *whole* of any branch of ſcience, and which are not taken up with the diſcuſſion of any ſingle queſtion, are neceſſarily of a very mixed nature, with reſpect to their method. For, according to the received diviſions of ſcience, they muſt, generally, conſiſt of parts that are of a nature

very different from one another, and which, therefore, require to be diſcuſſed in a very different manner. Sometimes a regular demonſtration is uſed; in other places the analyſis is preferred, and the practical parts of the ſcience are explained in the method of didactic narration, intermixed with the reaſons (borrowed from the ſcientific parts of the ſubject) on which the precepts are founded.

MR. LOCKE, propoſing, in his excellent *Treatiſe on the Human Underſtanding*, to inquire into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and aſſent; conſiders, in the firſt place, all the properties and diſtinctions of *ideas*, as the elements of all our knowledge, and traces the ſources from which, and the channels by which, they are conveyed to our minds. He then conſiders in what manner, and with what degrees of accuracy, *words* are made to repreſent all theſe varieties of ideas, with what relates to the proper uſe and abuſe of words; and, laſtly, from theſe preliminaries, as ſo many certain facts and *data*, he draws the concluſions he had in view, concerning the nature and bounds of that knowledge, which reſults from the perception of the properties and relations of theſe ideas, and the imperfection attending the communication of this knowledge by words. All, therefore, that he advances upon the ſubject of *ideas* and *words* muſt be conſidered as *definitions*, *axioms*, or *lemmas*, to be uſed in the demonſtration of the propoſition he lays down in the remaining part of the treatiſe.

In examining the properties of ſome claſſes of ideas, he is led into large diſquiſitions concerning ſome particular ideas; as thoſe of *power*, *identity*, *&c.* but whether his opinions concerning

theſe

theſe ideas be juſt or not, it by no means affects the truth or uſefulneſs of the bulk of his obſervations and concluſions.

His manner of amplification is very diffuſe, and his method in the former part, didactic and narrative; relating a ſeries of obſervations on the properties of ideas, with a tacit appeal to every man's conſciouſneſs of the truth of what he advances.

In MR. HUTCHESON'S *Treatiſe of Moral Philoſophy*, we are firſt preſented with a narrative delineation of the ſeveral powers and principles of human nature, the juſtneſs of which human experience and human actions are ſuppoſed to avouch. Having delineated the internal frame of man, he deſcribes the various uſes to which theſe powers may be applied, and the various pleaſures and enjoyments we receive by their means. The nature of each of theſe ſpecies of pleaſure he examines ſeparately, in order to determine which of them contributes moſt to human happineſs, and thereby conſtitutes the chief good of man.

The reſult of this analytical inquiry is, that the chief good of man conſiſts in the gratification of thoſe affections which have the happineſs of our fellow-creatures for their object, or are connected with it; which affections are termed virtuous.

Virtue, thus explained, he branches out into its ſeveral kinds, and particularly ſhews the extent of it, as reſpecting God, mankind, and ourſelves. Laſtly, he demonſtrates, more particularly, the various obligations of virtue, in the principal caſes that may occur in a ſtate of nature, and likewiſe thoſe which occur in a ſtate of civil ſociety; the *right*, and the *lawful*, in every caſe being determined by the tendency any action hath to promote the good of mankind in general, or of any particular ſociety whoſe intereſt is conſiſtent with it.

LECTURE X.

Of the METHOD *of Mr.* Hume's Inquiry into the Principles of Morals, Hartley's Obſervations on Man, Harris's Hermes, *that of* Sermons, *and of* Miſcellaneous Writings.

THE plan of the moſt valuable part of Mr. HUME's *inquiry concerning the principles of morals*, is nearly the ſame with that part of Mr. Hutcheſon's Moral Philoſophy, which correſponds to it, and may moſt properly be termed *analytical*. For, in order to determine *the foundation of virtue*, he conſiders particularly every thing that is acknowledged to gain the eſteem of mankind; examining upon what common property it is that their encomiums turn, and in what meaſure their approbation is beſtowed; and having found that nothing is the object of eſteem but what is *uſeful to ſociety*, and, moreover, that the ſeveral virtues are claſſed in the firſt or ſecond rank of importance, according as they are more or leſs eſſential to the well-being of ſociety, he concludes, that *public utility* is the foundation of all virtue.

This ingenious writer greatly excels in his method of conducting argumentative diſcourſes, and, particularly, we ſee clearly in his writings the advantage of propoſing ſingular opinions in the method of analyſis. The greater part of his diſcourſes are ſo exact

exact a copy of the eaſieſt and moſt perfect method of inveſtigation, that we imagine we ſee, in every ſtep of the proceſs, the very manner in which he himſelf was led to conceive the ſentiments he recommends. To obviate objections, he carefully conceals the reſult of ſome of his inquiries, till his reader be prepared for it, by ſuch a happy gradation of previous obſervations and inferences, that he cannot tell how to avoid it; and if, at that time, he ſhould wiſh to refuſe his aſſent, and heſitate about it, as he has, before he was aware, aſſented to all the premiſes, he is at a loſs where to found his objection. This writer ought, therefore, to be read with very great caution.

DR. HARTLEY, propoſing a new hypotheſis of the principles of the human mind, examines very particularly every thing relating to, or dependent upon the mind of man, viz. ſenſations, ideas, muſcular motion, the external ſenſes, affections, memory, imagination, reaſoning, dreams, &c. and endeavours to ſhow that none of the phenomena of any of them contradict his hypotheſis; that many of them admit a peculiarly eaſy and complete illuſtration by it; and that the moſt difficult caſes are not rendered more difficult, but rather eaſier by the help of it. And leſt this hypotheſis concerning the principles of the human mind ſhould be ſuſpected to bear an unfavourable aſpect upon a plan of human duty, and human expectations, he conſiders the whole of both ſyſtematically; ſhowing, whenever he hath opportunity, that the evidences of religion, natural and revealed, with the rule of life drawn from it, receive additional light and evidence from it; and, laſtly, that it hath a happy influence both upon our conduct in this life, and upon our expectations after death.

This

This is the general plan of that immenſe work. The particular method of it is ſtrictly geometrical, and ſynthetical. The author begins with definitions and axioms, lays down formal propoſitions, and advances ſuch proof as the nature of the caſe will admit. He deduces formal corollaries from almoſt every propoſition, and in the *ſcholia* he explains the nature of his proofs, and ſhows in what manner evidence is reflected from one part to another. Interſperſed through the whole of this work is a vaſt variety of curious and uſeful knowledge.

This method may not, at firſt ſight, ſeem ſo well adapted to a theory ſo much *original* as that of Dr. Hartley; and it muſt certainly have been a work of great labour and difficulty to digeſt a ſet of ſentiments, ſo intirely new, into ſo regular and ſyſtematical a form; becauſe in a ſynthetic diſcourſe every thing that is advanced muſt have one particular place, and no other: whereas in the analytic method there is much greater latitude. For that method is a copy of the method of inveſtigation, and the ſame thought may occur to the mind in a variety of connexions. Nevertheleſs, ſo *extenſive* a theory could not eaſily have been delivered without confuſion in any other method. Beſides, it was enough to recommend this method to Dr. Hartley, that, of all others, it is the *faireſt*, and ſhows the greateſt impartiality; as a treatiſe in this form is the moſt commodious for examination, and ſuggeſts the eaſieſt method of ſhowing the fallacy of it, if it be falſe. A perſon would be much more at a loſs how to anſwer Mr. Hume, than Dr. Hartley.

Mr. HARRIS, propoſing in his *Hermes* to trace the firſt principles of ſpeech, and to ſhow, by an analytical proceſs, in what manner they may be inveſtigated, firſt examines intire *ſentences*,

ces, and conſiders what differences, in the forms of expreſſions, correſpond to the differences in their meaning. Having thus diſcovered the properties of different ſentences; he conſiders the particular *words* that compoſe ſentences, and thus having, by degrees, arrived at the ſimpleſt elements of ſpeech, and diſcovered how many differences there are in words, or the number of general heads to which they may be reduced, he hath completely accompliſhed his ſcheme of analyſis.

It may not be unuſeful to obſerve, in order to illuſtrate the variety of method, that another perſon, intending to draw up a ſynthetic or ſyſtematic treatiſe upon the ſame ſubject, for the uſe of learners, would moſt naturally take a method the very reverſe of Mr. Harris's. For example, he would, in the firſt place, enumerate the ſeveral claſſes into which *words* may be diſtributed, and ſhow the modifications that each of them admit. After this he would ſhow in what manner theſe words, according to their different ſpecies, form *ſentences*, and how theſe ſentences are combined into *periods*. This is the method of the General Grammar of *Meſſieurs de Port Royal*, and others.

Divines conduct their inquiries into the ſenſe of the ſacred writers upon any controverted ſubject in a method nearly analytical. For, in order to give their readers intire ſatisfaction with regard to their impartiality, they produce all the texts of ſcripture relating to the queſtion in debate, ranging them under ſuch proper heads as the nature of the undertaking requires, and aſcertaining the meaning of every paſſage they quote with all poſſible accuracy; and they deduce the doctrine they contend for as an inference fairly drawn from the texts thus collected and compared.

It

It makes no material difference in the method of theſe inquiries, if the opinion of the writer be advanced in the entrance of the work, and the texts be afterwards produced as proofs of what he advances. All ſuch propoſitions require to be proved by an *induction of particulars*; and it is a capital thing, in the conduct of theſe inquiries, that the induction be as complete as poſſible.

Our beſt SERMONS, with reſpect to the method of their compoſition, are of two kinds. Some are intended to be a demonſtration of ſome doctrine of religion, or a diſcourſe upon ſome religious duty, with proper inferences, in the regular ſynthetic method. Others are uſually called *textual*, becauſe the writers, aſſuming ſome text of ſcripture, endeavour to extract from it all the uſeful information and direction it contains. They accordingly, in this latter method, divide their ſubject into as many parts as their text contains diſtinct articles, and treat of each ſeparately, according to its nature. The method of this kind of ſermons admits of endleſs variety, but the text cannot be changed.

To the former the text ſerves only as a *motto*, and may be changed at pleaſure; the method being ſuggeſted by the *ſubject*, and not at all by the *text*. It follows, likewiſe, from the account given in the preceding lectures of the beſt method of conducting a demonſtration, that there muſt be a great uniformity in the plan of theſe diſcourſes, and that each will exhauſt the whole ſubject.

To remedy this inconvenience, it is uſual, and it introduces an agreeable variety into this kind of ſermons, to take only ſome part of ſuch a ſcheme of ſyntheſis into one diſcourſe. Some intire diſcourſes, for inſtance, are uſefully taken up in *definition* only, or in determining the ſenſe of terms of conſiderable conſequence; ſuch as *faith*, *grace*, &c. and, where wrong ſenſes

have been affixed to ſuch terms, it hath a good effect, in giving the ſenſe of them, to do it, as it is uſually termed, both *negatively* and *poſitively*; that is, to explain, in the firſt place, what the ſenſe is *not*, and then what it *is*. But let every interpretation that is diſtinctly refuted and rejected be ſuch as either actually *is*, *hath been*, or very probably *may be* adopted. Otherwiſe the negative definition is ſuperfluous and ridiculous. Indeed, in many circumſtances, to take notice of ſeveral that do fall within the abovementioned limitations would be trifling and uſeleſs.

Beſides, in order to avoid unneceſſarily oppoſing popular prejudices, it is generally adviſable to define important words juſtly, without taking the leaſt notice of other ſenſes that have long been affixed to them. The very mention of them, though with a view to refute them, will very often only tend to ſtrengthen the mechanical aſſociation by which the words and the wrong ſenſe have been connected. Theſe ſtrong aſſociations are like *habits*, which require to be treated with great caution, and muſt not be combated by bringing the ideas belonging to them frequently before the mind. Oppoſite ideas muſt be introduced, and they be ſuffered to diſappear, as it were, gradually, and of themſelves.

Other diſcourſes preſent us with the proof only of any doctrine or duty with one diſtinct ſet of arguments, or even illuſtrate one particular proof. Others are employed in anſwering objections, or only ſome particular objections. In others again, after a brief explication, we are ſhewn the *effects* of a doctrine, duty, or habit of mind in ſpeculative or practical *inferences*.

In ſhort, as either a ſingle part, or any combination of the parts of a complete ſyntheſis may be uſefully employed to form a diſcourſe, the variety that may be introduced in thoſe diſcourſes, which are not confined to any particular *text*, but which

relate to the *ſubject*, is prodigious. And, in general, it will be found to be much more agreeable to an auditory to hear a ſubject treated in a variety of diſcourſes, from different texts, and at different times; each of which, by this method of diſtribution, may appear to be *complete of itſelf*, than to have their miniſter make uſe of the ſame text, and the ſame heads of diſcourſe, till the whole ſubject is exhauſted.

The above proceſſes, of *ſyntheſis* and *analyſis*, are calculated either to demonſtrate truth unknown to others, or to ſet one that is known in the ſtrongeſt point of light; and when a perſon propoſes to treat a ſubject fully, with either of theſe views, he cannot do better than to take one or other of thoſe methods, according as the nature of the caſe will direct. But ſuppoſing the ſubject a perſon writes upon be familiar, and his ſentiments be ſo generally received, that he need be under no concern about the *proof* of them; he may, for the ſake of an agreeable variety, adopt almoſt whatever method he pleaſes. In ſuch a caſe there is no part of a diſcourſe, and no ſentiment belonging to it, but what may, by the addreſs of the compoſer, be introduced in almoſt any place whatever, and the reſt of the diſcourſe be ſo adjuſted, as to occaſion no ſenſible confuſion or diſorder. To ſee this executed in the happieſt manner, conſult the *Spectator*, and other celebrated familiar eſſays.

To illuſtrate this in one inſtance. Mr. ADDISON's beautiful eſſay on *omens*, *Spectator*, No. 7, is introduced by a very diverting account of ſome incidents that happened in a viſit which he made. Theſe occaſion a reflection on the folly of adding to the real evils of life by ſuch ſuperſtitious fears and ſupernumerary duties. To confirm this he recites a variety of other inſtances ſimilar to thoſe that occurred to him upon his viſit. Theſe intro-

duce other obſervations on the folly of that kind of ſuperſtition; and the eſſay cloſes with the proper method of fortifying the mind againſt thoſe terrors, and an account of his own temper and practice with reſpect to them.

The method of this kind of eſſays is admired in proportion as the turn and ſucceſſion of thought in them appears eaſy and natural. Conſequently, the only thing to be attended to, with regard to it, is the *tranſition* from ſentiment to ſentiment. Let the train be ſuch as that it may be conceived probable that the thoughts would naturally ſuggeſt one another in the order in which they are put down; and whatever the piece conſiſts of, whether obſervations, reflections, arguments, &c. (provided they be in themſelves juſt and ſtriking) the eſſay will appear natural, eaſy, and agreeable.

The Ode, and moſt other poems, which may be analyſed into a mixture of narration and reflection, muſt be allowed the ſame latitude. Some bounds, however, muſt be ſet to the licentiouſneſs of the human imagination, particularly that of poets, which otherwiſe would ramble from one ſubject to another by very ſlight tranſitions, ſuch as may be forgotten the moment they have been made uſe of, and conſequently wholly omitted in the compoſition: ſo that, though a real train of connected ideas tranſmitted the thoughts of the poet from one ſubject to another, there remain no traces of that medium of tranſition, and the reader can perceive no connexion at all between the parts of it.

Something of *unity* ought, undoubtedly, to be preſerved through the whole of every intire piece, whether in proſe or verſe; and to this general deſign of the whole, every part, wherever ſituated, ought to bear ſome relation. As in a piece of muſic, not-

withſtanding the ſeeming wild excurſion of the notes, they are all chords to that which is called the key-note.

A want of ſufficient connection is manifeſt in many of the odes of Horace; the epiſode of Eurydice in the laſt book of the Georgics, ſeems to have been introduced rather on account of its own beauty than its relation to the ſubject of the book; and it has exerciſed the utmoſt ingenuity of critics to ſhow the propriety of ſeveral parts of Pindar's poems. In general, the moderns pay more attention to regularity than the ancients.

I would obſerve, at the concluſion of this part of the courſe, that the whole uſe of topics and of the diſpoſition of them, hitherto explained, hath for its object and end the *informing of the judgment*, and *influencing the practice*, and that this is the only direct and proper, at leaſt the ultimate end of oratory. The pleaſure that a diſcourſe may give to the *imagination*, or the emotion it may raiſe in the *paſſions*, are things that are brought about more indirectly, being effected by the *manner* in which things that tend ultimately to *convince* and *perſuade* are expreſſed. The orator may, indeed, intend to pleaſe or affect his hearers; but, if he underſtands himſelf, he only means to influence their *judgments*, or *reſolutions*, by the medium of the imagination or the paſſions.

In theſe two preceding parts of this courſe, therefore, thoſe things have been conſidered which are more peculiarly the proper objects of an orator, and *eſſential* to his views. In what remains will be explained what is, though very greatly, yet indirectly of ſervice to him, and an *advantage* rather than a neceſſary part of his art. This thought, by the way, ſuggeſts an important advice, with which I ſhall conclude this part.

Let

Let the firſt, and principal view of every orator, whether in writing or ſpeaking, be to *inform the judgment*, and thereby *direct the practice*; and let him only atttempt to *pleaſe*, or *affect*, when it is ſubſervient to that deſign; when the occaſion itſelf, in a manner, prompts to it, and the bent of his own genius leads him to comply with ſuch an invitation.

PART

PART III.

OF

STYLE.

LECTURE XI.

Of TASTE, *and the Nature of* FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE.

THE third part into which the art of oratory is diſtributed, comprehends whatever is *ornamental* in a diſcourſe or compoſition. The bare materials, and even the diſpoſition of them in a diſcourſe, are adapted to do little more than make an impreſſion upon thoſe perſons who, of themſelves, and from a regard to the nature and importance of the ſubject, will give their attention to it; whereas the ſubject of this laſt part is calculated to attract and engage the attention, by the grace and harmony of the ſtyle, the turn of thought, or the ſtriking or pleaſing manner in

in which ſentiments are introduced and expreſſed. We have hitherto examined what we may call the bones, muſcles, and nerves of a compoſition; we now come to the covering of this body, to deſcribe the external lineaments, the colour, the complexion, and graceful attitude of it.

In treating of this part of my ſubject, I ſhall endeavour to lay open the ſources of all the pleaſures we receive from this moſt refined art, explaining what are the properties, or principles, in our frame which lay the mind open to its influences, as well as deſcribe the various forms of expreſſion which are found, by experience, to affect our minds in ſo agreeable a manner, and give examples of ſuch forms of expreſſion.

Whatever contributes to adorn a diſcourſe, muſt either give life and beauty to the *ſentiment*, or harmony to the *diction*. I ſhall conſider each of theſe in their order. By ornament of *thoughts*, I mean that manner of introducing and preſenting them to the mind which will give them the moſt favourable appearance. This, therefore, comprehends all the pleaſures which may be ſaid to be perceived by the *mind*; whereas, when I treat of the ornament of *diction*, I ſhall conſider the language as affecting the *ear* only.

Whatever it be, in the ſentiment or ideas, that makes a diſcourſe to be read with pleaſure, muſt either be *intereſting*, by exciting thoſe groſs and more ſenſible feelings we call *paſſions*, or muſt awaken thoſe more delicate ſenſations, which are generally called the *pleaſures of the imagination*. Each of theſe kinds of feelings are, by ſome philoſophers, referred to ſo many diſtinct *reflex*, or *internal ſenſes*, as they call thoſe faculties of the mind by which we perceive them; whereas, according to Dr. Hartley's theory, thoſe ſenſations conſiſt of nothing more than a congeries

or combination of ideas and ſenſations, ſeparately indiſtinguiſhable, but which were formerly aſſociated either with the idea itſelf that excites them, or with ſome other idea, or circumſtance, attending the introduction of them. It is this latter hypotheſis that I adopt, and, by the help of it, I hope to be able to throw ſome new light on this curious ſubject.

An enumeration of the *ſtronger paſſions* of the human mind, which are rouſed by the powers of oratory, and the art of compoſition, I regard as foreign to my undertaking to attempt: but it may, with reaſon, be expected that I ſhould deſcribe thoſe *finer feelings* which conſtitute *the pleaſures of the imagination*, and which are ſeldom attended to in any delineations of human nature; as alſo ſome *critical ſituations of mind* reſpecting the paſſions and emotions in general, the knowledge of which is eſſential to criticiſm upon works of genius and imagination; and explain thoſe *forms of addreſs* which are *adapted to gain aſſent*. But, previous to this, I ſhall give ſome account of *Taſte*, and of the difference between *plain* and *figurative language*.

An exquiſite feeling of the finer ſenſations abovementioned, may be ſaid to conſtitute a *fine taſte:* but no perſon can be a complete *judge* of the merit of a compoſition unleſs he perfectly underſtand the ſubject of it, ſo as both clearly to diſtinguiſh the character of the *deſign*; as whether it be great or mean, new or common, &c. and alſo to judge how far the execution is adapted to the undertaking.

The well-known ſtory of the ſhoemaker viewing the Venus of Apelles, may aſſiſt us to diſtinguiſh our ideas in this caſe. This artiſan diſcovered no ſtrong ſenſe of pleaſure upon the ſight of ſo extraordinary an effect of human genius, and therefore could

not be ſaid to have *taſte*, but he certainly was a very good judge of the proportions of the foot and of the ſhoe.

Judgment is univerſally acknowledged to be altogether acquired, and that *taſte*, too, or the capacity of perceiving the pleaſures of imagination, may alſo be acquired, to a very great degree, is evident from the actual acquirement of a variety of ſimilar taſtes, even late in life. Inſtances of this may be given in a taſte for flowers, for gardening, and for architecture, which are hardly ever acquired very early in life.

It is hardly poſſible that any perſon who never attempted to ſketch out an object himſelf, ſhould have a high reliſh for the beauties of painting; but let any perſon be inſtructed in drawing, let him be much employed in viewing and examining a great variety of pictures, let him be led to converſe much with painters, and other connoiſſeurs in that art; and I think one might pronounce, without any great apprehenſion of being miſtaken, that he would, infallibly, not only acquire *judgment* in the productions of that art, and be able to diſtinguiſh a fine deſign and execution, but that he would have a *reliſh* for it, that what he approved he would *admire*, and that the view of it would affect him with a ſenſible pleaſure. The ſame may be ſaid with reſpect to muſick, poetry, and all the other fine arts.

Beſides, it will appear very clearly, in our progreſs through this ſubject, that all the *principles of taſte* in works of genius, the very ſources from which all theſe fine pleaſures are derived, are within the reach of all perſons whatſoever; and that ſcarce any perſon can paſs his life in cultivated ſociety, where the fine arts flouriſh, without acquiring, in a greater or a leſs degree, a taſte for ſome or other of them.

In

In fact, ſince all emotions excited by works of genius conſiſt of ſuch ideas and ſenſations as are capable of being aſſociated with the perception of ſuch works, nothing can be requiſite to the acquiſition of taſte, but expoſing the mind to a ſituation in which thoſe aſſociated ideas will be frequently preſented to it. A great deal, however, depends upon the time of life, and other circumſtances, in which ſuch impreſſions are made upon the mind. Youth, eſpecially, which is favourable to all impreſſions, is peculiarly favourable to theſe. But this circumſtance makes a difference in *degree* only, and not in the nature of the thing. Some perſons may alſo have acquired a diſlike to theſe, as well as other ſtudies; but as this diſlike was produced by an early aſſociation of ideas, ſo it may be overcome by oppoſite aſſociations. It muſt not be forgotten, alſo, that as our bodies in general differ with reſpect to their *ſenſibility to impreſſions*, ſo the texture of the brain, on which the mental faculties depend, muſt be ſubject to a ſimilar difference.

I propoſed in this place to ſhew in what figurative and ornamented ſtyle conſiſts. In plain unadorned ſtyle every thing is called by its proper name, no more words are uſed than are apparently ſufficient to expreſs the ſenſe, and the form and order of every part of the ſentence are ſuch as exactly expreſs the real ſtate of mind of him that uſes it; not a queſtion, for inſtance, being aſked when the perſon who makes it is able to ſupply the anſwer. It is not enough to ſay, that plain unadorned ſtyle is that mode of expreſſion which is the moſt *natural:* for ſtyle the moſt highly ornamented, and enlivened with the ſtrongeſt figures, is as natural as the plain ſtyle, and occurs as naturally, without the precepts of art, and even without deſign, in proper circumſtances.

Style may be ſaid to be figurative when the literal interpretation, according to the uſual ſenſe of words, and the conſtruction of them, would lead a perſon to miſtake the ſenſe; as, for inſtance, when any thing is ſignified by a term which was not originally affixed to it; when the terms which are uſed to expreſs any thing would, if interpreted literally, lead a perſon to imagine it was greater or leſs than it is; and when the form of the ſentence is ſuch as, when explained by the rules of grammar only, doth not truly expreſs the ſtate of mind of him that uſes it.

Notwithſtanding this, ſtyle that is merely figurative and ornamented, is far from being calculated to *deceive*. For whenever it is uſed, no other language, or mode of ſpeech, could give ſo true an idea of the ſtate of the ſpeaker's mind, though it is confeſſed to be by no means *literally* expreſſive of that ſtate. For inſtance, when *Virgil* calls the two *Scipios*, *the Thunderbolts of War*, he makes uſe of an ornamented and highly-figurative expreſſion, not correſponding to his real ſentiments; for he would never have replied in the affirmative, if he had been aſked ſeriouſly whether he really imagined they were two thunderbolts; and yet no plainer terms, though more expreſſive of their true character, would have given his readers ſo clear an idea of the *force* and *impetuoſity* which he meant to aſcribe to thoſe heroes.

Again, when the ſame excellent and correct poet ſays that mount *Ætna threw its fires as high as the ſtars*, nobody taxes him with a deſigned falſehood; though his expreſſions be not literally true, and we are ſure he could not but have been ſenſible of it himſelf at the time that he made uſe of them: but nothing ſhort of an hyperbole could have given us a true image of the effort of his imagination, to expreſs his idea of the very great height of thoſe flames.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, when Æneas, in the ſame poet, in the midſt of the relation of his adventures, comes to mention *Sicily*, inſtead of ſaying, in ſo many words, that *his father died there*, addreſſes himſelf directly to his father, and exclaims, *Hic me, pater optime, feſſum deſeris*; do any of his readers imagine he really conceived his father to be within hearing? But no ſimple narration could ſufficiently have expreſſed that ſtrong regret, and tender affection, which the revival of his father's memory awakened in his mind. We naturally *perſonify* every thing that cauſes us much pleaſure or pain, and a vivid recollection makes every thing ſeem preſent. Thus this direct addreſs to the dead Anchiſes, though, ſtrictly ſpeaking, without the leaſt foundation, gives us the trueſt idea of the unfeigned grief of Æneas, and of the affecting ſenſe he had of his loſs, and therefore lets us into the true ſtate of his mind; not, indeed, by a direct interpretation of his words, but in a more certain, though an indirect manner, by means of thoſe *circumſtances* which always accompany that ſtate of mind.

Figurative ſpeech, therefore, is indicative of a perſon's real feelings and ſtate of mind, not by means of the words it conſiſts of, conſidered as *ſigns of ſeparate ideas*, and interpreted according to their common acceptation; but as *circumſtances* naturally attending thoſe feelings which compoſe any ſtate of mind. Thoſe figurative expreſſions, therefore, are ſcarce conſidered and attended to as *words*, but are viewed in the ſame light as *attitudes*, *geſtures*, and *looks*, which are infinitely more expreſſive of *ſentiments* and *feelings* than words can poſſibly be.

Since, however, the literal impropriety of figurative expreſſions is excuſed only on account of their being conſidered as indications of thoſe feelings and ſentiments which no words, literally interpreted, could deſcribe, they ſhould never be uſed but

when the ſituation of the perſon who uſes them is ſuch as will render thoſe feelings and ſentiments natural. Otherwiſe, there being nothing left to excuſe and cover the impropriety of the figure, the words preſent nothing but the *naked abſurdity*, and the writer is detected, either in pretending to feelings that could have no exiſtence, or in aſſerting what is apparently falſe and contradictory. This obſervation may be applied to every figure of ſpeech; and as it is an obſervation of conſiderable conſequence, it will be frequently repeated, and applied to the particular figures, when they come to be ſeparately explained and illuſtrated.

LECTURE

LECTURE XII.

The Diviſion of this Part of the Work into what affects the PASSIONS, JUDGMENT, *and* IMAGINATION.

Of the Effect of VIVID REPRESENTATION, *the Uſe of the* PRESENT TENSE *in deſcribing paſt Scenes, and of* PARTICULAR NAMES *and* CIRCUMSTANCES.

HAVING conſidered the nature of taſte, and of figurative language in general, I proceed to conſider diſtinctly the ſeveral objects that offer themſelves to our attention reſpecting the *ornament* that ſentiment admits of. Theſe, as they were before pointed out, are either ſome of the more remarkable and general affections of the ſtronger *paſſions*; thoſe forms of addreſs which are adapted to engage *aſſent*, or thoſe finer feelings which conſtitute the *pleaſures of the imagination*. Each of theſe three objects will engage our attention in the order in which they are here mentioned.

The firſt obſervation I ſhall make on *the general affections of the paſſions*, is, that they are engaged, and we feel ourſelves intereſted, in proportion to the *vividneſs of our ideas* of thoſe objects and circumſtances which contribute to excite them. The genuine

and

and proper uſe of the paſſions undoubtedly is to rouze men to juſt and vigorous action upon every emergency, without the ſlow intervention of reaſon. It is, therefore, wiſely provided, that they ſhould be raiſed by the immediate view and apprehenſion of the circumſtances proper for their exertion. Being, therefore, blind and mechanical principles, they can only be connected with the view of ſuitable circumſtances; ſo that, whenever theſe are preſented, whether the paſſion would, in fact, be uſeful or not, it cannot fail to be excited, and to riſe to its uſual height.

This obſervation ſupplies us with a reaſon why our minds are as ſenſibly affected with ſcenes of *paſt*, or even of *ideal diſtreſs*, as with a mere relation of what is *preſent* and *real*. All the advantage that the latter circumſtances united have, is, that they engage us to think more intenſely of the caſe, which will conſequently make the ideas more vivid, and the ſcene more intereſting. But that ſcenes of *ideal* diſtreſs have as much power over the imagination as ſcenes of diſtreſs that are *paſt*, cannot but be allowed, when we conſider, that even reaſon can plead nothing more in favour of the one than of the other; ſince the paſſion is equally *unavailing* in both caſes. Why may I not, with reaſon, be as much intereſted in the adventures of Æneas or Telemachus, as in thoſe of Themiſtocles, Xenophon, or any of the heroes of Greece or Rome? If the one never had any exiſtence, neither have the other any at preſent, which, with reſpect to the *final cauſes* of our paſſions, is the ſame thing.

The faithful hiſtorian, and the writer of romances, having the ſame acceſs to the ſprings of the human paſſions, it is no wonder that the latter generally moves them more forcibly, ſince he hath the choice of every circumſtance that contributes to raiſe them; whereas the former hath nothing in his power but the *diſpoſition* of

of them, and is reſtricted even in that. I fancy, however, that no perſon of reading and obſervation can doubt of the fact, that more tears have been ſhed, and more intenſe joy hath been expreſſed in the peruſal of novels, romances, and feigned tragedies, than in reading all the true hiſtories in the world. Who ever, upon any occurrence in real hiſtory, ever felt what he muſt feel in reading Clariſſa, George Barnwell, Eloiſa, and many other well-contrived fictions. It is to no purpoſe to ſay to ourſelves, "This is all a fiction, why am I thus affected?" if we read, and form an *idea* of the ſcenes there exhibited, we muſt *feel* in ſpite of ourſelves. The thought of its being a fiction enables us to make but a feeble and ineffectual effort to repreſs our feelings, when the ideas which excite them are very ſtrong and vivid. Some perſons, however, may have acquired ſuch an averſion to all works of fiction, that they cannot be prevailed upon to give that unprejudiced attention to them which this experiment requires.

The uſe of the *preſent tenſe* in the narration of paſt events, contributes greatly to heighten the ideal preſence of any ſcene. This form of narration is introduced with the moſt advantage when a preceding lively and animated deſcription hath already, as it were, tranſported the reader into the ſcene of action. In that ſituation of mind, he is ſo far from being ſenſible of the real impropriety of that ſtyle, that it appears to him the moſt natural; and indeed no other would correſpond to his feelings: and too precipitate a return to the proper ſtyle of narration would have a very bad effect, as it would put an end to the pleaſing *illuſion*, which makes the ſcene ſo intereſting, and which can continue no longer than while the reader conceives himſelf preſent with the

objects that are preſented to his imagination. In the following poetical deſcription of a battle, we have an example of a very *natural*, and therefore (for the reaſon given above) *unperceived* tranſition from the preter to the preſent time.

> And now with ſhouts the ſhocking armies cloſed,
> To lances lances, ſhields to ſhields oppoſed;
> Hoſt againſt hoſt the ſhadowy legions drew,
> The ſounding darts an iron tempeſt flew;
> Victors and vanquiſh'd *join* promiſcuous cries,
> Triumphing ſhouts and dying groans *ariſe*.
> With ſtreaming blood the ſlipp'ry field *is* dy'd,
> And ſlaughter'd heroes *ſwell* the dreadful tide.

In the following deſcriptions we cannot but feel the ill effect of too precipitate a return to the proper ſtyle of narration, and of the ſtill worſe effect of paſſing from time paſt to the preſent, and from the preſent to the paſt, as it were alternately in the ſame ſcene.

> Here all the terrors of grim war *appear*,
> Here *rages* force, here *tremble* flight and fear;
> Here *ſtorm'd* contention, and here fury *frown'd*,
> And the dire orb portentous gorgon *crown'd*.
>
> ILIAD V. 914.

> Then died Scamandrius, expert in the chace,
> In woods and wilds to wound the ſavage race:
> Diana taught him all her ſylvan arts,
> To bend the bow, and aim unerring darts:
> But vainly here Diana's arts he *tries*,
> The fatal lance *arreſts* him as he flies;

From

From Menelaus' arm the weapon ſent
Thro' his broad back and heaving boſom *went:*
Down ſinks the warrior with a thund'ring ſound,
His brazen armour *rings* againſt the ground.

ILIAD V. 65.

Since no form of expreſſion can appear natural, unleſs it correſpond to the feelings of the perſon who uſes it, let no writer adopt the preſent tenſe in deſcribing a paſt tranſaction, unleſs the ſcene be ſo intereſting, that the reader can hardly help realizing it, and fancying that he actually ſees and hears every thing that is repreſented; otherwiſe the affectation becomes ſenſible, and cannot fail to give diſguſt.

It is a very extravagant ſtretch of this figure when a public ſpeaker repreſents a ſcene that is paſt or future as preſent in the very place of audience; for it requires an illuſion capable not only of affecting the imagination, but of impoſing upon the bodily ſenſes too, to cover the abſurdity of ſuch language. Let this obſervation be applied to ſome preachers when they deſcribe the day of judgment.

Theſe obſervations relating to the vivid repreſentation of objects, ſhow us the importance of a diſcreet uſe of fiction, and works of imagination, for the cultivation of the human heart. The heart is inſtructed chiefly by its own feelings. It is of conſequence, therefore, how they are directed, and it cannot be a matter of indifference what tales and novels are put into the hands of children and youth. When once perſons are of an age to form ideas of ſuch deſcriptions, and feel the ſenſations reſulting from them, reading a romance is nearly the ſame thing as their ſeeing ſo much of the world, and of mankind. Whatever, there-

fore, we ſhould think improper for them to *ſee*, it is improper for them to *read* or *hear*; for they have like ſenſations, and retain ſimilar impreſſions from both.

In the ſecond place, I would obſerve, with regard to the conduct of the paſſions, that to repreſent things to the life, in order thoroughly to affect and intereſt a reader in the peruſal of a compoſition, it is of ſingular advantage to be very *cirumſtantial*, and to introduce as many *ſenſible images* as poſſible.

The powers of art have no other means of exciting our paſſions than by preſenting ſuch ſcenes as are found to excite them in real life. Now in nature, and real life, we ſee nothing but *particulars*, and to theſe ideas alone are the ſtrongeſt ſenſations and emotions annexed. General and abſtract names are only ſubſtitutes for the particular, and are therefore farther removed from their connexion with real objects; inſomuch, that when general and abſtract terms are uſed, the imagination muſt be employed to reduce them to particulars, before any real ſcene can be imagined, or any paſſion raiſed. Now ſince general terms do not, without an effort of the imagination, ſuggeſt thoſe determinate ideas which alone have the power of exciting the paſſions, and the very exertion of ſuch an effort muſt, in ſome meaſure, prevent that temporary illuſion, which is requiſite to the ideal preſence of objects, it is proper that the writer, who would thoroughly affect and intereſt his reader, ſhould, as much as poſſible, make that effort unneſſary, by avoiding general and abſtract terms, and introducing the proper names of perſons and things, which have a more immediate connection with ſcenes of real life.

Every body muſt have experienced, in relating any thing that really happened, how difficult it is to avoid mentioning thoſe circumſtances

cumſtances of *time*, *place*, and *perſon*, which were orginally aſſociated with the particulars of the ſtory; and it is evident (notwithſtanding it be generally eſteemed a mark of greater judgment to *generalize* ſtories, and omit thoſe particulars) that ſtories told with all thoſe circumſtances, provided they be not ſo many as to diſtract the mind of the hearer, and too much retard the relation of the principal incidents, are generally heard with more attention. In fact, it cannot be but that theſe circumſtances excite more determinate and preciſe ideas; and the more preciſe and vivid are our ideas, with the greater ſtrength do they excite all the emotions and paſſions that depend upon them. The mention of theſe particulars makes a relation to reſemble real and active life.

So important is this obſervation, and ſo far is it from having been thoroughly attended to, that it may almoſt furniſh a criterion to diſtinguiſh true hiſtory from fable and romance. Even the beſt of our modern romances, which are a much more perfect copy of human life than any of the fictions of the ancients, if they be compared with true hiſtory, will be found to fall greatly ſhort of it in their detail of ſuch particulars as, becauſe they have a kind of *arbitrary*, and, as it were, *variable* connexion with real facts, do not eaſily ſuggeſt themſelves to thoſe perſons who attend only to the connexion and ſubordination of the incidents they have invented, and who, therefore, never introduce more perſons or things than are neceſſary to fill them up: whereas a *redundancy of particulars*, which are not neceſſarily connected, will croud into a relation of real facts.

It may not be improper to add, in this place, that the mention of ſo many particular perſons, places, and times, in the books

of ſcripture affords, to the curious obſervers of nature and probability, no ſmall evidence of their genuineneſs and truth.

The advice I would found upon theſe obſervations is, that a writer who would copy nature, and command the paſſions which are peculiar to the ſeveral ſcenes of it, ſhould, in all narration or deſcription, wherever the circumſtances of a diſcourſe will admit of it, prefer a more particular to a more general term; as *father*, *mother*, *brother*, *ſiſter*, &c. inſtead of *relation*; *juſtice*, *temperance*, *veracity*, &c. and *cruelty*, *covetouſneſs*, *deceit*, &c. as the caſe requires, inſtead of the more indefinite terms *virtue*, and *vice*; and univerſally, the proper names of perſons, places, and things, rather than more comprehenſive terms which are applicable to other ideas beſides thoſe that are intended to be conveyed.

Shakeſpeare intereſts his readers more than moſt other dramatic poets, becauſe he copies nature and real life in this reſpect more cloſely than moſt others. It will, perhaps, not appear improbable that Shakeſpeare's frequent uſe of particular terms, and his attention to the choice of them, contributed not a little to his peculiar excellence in diſtinguiſhing the paſſions and characters of human nature; whereas dealing much in general terms, leads writers to confound all characters, and not to make thoſe diſtinctions which nature doth. If it ſhould be rather thought that Shakeſpeare's happineſs in diſtinguiſhing characters led him to be ſo particular and circumſtantial in his deſcriptions, it may be allowed, without contradicting the converſe of this hypotheſis; and it equally confirms the ſuppoſition of the connection that is here ſuggeſted to ſubſiſt between the diſtinguiſhing particular characters, and the uſe of particular terms. Homer abounds more in the minute details of circumſtances than Virgil, and his characters are better diſtinguiſhed. Virgil uſes more general terms

upon all occaſions, and the ſameneſs of his characters is remarkable.

To exemplify this obſervation, I ſhall ſubjoin a deſcription from Shakeſpeare, of the manner in which a prodigy was talked of among the common people, as being particularly excellent in its kind.

> Old men, and beldams in the ſtreets
> Do prophecy upon it dangerouſly.
> Young Arthur's death is common in their mouths;
> And when they talk of him, they ſhake their heads,
> And whiſper one another in the ear;
> And he that ſpeaks doth graſp the hearer's wriſt,
> Whilſt he that hears makes fearful action,
> With wrinkled brows, with nods, with rolling eyes.
> I ſaw a ſmith ſtand with his hammer thus,
> The while his iron did on th' anvil cool,
> With open mouth ſwallowing a taylor's news,
> Who, with his ſhears and meaſure in his hand,
> Standing on ſlippers, which his nimble haſte
> Had falſely thruſt upon contrary feet,
> Told of a many thouſand warlike French
> That were embattled, and rank'd in Kent.
> Another lean, unwaſh'd artificer
> Cuts off his tale, and talks of Arthur's death.
>
> KING JOHN, Act IV. Scene 4.

The ſacred writings abound with the moſt lively and animating deſcriptions, which derive their excellence from the notice that is taken of particular circumſtances. See, among other paſſages, Iſaiah xxxix. 4. to 15. and Jer. xiv. 15. to the end.

One

One reaſon why philoſophers ſeldom ſucceed in poetry, may be, that *abſtract ideas* are too familiar to their minds. Philoſophers are perpetually employed in reducing particular to general propoſitions, a turn of thinking very unfavourable to poetry. One reaſon, likewiſe, why poetry is generally ſooner brought to perfection than any other branch of polite literature, may be, that, in early ages, the ſtate of language is moſt favourable to poetry; as it then contains fewer abſtract terms. On this account, a poet in an early age has the advantage of a later poet, who has equal ſtrength of imagination. It may be ſaid that, to counterbalance this, the greater progreſs which the art of criticiſm will have made in a more refined age, will be an advantage to a later poet. But perhaps refinement in criticiſm may rather be unfavourable to the genuine ſpirit of poetry, as an attention to rules tends to deaden and diſſipate the fire of imagination.

LECTURE

LECTURE XIII.

Of the Tendency of ſtrong Emotions *to produce* BELIEF, *and the* transferring of Paſſions *from one Object to another.*

THE tendency of ſtrong emotions and paſſions to generate belief may help to throw light upon ſeveral things which occur upon the ſubject of criticiſm, and works of taſte and genius. And that we ſhould be prone to conclude, that very vivid ideas, and ſtrong emotions of mind, are derived from external objects, and circumſtances really exiſting, can be no matter of ſurprize, when we reflect that objects really exiſting do generally excite ſuch ideas and emotions. *Vivid ideas* and *ſtrong emotions*, therefore, having been, through life, aſſociated with *reality*, it is eaſy to imagine that, upon the perception of the proper feelings, the aſſociated idea of reality will likewiſe recur, and adhere to it as uſual; unleſs the emotion be combined with ſuch other ideas and circumſtances as have had as ſtrong an aſſociation with *fiction*. In this caſe the abſurdity and impoſſibility of the ſcene precludes aſſent; and at the ſame time, by taking away the aſſociated circumſtance, it greatly weakens the original impreſſion. But while the impreſſions remain vivid, and no certain marks of fiction appear, the idea of reality will occur; that is, the mind will find itſelf ſtrongly inclined to believe the ſcene to be real.

This may help us to account for the ſatisfaction that is received, and particularly by youth, and all perſons of little knowledge and experience, in reading the hiſtory of ſuch beings and powers as far exceed every thing human, and which never could have had any exiſtence; as of *fairies* in European countries, *genies* in the Eaſt; the *heathen gods and goddeſſes* in the ancient claſſical ages, and *knights-errant* and *necromancers* in modern ſtory.

It may, likewiſe, ſuggeſt a reaſon why theſe ſtories are read with leſs pleaſure by perſons more advanced in years. In youth the vivid and magnified ideas preſented by ſuch ſtories, and the emotions conſequent upon them, have a ſtronger aſſociation with *truth* than any improbable circumſtances attending them have yet acquired with *falſehood*. In reading them, therefore, there is nothing to prevent the object from being conceived to be *ideally preſent*, and their unexperienced paſſions are excited mechanically, as by the preſence of the like real objects. Whereas the aſſociation which ſuch ſtrange powers and properties have acquired with the ideas of *impoſſibility*, *falſehood*, and *abſurdity*, in the minds of perſons of conſiderable age and reflection, often makes it impoſſible for them, even in imagination, to conceive ſuch things really to exiſt.

If, however, the fiction be conſiſtent with itſelf, and be natural upon any uniform principles, or ſuppoſitions, ſo that it ſhall require only one ſingle effort of the imagination to conceive the exiſtence of the imaginary beings and powers, and the ideas of inconſiſtency and contradiction do not frequently occur through the courſe of the narration, to deſtroy the illuſion; a reader of a lively turn of mind, though of good diſcernment, may enter into the ſcene, and receive great pleaſure from the performance. But ſtill, in conſequence of a thouſand reiterated aſſociations, all repreſen-

preſentations of things not founded on *nature* and *truth* will grow leſs and leſs intereſting as men advance in life. Even thoſe fictions which moſt nearly reſemble truth, have but little power of amuſing perſons of great age and reflection. And that ſtories in which are introduced ſuch imaginary beings as the heathen gods, fairies, genies, necromancers, and the like, retain their power of amuſing perſons of reading and taſte ſo long as they do, may be aſcribed to the impreſſions made by them upon ſuch perſons in their very early years; by means of which the ſcenes in which they are exhibited are rendered much more vivid, and conſequently have ſtronger aſſociations with *reality* than they would have had, if thoſe perſons had not been made acquainted with them, till they had been capable of perceiving their abſurdity.

Our proneneſs to verify ſtrong ſenſations may be ſeen, in the pleaſure we receive from arguments intended to prove that there is ſome foundation in true hiſtory for thoſe ſtories which affected us ſtrongly when we were young; for inſtance, the fabulous hiſtory and mythology of the Greeks; the poſſibility of Æneas and Dido having been cotemporaries; the favourable hearing which arguments in proof of the reality of apparitions and witches have met with from many perſons of ſenſe and experience; and from the pleaſure which all perſons of taſte have lately received from the attempt to ſhew the real correſpondence there is with nature and truth in the manners, cuſtoms, ceremonies, and extravagancies of chivalry. May I not, likewiſe, appeal to all perſons of reading and imagination, if it would not give them a moſt ſenſible pleaſure to receive certain information, that all the adventures of ſuch perſons as *Robinſon Cruſoe*, and others whoſe fictitious ſtories they have read with delight,

were literally true? And whatever we ſhould receive pleaſure from believing, we ſhould certainly be *inclined* to believe.

This connexion of vivid ideas and emotions with reality, will eaſily furniſh the mind with pretences for juſtifying the extravagance of ſuch paſſions as love, gratitude, anger, revenge, and envy. If theſe paſſions be raiſed, though ever ſo unreaſonably, they are often able, by this means, to adjuſt the object to their gratification. Beſides, ſince, in conſequence of almoſt conſtant joint impreſſions, all ideas are aſſociated with other ideas ſimilar to themſelves, theſe paſſions, while the mind is under their influence, and as it were wholly occupied by them, will excite, in abundance, all ſuch ideas as conſpire with themſelves, and preclude all attention to objects and circumſtances connected with, and which would tend to introduce, an oppoſite ſtate of mind.

In the eye of the captivated lover, the object of his affections appears with more charms than firſt excited his paſſion: and how apt are we to take offence at thoſe perſons who endeavour to give us an ill opinion of thoſe who have ſhown us kindneſs or reſpect? On the other hand, how little merit can any body allow the man that hath affronted him? and how mean and contemptible a figure do thoſe perſons ſometimes make in our imagination, whoſe ſuperiority at firſt excited our envy?

An attention to theſe affections of our minds will ſhow us the admirable propriety of innumerable fine touches of paſſion in our inimitable Shakeſpeare. How naturally doth he repreſent Caſſius, full of envy at the greatneſs of Cæſar, whoſe equal he had been, dwelling upon every little circumſtance which ſhows the natural weakneſs of him whom fortune had made his maſter. Speaking of their ſwimming together croſs the Tiber, he ſays,

But

But ere we could arrive the point propoſed,
Cæſar cry'd, Help me, Caſſius, or I ſink.
I, as Æneas our great anceſtor,
Did from the flames of Troy, upon his ſhoulder,
The old Anchiſes bear; ſo from the waves of Tiber
Did I the tired Cæſar.

Again, in the ſame ſpeech,

He had a fever when he was in Spain,
And when the fit was on him, I did mark
How he did ſhake. 'Tis true this god did ſhake.
———————— I did hear him groan,
Ay, and that tongue of his ———
Alas! it cried, Give me ſome drink, *Titinius*,
As a ſick girl. —— JULIUS CÆSAR, Act I. Scene 3.

In the ſame author, king Lear, expoſed to a violent tempeſt, with his mind full of the ingratitude of his daughters, to juſtify his vexation and impatience, conceives them to have taken part with his daughters.

———————— Here I ſtand your brave,
A poor, infirm, weak, and deſpiſed old man.
But yet I call you ſervile miniſters,
That have with two pernicious daughters join'd
Your high-engender'd battles, 'gainſt a head
So old, and white as this. Oh! Oh! 'tis foul.
Act III. Scene 2.

This is perfectly natural, provided we can ſuppoſe his mind to have been ſo violently agitated as to perſonify, and feel real indig-

nation

nation againſt things inanimate, which (as will be explained ſhortly) is perhaps oftener the real caſe than is commonly imagined.

With equal regard to nature doth he repreſent Hamlet as ſhortening the time that intervened between the death of his father and the marriage of his mother with his uncle, becauſe that circumſtance heightened and gratified his indignation. At firſt he ſays,

> ——————That it ſhould come to this!
> But two months dead; nay, not ſo much, not two.

Preſently after, in the ſame ſoliloquy,

> ——————Yet within a month.

Afterwards he calls it a little month; and, at laſt,

> Ere yet the ſalt of moſt unrighteous tears
> Had left the fluſhing of her galled eyes,
> She married——Oh moſt wicked ſpeed, to poſt
> With ſuch dexterity to inceſtuous ſheets.
>
> Act I. Scene 1.

Nearly allied to this laſt obſervation is the following, that all ſtrong paſſions and emotions are liable to be transferred to indifferent objects, either related to the proper object, or thoſe whoſe ideas are accidentally preſent to the mind, at the time that it is under the influence of ſuch emotion or paſſion. This is nothing more than the ſimpleſt caſe of the aſſociation of ideas, but the effects of it are well worthy of our attention. Brute creatures, and even inanimate things, are not exempted from being, in this indirect manner, the objects of ſuch human paſſions, as it were the greateſt abſurdity to ſuppoſe them the *juſt* objects of.

Do

Do not all poets and writers of romance repreſent enamoured lovers in raptures with every thing belonging to the object of their affections, and taking uncommon pleaſure in the groves, and every place where they have had their delightful interviews. Pious David envied even the ſwallows which had built their neſts and laid their young in the Houſe of God. Aware of this, do not all perſons dread to communicate diſagreeable information, and are they not eager to be the meſſengers of good news? In the former caſe, the meſſenger becomes the object of averſion; in the latter caſe, he is regarded with good-will and friendſhip.

The loſs or abſence of a friend may give ſo much uneaſineſs, that our impatience for the want of him, ſhall produce a kind of indignation, which may, for a moment, fall even upon the object of our affection himſelf. This delicate circumſtance, as Lord Kaimes obſerves, hath not eſcaped the notice of Shakeſpeare, who hath given an exact idea of it, in the laſt words of the following paſſage:

——————— He is drown'd
Whom thus we ſtray to find, and the ſea mocks
Our fruſtrate ſearch on land. Well, let him go.
TEMPEST, Act III. Scene 3.

It is poſſible, however, that the poet might have had nothing more in view than ſimply to expreſs *acquieſcence in the event*. For the words, *Well, let him go*, will not expreſs any thing of *indignation*, without a particular tone, and manner, in the pronunciation of them.

With as true a hand hath he copied theſe finer touches of nature in repreſenting King *Richard* as expreſſing his indignation

againſt a horſe which had formerly been his, but which his enemy had got poſſeſſion of, and then rode.

> That jade had eat bread from my royal hand;
> This hand hath made him proud with clapping him.
> Would he not ſtumble? Would he not fall down?
> (Since pride muſt have a fall) and break the neck
> Of that proud man that did uſurp his back.
>
> RICHARD II. Act V. Scene 11.

In the ſame maſter of the human feelings we ſee the mind of *Othello*, when thrown into a violent perturbation by the firſt ſuſpicion of jealouſy againſt his wife, deſcribed as expreſſing its firſt reſentment in terms of the utmoſt impatience againſt the informer.

> Villain, be ſure thou prove my love a whore!
> Be ſure of it, &c.
>
> OTHELLO, Act III. Scene 8.

That theſe ſeeming irregular ſallies of paſſion are, however, *natural*, may eaſily be conceived from conſidering, that in our infancy we never look farther than the neareſt cauſe of our diſquiet on which to fix our reſentment; that few perſons, upon ſudden provocation, can forbear expreſſing their reſentment in the ſame indiſcriminate manner; and that there are many well-atteſted inſtances of the greateſt imaginable extravagancies of this kind in perſons of ſtrong paſſions and little reflection. Are we not credibly informed by Herodotus, that Xerxes, in great wrath and earneſtneſs, inſulted the Helleſpont, both by words and actions, when he found the bridge he had laid over it broken to pieces. Nay, did not the Athenians inſtitute a proceſs at law

againſt all inſtruments of murder, by which clubs, axes, ſwords, and the like, were ſtrictly tried, and, if found guilty, expelled the territories of Attica? Nothing like any of theſe inſtances could ever have occurred, nor could any paſſion ever have been expreſſed, or gratified, in ſo abſurd a manner, if the mind had not been under a *temporary illuſion*, during which it actually conceived thoſe things, which were no moral agents, to be the proper objects of paſſion.

Let it be obſerved, that the perſonification of brute creatures and inanimate things is taken notice of in this place, as it accounts for their becoming the objects of the *paſſions* properly ſo called. This ſubject will be conſidered in a future lecture in quite another light, as contributing to excite thoſe *finer feelings*, which have been before ſpoken of, as conſtituting the pleaſures of the imagination.

LECTURE XIV.

Of the Influence of the Paſſions on each other, and other Circumſtances relating to ſtrong Emotions of Mind.

ANOTHER obſervation relating to the paſſions, and of conſiderable uſe in criticiſm, is that they are excited with more or leſs eaſe according to the *ſtate of mind previous to them*; and that when ſeveral of them are in joint poſſeſſion of the mind, they are liable to be greatly affected by their *mutual influences* upon one another.

Thoſe paſſions, the emotions belonging to which are ſimilar, eaſily introduce, and, as it were, paſs into one another. As Mr. Hume well expreſſes it, "All reſembling impreſſions are connected "together; and no ſooner one ariſes, than the reſt naturally fol- "low. Grief and diſappointment give riſe to anger, anger to "envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again. In like "manner our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws "itſelf into love, generoſity, courage, pride, and other reſem- "bling affections" *Hume's diſſertation on the paſſions.*

On the other hand, when emotions of a very oppoſite nature, which conſiſt of contrary feelings, are, from independent cauſes, excited in the mind at the ſame time, the oppoſition, or contraſt, ſerves to heighten both. Their difference being hereby rendered

rendered very ſenſible, each of them is more ſtrongly felt than either of them would have been, if they had been impreſſed ſingly.

The former of theſe obſervations admits of the eaſieſt illuſtration from the *kindred paſſions*, as they may be called, of love and pity. Theſe, having the ſame languid tone, the ſame ſituation of mind is favourable to the introduction of both; and the mind, after having been under the influence of one, is more eaſily ſuſceptible of impreſſions from the other.

This is finely illuſtrated in the ſpeech of Othello in Shakeſpeare, the following lines of which cloſe the account he gives of his courtſhip of Deſdemona.

——— On this hint I ſpake.
She loved me for the dangers I had paſt,
And I loved her that ſhe did pity them.

OTHELLO, Act I. Scene 8.

It muſt, however, be acknowledged that, in this caſe, a relation of perilous adventures, in which a perſon hath acquitted himſelf bravely, begets a great *eſteem* for the adventurer, which is a conſiderable ingredient in the paſſion of love.

To be ſenſible of the effect of the *contrariety* of emotions, let any one but think how impatient of *mirth* muſt a perſon be who is oppreſſed with *ſorrow!* how much every appearance of joy heightens his diſtreſs! Hence the ſentiments which Milton aſcribes to Satan in Paradiſe:

With what delight could I have walk'd the round!
——— But I in none of theſe
Find place or refuge, and the more I ſee

Pleaſures about me, ſo much the more I feel
Torments within me.

PARADISE LOST, Book IX.

When two ſtates of mind are wholly oppoſite to one another, it is pleaſant to obſerve the *fluctuation of mind* occaſioned by the alternate prevalence of each of them. If a *reſolution* muſt ſucceed it, as is the caſe of Meleager's mother debating with herſelf whether to deſtroy her ſon, or revenge her brother; the preponderating of the mind to one ſide in ſome meaſure gratifies that paſſion, which neceſſarily abates its violence, and gives a momentary advantage to the contrary inclination. This circumſtance may prolong the ſtate of ſuſpenſe, in which, in this ſituation, the mind is neceſſarily kept a conſiderable time.

If no reſolution be depending, as in the mere impreſſion made upon the mind by good and bad news, the ſtronger emotion will at length overpower the leſs; and the mind, after having been ſubject to the influence of both, will ſettle in a ſtate which is the reſult of their joint impreſſions. We ſee a ſtrong conflict of oppoſite ſenſations in Oſmyn in chains on hearing ſome unexpected good news. *Mourning Bride, Act III. Scene* 2.

Theſe obſervations relating to the oppoſition of emotions and paſſions is of great importance, even in the conduct of life. In no other reſpect doth men's happineſs ſo much depend upon the regulation of their paſſions. Since it is obvious that the ſenſe we have of our happineſs may be increaſed by compariſon with the miſery of others; and our meanneſs and wretchedneſs may, for the ſame reaſon, be made ſenſible and intolerable, by reflection upon the happineſs we do not partake. The paſſion of envy hath no other ſource for its venom; and hence the delight-

ful ſentiments of gratitude, and the calm emotions of contentment derive all their pleaſures.

In order to raiſe a very lively and tender ſentiment, it is of advantage to deſcribe the circumſtances which raiſe it, in as *few words* as poſſible. The leſs time is loſt in tranſition, the nearer is any ſentiment brought in contraſt with the preceding ſtate of mind, and conſequently the more ſenſibly it is perceived. Beſides, when few words are ſufficient to preſent a moving ſcene to the mind, it approaches nearly to giving a view of the *ſcene itſelf*, without deſcription. The writer diſappears, and the ſcene itſelf is before us: and to apply a general maxim to this particular caſe, if the principal and leading circumſtances in any ſcene be expreſſed, the more negligent a writer ſeems to be to unfold all the particulars connected with them, the more will the reader *imagine*; and inſtead of his perceiving the effect of every circumſtance of the ſcene ſeparately, they will all croud upon his mind in one *complex ſenſation*, and affect him with all their powers united.

The following is a moving image in Virgil's deſcription of the return of Eurydice to the infernal regions.

Invalidas tibi tendens, *heu non tua*, palmas.

GEORG. Lib. IV.

The reader conceives a more lively ſenſation of a variety of undiſtinguiſhed emotions from that ſhort parentheſis, *heu non tua*, than if the poet had expatiated upon all the circumſtances of the difference of Eurydice's preſent relation to Orpheus, and that in which they had ſtood to one another, and which, but the moment before, they had both fondly imagined was going to revive.

The

The ſame author gives his readers a more exquiſite ſenſation, by means of a ſingle epithet, in the following paſſage, in which he deſcribes the attempt that Dædalus made to deſcribe the misfortune of his ſon, than he could have conveyed in more words, though ever ſo proper.

> Bis conatus erat caſus effingere in auro,
> Bis *patriæ* cecidêre manus. ÆNEID, Lib. VII.

When, under any affection of mind, ſtrong ſenſations have been aſſociated with *particular words*, it is natural for a perſon under the influence of the correſponding paſſion to repeat ſuch words. In theſe caſes, ſingle words preſent to the mind intire ſcenes with all their moving circumſtances.

Inimitably expreſſive of tenderneſs is the repetition of the name of *Eurydice*, in the affecting hiſtory of Orpheus, both in Virgil and Ovid, thus happily imitated by Mr. Pope.

> Yet e'en in death Eurydice he ſung,
> Eurydice ſtill trembled on his tongue:
> Eurydice the woods,
> Eurydice the floods,
> Eurydice the rocks and hollow mountains rung.
>
> ODE ON CÆCILIA'S DAY.

In all ſtrong paſſions, ſome one idea being preſent to the mind more eminently than others, perſons under the influence of them naturally expreſs that idea the firſt, even though it obliges them to throw the ſentence in which it is introduced into diſorder. Thus Niſus, in Virgil, expoſing himſelf to death for Eurialus,

> Me me adſum, qui feci; in me convertite ferrum.
> Oh Rutuli, mea fraus omnis. ÆNEID, Lib. IX.

Perolla, in Livy, full of horror and aſtoniſhment at the intention of his ſon to murder Hannibal, begins his ſpeech to him in the utmoſt diſorder, with the moſt ſolemn form of adjuration; "Per, ego, te, fili," &c.

It is a direct conſequence of the aſſociation of ideas, that, when a perſon hath ſuffered greatly on any account, he connects the idea of the ſame cauſe with any great diſtreſs. This ſhews with what propriety Shakeſpeare makes King Lear, whoſe ſufferings were owing to his daughters, ſpeak to Edgar, diſguiſed like a lunatic, in the following manner:

> What, have his *daughters* brought him to this paſs?
> Could'ſt thou ſave nothing? Did'ſt thou give them all?
>
> KING LEAR.

And Macduff,

> ——————He hath no children. MACBETH.

Writers not really feeling the paſſions they deſcribe, and not being maſters of the natural expreſſion of them, are apt, without their being aware of it, to make perſons under the influence of a ſtrong emotion or paſſion, ſpeak in a manner that is very unſuitable to it. Sometimes, for inſtance, they ſeem rather to be deſcribing the *paſſion of another*, than expreſſing their own. Sometimes the language of perſons, in intereſting circumſtances, ſhows ſuch an excurſion of mind from the principal object, as demonſtrates that their minds were not ſufficiently engroſſed with it. And ſometimes, aiming to ſtrike and aſtoniſh, they make their heroes uſe ſuch language as is expreſſive of no paſſion whatever, but is quite extravagant and abſurd.

The

The French dramatic writers are moſt commonly guilty of the firſt impropriety. Seldom conceiving the force of a real paſſion, they declaim upon the ſubject in ſuch a ſtyle as an *obſerver* might poſſibly uſe, but which would never occur to a perſon really intereſted. In Corneille there are few inſtances of a juſt expreſſion of paſſion. The generality of readers, being little intereſted in ſuch repreſentations, are not apt to attend to the impropriety; but every perſon, upon reflection, would be ſenſible that no perſon, really agitated with paſſion, would expreſs himſelf as Voltaire hath made Titus do.

O de ma paſſion fureur deſeſperée. Act III. Scene 6.

Even our Shakeſpeare himſelf, though no writer whatever hath ſucceeded ſo well in the language of the paſſions, is ſometimes deſerving of cenſure in this reſpect; as when Conſtance, in King John, ſays to the meſſenger that brought her a piece of diſagreeable news,

Fellow, be gone, I cannot brook thy ſight:
This news hath made thee a moſt ugly man.

The ſentiment and expreſſion in the former line is perfectly natural, but that in the latter reſembles too much the comment of of a cool obſerver. Of the ſame kind, but much more extravagant, is the following paſſage, which is part of the ſpeech of Conſtance, giving her reaſons why ſhe indulged her grief for the loſs of her ſon.

Grief fills the room up of my abſent child,
Lies in his bed, walks up and down with me,
Puts on his pretty looks, repeats his words,

Remembers

Remembers me of all his gracious parts,
Stuffs out his vacan garment with his form:
Then I have reaſon to be fond of grief.

KING JOHN, Act IV. Scene 1.

Shakeſpeare's talent for wit and humour, and the genius of the times in which he wrote, have, upon many occaſions, betrayed him into the ſecond impropriety, which is, to make perſons under ſtrong emotions ſpeak, as if their minds were not ſufficiently engroſſed with the principal object of their concern. Would even a child, apprehenſive of having his eyes inſtantly burned out, ſpeak as he hath repreſented young Arthur to have ſpoken, in order to perſuade his executioner to deſiſt from his purpoſe?

In good ſooth the fire is dead with grief.
Being create for comfort, to be uſed
In undeſerved extremes. See elſe yourſelf,
There is no malice in this burning coal.
The breath of heav'n hath blown its ſpirit out,
And ſtrew'd repentant aſhes on its head.

KING JOHN, Act IV. Scene 1.

More improbable ſtill is it that King John, in the agonies of death, and with his ſtomach and bowels inflamed with intenſe heat, would pun and quibble in the manner that Shakeſpeare repreſents him to have done; and that, when he was not able to procure any thing to cool his inward heat, he ſhould ſay,

I beg *cold comfort*, and you are ſo ſtrait,
And ſo ungrateful, you deny me that.

Act V. Scene 9.

If we cenſure thoſe writers who repreſent perſons as ſpeaking in a manner unſuitable to their ſituation, with much more rea-

ſon may we cenſure thoſe who repreſent perſons as thinking and ſpeaking in a manner unſuitable to *any character*, or any circumſtances whatever? Among theſe unnatural ſentiments we may rank the avowing, or open undiſguiſed propoſal, of wicked purpoſes: becauſe human nature is ſo conſtituted, that direct vice and wickedneſs is univerſally ſhocking. For this reaſon men ſeldom entertain the thought of it in their own minds, much leſs propoſe it to others, but either under the appearance of virtue, or of ſome great advantage, and with ſome *ſalvo* for the immorality of it.

With admirable propriety doth King John hint to Hubert how much he would oblige him if he would remove prince Arthur out of his way. But the following ſoliloquy of the Baſtard Falconbridge, in the ſame play, is certainly unnatural.

> Well, while I am a beggar I will rail,
> And ſay there is no ſin but to be rich:
> And being rich, my virtue then ſhall be
> To ſay there is no vice but beggary.
> Since kings break faith upon commodity,
> Gain be my lord, for I will worſhip thee.
>
> KING JOHN, Act II. Scene 6.

In a much more unnatural and extravagant manner is Lady Macbeth repreſented talking to herſelf when ſhe is projecting the death of the king. *Macbeth*, Act I. Scene 7.

Inſtances of the moſt abſurd rant, and ſuch extravagance as is incompatible with every character, and with every paſſion, abound in Dryden's plays, particularly in the part of Almanzor in the Conqueſt of Granada.

It is impoſſible not to ſmile when Moliere makes Harpagus (when he is about to examine upon the rack all his family, ſervants,

vants, ſons, and daughters) ſay he would apply the torture himſelf, " et a moi auſſi."

Very extravagant likewiſe is the following ſpeech, which Shakeſpeare puts into the mouth of Ligarius:

——— Now bid me run,
And I will ſtrive with things impoſſible,
And get the better of them.

JULIUS CÆSAR, Act II. Scene 3.

LECTURE XV.

Of Forms of Addreſs adapted to gain BELIEF; *and, firſt, of thoſe that imply* PRESENT THOUGHT, *and an* UNPREMEDITATED EXPRESSION.

HAVING obſerved what I think moſt important relating to the *paſſions*, I proceed to conſider what relates to the *judgment*, in aſſenting to what is propoſed to it.

Independent of the power of *arguments*, there are ſeveral *forms of addreſs adapted to engage belief*, which abound in the works of orators. Theſe it is in the power of every ſpeaker to adopt at pleaſure, as they are, each of them, nothing more than a different manner in which arguments may be introduced and expreſſed. Since, however, they do contribute greatly to the ſucceſs of an orator, I ſhall enumerate the principal and moſt ſtriking of them, and endeavour to ſhew the cauſe of the influence which they have upon our minds.

Every art of perſuaſion founded upon nature, and really tending to engage belief, muſt conſiſt of ſuch forms of addreſs as are natural to a perſon who is himſelf ſtrongly convinced of the truth and importance of what he contends for; who is conſcious that he is perfectly maſter of his ſubject, and acquainted with every thing that can be advanced for or againſt the queſtion in debate;

debate; who is poſſeſſed even of a redundancy of proof for what he advances; and who is, moreover, perfectly candid and unprejudiced, willing to allow all the weight he can to the pleas of his adverſaries.

From the principle of *ſympathy*, which is natural to the human mind, we univerſally feel ourſelves diſpoſed to conform to the feelings, the ſentiments, and every thing belonging to the ſituation of thoſe we converſe with, and particularly of all thoſe perſons who engage much of our attention. If, therefore, no prejudice intervene, we always feel ourſelves more or leſs diſpoſed to adopt the opinions of thoſe perſons with whom we have frequent intercourſe. Conſequently, we are, in all caſes, more diſpoſed to give our aſſent to any propoſition, if we perceive that the perſon who contends for it is really in earneſt, and believes it himſelf. Indeed, prior to our hearing any arguments, we are naturally inclined to ſuppoſe, that a ſtrong conviction and perſuaſion in other perſons could not be produced without a *ſufficient cauſe*; from being ſenſible that a like ſtrong perſuaſion is founded upon ſufficient reaſons in ourſelves. The ideas of *ſtrong perſuaſion* and of *truth* being, on this account, intimately aſſociated together, the one will introduce the other, ſo that whatever manner of addreſs tends to demonſtrate that the advocate for any opinion is really convinced of it himſelf, tends to propagate that conviction.

A perſon ſhews that he is fully perſuaded of the truth of what he contends for, and his confidence in the goodneſs of his cauſe, when he is willing to appeal to the judgment and conſcience of other perſons, and particularly when he dare appeal to his adverſary himſelf. For no perſon would ſeriouſly make ſuch an appeal, who did not believe his cauſe to be ſo clear that all the world,

world, if they conſidered it, would concur with him in it. This formal appeal, therefore, to a perſon's judges, his hearers, and his adverſary, is a figure of the firſt rank in oratory, and greatly conducive to the purpoſe of perſuaſion.

It hath ſtill a ſtronger effect of the ſame kind when an orator breaks out into an *exclamation*, expreſſing his wonder, aſtoniſhment, and indignation, that his opinion ſhould be controverted, or his cauſe oppoſed; and a ſtronger ſtill, when not only viſible but inviſible powers, when not only rational beings, but things inanimate are invoked, to atteſt the truth of what is advanced. All paſſions are communicative, and are univerſally propagated by the genuine expreſſions of them.

Many happy inſtances of theſe forms of addreſs are found in the orations of Cicero, particularly in his invectives againſt Verres, Catiline, and Antony. The very firſt words of his firſt oration againſt Catiline, which was delivered in the ſenate, when Catiline himſelf was preſent, conſiſt of a very vehement exclamation and expoſtulation. "How long, O Catiline, will you "abuſe our patience? &c." In a ſpeech aſcribed to Furius Capitolinus, in which he expoſtulates with the plebeians upon the encroachments they were perpetually making upon the privileges of the patricians, is the following noble and ſpirited appeal: "In the name of the immortal gods, what is it, Romans, "you would have? You deſired tribunes; for the ſake of peace "we granted them. You were eager to have decemvirs; we "conſented to their creation: you grew weary of theſe decem-"virs, we obliged them to abdicate, &c."

In Cicero's oration for Milo, he exclaims, "O that happy "country which ſhall receive this man! Ungrateful this if it "baniſh him! miſerable if it loſe him!" Declaiming in praiſe

of Pompey, he invokes countries, ſeas, havens, and iſlands, as witneſſes of his courage, humanity, and wiſdom.

There is ſomething peculiarly ſolemn and awful in the following apoſtrophes in the ſcriptures: "Hear, oh heavens, and give "ear, oh earth, for the Lord hath ſpoken, Iſaiah i. 2. Be aſto-"niſhed, oh ye heavens, at this, Jer. ii. 12."

Whatever, likewiſe, hath the appearance of *preſent thought*, and *extempore* unprepared addreſs, contributes not a little to make a perſon ſeem to be in earneſt. He then ſeems to ſpeak from his *real feelings*, without having recourſe to artificial helps. In this view it hath often a good effect to check one's ſelf, and retract what we were ſaying, or even to reject a ſecond, and recur to a firſt ſuppoſition; to ſtop ſuddenly, and make an imperfect ſenſe, as if ſomething juſt then conceived had checked the courſe of the ſentence, which was intended to have been delivered without interruption. Objections which the orator thinks proper to reply to, he may make to appear as if they occurred to his mind only the moment he mentions them; in which caſe the anſwer, not appearing to be premeditated, will be heard with the utmoſt advantage. It hath, likewiſe, the appearance of purſuing a ſudden ſtart of thought, and hath ſometimes a very good effect, when opportunity is taken, as if undeſignedly, to make *parentheſes* in ſentences, and to *digreſs* from the principal ſubject or argument, and return to it again.

I think it needleſs to give examples of all theſe varieties of addreſs which derive their power from the reſemblance they bear to *unpremeditated diſcourſe*, in which the ſentiments are ſuppoſed to be natural and ſincere, proceeding directly from the heart; and ſhall only mention one from Tillotſon, in which, with a very

"good

good effect, he retracts a ſingle word. "What is it then can "give men the heart and courage (but I recall that word, be-"cauſe it is not true courage, but fool-hardineſs) to out-brave "the judgments of God."

Such forms as theſe are moſt natural in great agitation of mind, when the ſucceſſion of ideas is uncommonly rapid, and when, conſequently, it may be expected that ſome thoughts ſhould interfere with others, and occaſion frequent breaks in ſentences, and interruptions in a chain of reaſoning. St. Paul's epiſtles abound with theſe abruptneſſes; and as they have not the leaſt appearance of *deſign* in them, they ſhow that he wrote from his heart, and dictated his real thoughts and ſentiments at the time of their compoſition. They likewiſe throw conſiderable light upon the *natural temper* of that great apoſtle. We ſee that he was a warm man, of a quick apprehenſion, of great ardour and vehemence in whatever he engaged in, and that he was inclined to be haſty.

The perfection of ſpeaking is, certainly, to ſpeak extempore. All men muſt, in a greater or leſs degree, have tried their talent this way, and have found the difficulty of ſucceeding in it. Hence people liſten with a continued *wonder* while a perſon is delivering himſelf fluently without notes, and their admiration concurs with the forementioned cauſes to attach them to the ſpeaker, to his ſentiments and views. Can we imagine it poſſible that the primitive chriſtians, the firſt reformers, and, I may add, the founders of our modern ſects, ſuch as the Independants, Quakers, and Methodiſts, could ever have attained to ſo great a degree of popularity, without the talent of haranguing extempore? Can we then wonder at the ſucceſs of a judicious and happy imitation of thoſe extempore forms of addreſs?

As a caution againſt making too free with theſe very bold forms of addreſs, which are adapted to ſhow that a man is in earneſt, and confident of the goodneſs of his cauſe, I would adviſe that no one appeal to another, unleſs it be morally certain that the perſon he appeals to, and boldly expoſtulates with, will really take his part, or, at leaſt, that it will be generally allowed that he *ought* to do it. Otherwiſe he expoſes his own vain confidence, and betrays the cauſe he eſpouſes.

Let no perſon venture to exclaim and apoſtrophize, unleſs the *importance*, as well as the goodneſs of his cauſe will juſtify it. Theſe ſtrong natural emotions are not to be counterfeited. To theſe *arcana of nature* it is hardly poſſible that *artifice* ſhould have acceſs: and if the circumſtances and occaſions of the addreſs will not juſtify ſuch vehemence of ſtyle, a man makes himſelf ridiculous by attempting the impoſition. Beſides, direct exclamations and apoſtrophes to perſons not preſent, or to things inanimate, though ever ſo juſt, ought to be uſed very ſparingly; ſince, if they produce their natural and full effect, they raiſe the attention to ſuch a degree as cannot be kept up long.

It is, likewiſe, proper that all Engliſhmen in particular ſhould be informed, that a perſon of a liberal education in this country can hardly ever be in ſuch a ſituation, as will not render the imitation of ſome of the boldeſt, the moſt ſucceſsful, and admired ſtrokes of Roman, not to ſay Grecian eloquence, extremely improper and ridiculous. The Engliſh pulpit, the Engliſh bar, and the Engliſh ſenate, require an eloquence more addreſſed to the reaſon, and leſs directly to the paſſions, than the harangues of a Roman pleader, or the ſpeech of a Roman ſenator. Our hearers have generally more good ſenſe and juſt diſ-

cernment, at leaſt they are naturally more *cool* and phlegmatic; both which qualities check a propenſity to ſtrong emotions: and marks of great vehemence muſt appear abſurd in a ſpeaker, when the audience is unmoved, and ſees nothing to occaſion ſuch emotion.

An audience, indeed, that is wholly *illiterate*, may have all their paſſions actuated by means of admiration, or aſtoniſhment, and *mechanical communication*; but then there are few Engliſh audiences compoſed wholly of perſons of ſo little reading and reflection as makes that practicable. And it is hardly poſſible that a perſon whoſe reading has lain among modern Engliſh books, or has converſed with perſons of a liberal education, ſhould not have acquired more *delicacy of taſte*, than to be taken with that groſs and direct addreſs to the paſſions, which Cicero adopted with applauſe. The refinement of modern times requires that we ſpeak, upon all occaſions, with more temper, and uſe more addreſs in raiſing the paſſions.

If a perſon adopt any of the forms of addreſs which derive their beauty, force, and efficacy, from their ſeeming to be extemporary, as well as thoſe which expreſs great earneſtneſs and vehemence; all his geſtures, the air of his countenance, and his whole manner, ſhould correſpond to them; becauſe certain geſtures and motions of the countenance univerſally accompany natural vehemence, and genuine extemporary expreſſion. When theſe things, which have ſo ſtrong a connection in nature, are not united, the whole muſt appear extremely unnatural, the *imperfect artifice* will be eaſily ſeen through, and the impoſtor be deſervedly expoſed.

If a perſon never attempt theſe forms of ſpeech but when his temper really correſponds to and dictates them, he will ſeldom fail

fail in point of propriety; becauſe the ſtate of mind being ſtrongly aſſociated with thoſe correſpondent motions, they are excited mechanically and juſtly. No *attention* can ſupply the place of this. The external expreſſions of paſſion, with all their variations, correſponding to the different degrees of their emotions, are too complex for any perſon in the circumſtances of a public ſpeaker to be able to attend to them. Or, were it poſſible, the difference between a *genuine automatic* and a *voluntary* motion, is ſufficiently apparent. All motions that are automatic have a quickneſs and vigour which are loſt when they become voluntary; witneſs *ſighing*, *laughing*, the geſtures peculiar to *anger*, &c. and the ſame when imitated. The difference is too apparent to eſcape any perſon's obſervation.

If theſe obſervations be ſufficiently attended to, they will deter any prudent and conſiderate perſon from attempting phraſes and modes of addreſs, expreſſive of *earneſtneſs*, when they do not really feel thoſe emotions, which will of themſelves ſuggeſt the proper attitudes and geſtures correſponding to them.

Theſe cautions are given in this place, becauſe they peculiarly relate to thoſe forms of addreſs which expreſs earneſtneſs, extreme confidence in the goodneſs of one's cauſe, and that quick conception and animated delivery natural to *extemporary* ſpeaking, which have now been explained. They are, indeed, applicable, but not in the ſame degree, to the remaining forms of addreſs which are adapted to gain belief.

LECTURE XVI.

Of OBJECTIONS, SUPPRESSION *of what might be ſaid, and Marks of* CANDOUR.

WE more eaſily give our aſſent to any propoſition when the perſon who contends for it appears, by his manner of delivering himſelf, to have a perfect knowledge of the ſubject of it, ſo as to be apprized beforehand of every thing that can be objected to it, and eſpecially if he ſeem to be maſter of more arguments than he chuſes to produce. For we naturally preſume that a perſon thus furniſhed hath *ſtudied* the queſtion in debate, that he cannot but have weighed the arguments that appear to be ſo familiar to him; and therefore that he hath determined juſtly concerning it. Theſe forms of addreſs, as well as thoſe which are natural to a perſon who is greatly in earneſt, have been obſerved, and the advantage attending them may be had by thoſe perſons who adopt, or imitate them, with judgment.

Thus an able orator will ſometimes diſarm his antagoniſts, and gain his hearers, by *anticipating* all they can alledge for themſelves, and by obviating their cavils before they have had any opportunity to ſtart them; by which means his argument proceeds without interruption.

The

The chief art of an orator in anſwering objections conſiſts in introducing them at a proper time, juſt when it may be ſuppoſed they may have occurred to his hearers; before they could have had time to influence their minds, and leſſen the weight of his arguments. By this means an orator ſeems to read the very thoughts of his audience; and a proof of ſuch a perfect acquaintance with his ſubject, and even with the ſentiments of his hearers, and of his adverſaries, about it, cannot fail to operate powerfully in his favour.

In an oration aſcribed to Junius Brutus, exhorting the Romans to throw off the yoke of the Tarquins, we have an example of an objection anticipated in a very happy, maſterly, and ſpirited manner. After demonſtrating to the people the power they were poſſeſſed of to redreſs their grievances, the urgent neceſſity, and peculiarly-favourable opportunity for exerting it; he makes a ſudden pauſe, as if he had juſt perceived ſome ſigns of diffidence in the countenances of his audience, and had diſcerned the very thoughts which occaſioned them; and ſays, "Some of you are, "perhaps, intimidated by the *army* which Tarquin now com- "mands. The ſoldiers, you imagine, will take the part of "their general. Baniſh ſo groundleſs a fear. The love of li- "berty is natural to all men. Your fellow-citizens in the camp "feel the weight of oppreſſion with as quick a ſenſe as you "that are in Rome. They will as eaſily ſeize the occaſion of "throwing off the yoke. But let us grant there may be ſome "among them who, through baſeneſs of ſpirit, or a bad educa- "tion, will be diſpoſed to favour the tyrant. The number of "theſe can be but ſmall, and we have means ſufficient in our "hands to reduce them to reaſon. They have left us hoſtages "more dear to them than life. Their wives, their children,

"their

" their fathers, their mothers, are here in the city. Courage, " Romans, the gods are for us," &c.

An example of the ſame nature we have in St. Paul, diſcourſing about the reſurrection. " But ſome will ſay, How are the " dead raiſed? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, " that which thou ſoweſt is not quickened except it die," &c. 1 Cor. xv. 35, 36.

If it be not convenient to ſpeak at large to an objection juſt at the time when it may moſt probably be ſuppoſed to occur to the audience, when yet it might be attended with ſome inconvenience, and it would not be prudent, wholly to overlook it; it may, in ſome meaſure, take off the force of it, if, at that time, the orator only hint his being aware of it, and promiſe to diſcuſs it more particularly afterwards. In this caſe the hearer is engaged to drop his attention to it, and to defer the conſideration of it till the ſpeaker himſelf take notice of it.

Sometimes there may be an appearance of impropriety in the very *circumſtances* of the oration, which muſt be taken notice of before any argument can be entered upon. As when Demoſthenes roſe up to ſpeak firſt in the aſſembly, when he was not of a ſufficient age to aſſume that privilege, and when Cicero engaged in the accuſation of Verres, when he had never appeared at the bar before, but in the defence of his clients. In both theſe caſes thoſe accompliſhed orators endeavoured to ſatisfy their audiences with reſpect to theſe unexpected circumſtances, before they entered upon any article of the ſubject in debate.

It is a capital ſtroke of eloquence, when an orator is able to retort the objection of his adverſary upon himſelf; and, allowing the truth of what is objected againſt him, to ſhow that, in reality, it is ſo far from making againſt him, that it makes greatly for

him, and, in fact, helps to confute his opponent. Thus St. Paul frankly acknowledges the *hereſy* with which his adverſaries charged him; but at the ſame time intimates that his was ſuch a hereſy as was perfectly conſiſtent with, and even required by the law which they were then endeavouring to prove he had violated, inſulted, and apoſtatized from. "But this I confeſs unto "thee, that after the way which they call hereſy, ſo worſhip I the "God of my fathers, believing all things which are written in the "law, and the prophets; and have hope towards God, which "they themſelves alſo allow, that there ſhall be a reſurrection of "the dead, both of the juſt and unjuſt." Acts xxiv. 14, 15.

Cicero, though not with the ſtricteſt regard to truth, endeavours to give a favourable turn of this kind to the objection which was made to his conduct in leaving Rome, during the prevalence of the Clodian faction. "My departure," he ſays, "is objected to me; which charge I cannot anſwer without commending "myſelf. For what muſt I ſay? That I fled from a conſciouſneſs of guilt? But what is charged upon me as a crime was ſo "far from being a fault, that it is the moſt glorious action ſince "the memory of man. That I feared to be called to account by "the people? That was never talked of; and if it had been done, "I ſhould have come off with double honour. That I wanted "the ſupport of good and honeſt men? That is falſe. That I "was afraid of death? That is a calumny. I muſt therefore "ſay, what I would not unleſs compelled to it, that I withdrew "to preſerve the city."

In ſuch caſes as theſe, the pleaſing ſurprize of the audience, from ſeeing a thing in a light ſo different from what they expected, and in which it had been repreſented, and the conviction of the extreme weakneſs of the adverſary, in laying

hold

hold of arguments which really made againſt him, operate greatly in the orator's favour.

Any thing in an oration which is introduced in this form of *objection* and *anſwer*, or any thing ſimilar to it, falls properly under the conſideration of *artificial addreſs*; ſince nothing of that kind is abſolutely neceſſary in argumentation. In ſtrict ſynthetical demonſtration there is no part of the whole proceſs which bears that name, or any thing equivalent to it. Every demonſtration is built upon ſelf-evident truths. If a perſon thoroughly underſtand the proceſs as he goes along, no objection will ever occur. If any do occur, it ſhows that he hath not ſufficiently attended to ſomething or other that went before, and he hath nothing to do but reviſe the ſteps he hath gone over, for his complete ſatisfaction.

Facts and circumſtances, on which the orator doth not intend to lay the chief ſtreſs of his argument, are often employed to good advantage, when they are mentioned only in a ſlight and incidental manner. By this artifice an orator inſinuates, that it was in his power to have ſaid a great deal more upon a ſubject than he hath done; and while he ſeems, out of a redundancy of proof, to ſelect only a few of the moſt important arguments, the imagination of the hearer is apt to give more than their juſt weight to thoſe which he affects to paſs over in ſilence. Beſides, it often happens that there is one point of light in which a fact, or a circumſtance, may for a moment be ſhewn to advantage; whereas, if the ſpeaker dwelt longer upon it, a cloſer attention would exhibit views of it unfavourable to his purpoſe.

By this art, circumſtances which would have made no figure in a detail, and have even given an idea of the poorneſs of a cauſe

in which they were minutely inſiſted on, may contribute very conſiderably to the ſucceſs of an oration. They are hereby ſeen in their moſt favourable light, and expoſed to view no longer than they will bear it.

Thus Demoſthenes, in recounting the victories of Philip, ſays, "I ſay nothing of his expeditions againſt the Illyrians, and "Pannonians, againſt Arymbas, and others, with which every "body is acquainted." Thus alſo Cicero, in one of his invectives, "I do not mention my adverſary's ſcandalous gluttony and "drunkenneſs, I take no notice of his brutal luſts, I ſay not a "ſyllable of his treachery, malice, and cruelty." And, in his defence of Sextius, "I might ſay many things of his liberality, "kindneſs to his domeſtics, his command in the army, and mo-"deration during his office in the province; but the honour of "the ſtate preſents itſelf to my view, and, calling me to it, ad-"viſes me to omit theſe leſſer matters."

When an orator ſpeaks of himſelf, this ſlight mention or pretended omiſſion of many particulars hath another advantage, that it carries the appearance of *modeſty*, and on that account contributes not a little to recommend the ſpeaker to the favourable opinion of his audience.

This ſlight mention of circumſtances hath an uncommonly-fine effect when, out of a delicacy of ſentiment, and a tenderneſs to thoſe he is addreſſing, a perſon declines inſiſting upon what are, in reality, his ſtrongeſt arguments. Was it poſſible for Philemon to inſiſt upon Oneſimus's paying what he owed him, after reading the following delicate and moving paſſage in Saint Paul's letter to him. "If he hath wronged thee, or oweth thee ought, "put that to mine account. I Paul have written it with mine "own hand, I will repay it. Albeit I do not ſay to thee, how

" thou oweſt unto me, even thine own ſelf beſides." Phil. xviii. 19.

The ſame Saint Paul, ſpeaking of himſelf and the churches of his planting, hath the following exquiſite paſſage, in his epiſtle to the Corinthians, who had liſtened to ſome unfavourable accounts of him. " In nothing am I behind the very chiefeſt " apoſtles, though I be nothing. Truly the ſigns of an apoſtle " were wrought among you, in all patience, in ſigns and won- " ders, and mighty deeds. For what is it wherein ye were in- " ferior to other churches, except it be that I myſelf was not " burdenſome to you? Forgive me this wrong." 1 Cor. xii. 11, 12, 13.

It is eaſy to conceive how, upon many occaſions, it may be of advantage not to ſay, or at leaſt to ſeem not to ſay, all we might upon a ſubject, but leave part to be ſupplied by the hearer or reader. This employs his faculties, and ſets his imagination ſtrongly and effectually at work. When an orator expreſſes himſelf in ſuch a manner as to make his hearers believe he could ſay more, and when his known ſituation makes it probable that he might have ſufficient reaſon for puſhing his argument no farther than he doth (as when a perſon ſpeaks or writes in defence of new and obnoxious opinions) in this caſe, the imagination of the hearer will never ſuggeſt too little. That ſuppreſſion, joined with our concern to ſee a perſon, of whom we have conceived a favourable opinion, in a ſituation which obliges him to conceal the truth, inflames the paſſions more than any thing that could have been ſaid, though ever ſo convincing and ſatisfactory, upon the ſubject.

The circumſtances in which Marc Antony delivered Cæſar's funeral oration, were peculiarly favourable to his views of exciting

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ing compaſſion and reſentment. Broken hints and ſilence would have a greater effect in his ſituation, than ſpeaking openly could have had in any other. For the ſame reaſon it would, no doubt, be for the advantage of chriſtianity, if unbelievers had nothing to fear from propoſing all their objections to it in the moſt open and public manner. In our preſent circumſtances, infidelity is often ſucceſsfully propagated by inſinuations, obſcure hints, and affected ſneers; whereas, if all pretence for theſe artifices were cut off, by an unreſtrained indulgence of free inquiry and debate, no other method could be found by which it could be ſo conveniently propagated. In common life, is it not well known that ſcandal is always moſt effectually propagated by hints and whiſpers?

Let it, however, be remembered, as a caution againſt the improper uſe of this method of promoting any cauſe, that ſilence is ridiculous when no reaſon can be imagined, either from fear, modeſty, tenderneſs, or any other cauſe, why a perſon ſhould not ſpeak out.

Laſtly, nothing more effectually conduces to gain belief, than the appearance of *candour* and *impartiality* in the orator, and his willingneſs to be convinced if he have fallen into an error. An opinion maintained with ſo much modeſty, by a perſon ſo diffident of his own judgment, and who appears to have no motive to bias him in favour of falſehood, is ſure to be attended to without prejudice. We cannot help ſympathizing with ſuch a ſpeaker, and aſſuming his impartiality and candid diſpoſition.

We ſhow our candour when we appear to be in *doubt*, and diſcuſs our own doubts; when we freely allow as much weight as poſſible to the objections of our adverſaries; and particularly when we frankly retract what we acknowledge we had too haſtily

advanced; alſo when, ſeeming to forget our own particular ſituation, as advocates for one ſide of a queſtion, we conſult with our hearers, our judge, or our adverſaries, as if perſons on all ſides were equally impartial, and intent upon finding out the truth. This is paying a compliment to our audience, and to our adverſaries, which is generally returned with advantage. A deciſion of a queſtion, after ſuch a candid and impartial diſcuſſion, hath the appearance of being the unanimous determination of all parties. It is no longer one party only that we are attending to, but we almoſt fancy ſuch a candid opinion to be the reſult of the conſultation of all perſons concerned.

In this caſe, the determination ſhould be indeed impartial, and what every perſon, who hears it, will think it right that all parties ſhould adopt.

We have a fine picture of doubt in Cicero's defence of Cluentius. " I know not which way to turn myſelf," &c.; and a good example of an impartial and fair appeal to an adverſary, in his accuſation of Verres, " Now I deſire your opinion," &c.; and again, in his defence of Rabirius, " What could you have done " in ſuch a caſe?" &c.

LECTURE XVII.

Of the PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION *in general, and of the Standard of* GOOD TASTE.

HAVING conſidered a variety of the moſt important circumſtances relating to the ſtronger *paſſions* and emotions, the knowledge of which more eminently contributes to form a critic in works of taſte and genius, and alſo thoſe *forms of addreſs* which are peculiarly adapted to gain *aſſent*; I come in the third place, according to the method I propoſed, to enumerate thoſe finer feelings which conſtitute the *pleaſures of the imagination*, in order to aſcertain the nature and kind of thoſe refined pleaſures: but, previous to this, I ſhall make a few general obſervations relating to the whole of this part of our ſubject.

The firſt circumſtance I ſhall take notice of with regard to thoſe exquiſite feelings is, that the only inlets to them are, as Lord Kaims obſerves, the *eye* and the *ear*, and that the other ſenſes have nothing to do with them. Colours and ſounds, it is remarkable, are tranſmitted to the mind, or ſenſorium, without any ſenſible intervention of the corporeal organs by which they are tranſmitted. The eye and the ear, when they are in a ſound and healthy ſtate, are ſo little affected by the impreſſion of light, and the vibrations of the air, that were it not for internal evidence, we ſhould not know that we had any ſuch organs.

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We find that when our eye-lids are cloſed, we cannot ſee at all, and that we are obliged to turn our eyes towards any object before we can perceive it, or we ſhould not readily diſcover what it is on which viſion depends. In like manner, it is eaſy to conceive that a rational being, coming into the world with the perfect uſe of the ſenſe of hearing, would not be able, without ſome experiment of the ſame nature, to find out what part of his corporeal ſyſtem was the medium of thoſe ſenſations: whereas we cannot feel, taſte, or even ſmell, without being at the ſame time ſenſible that ſome part of the ſurface of our bodies is affected in the firſt of theſe caſes, and the tongue and noſe in the two laſt.

For theſe reaſons, feeling, taſting, and ſmelling are conſidered as ſenſations of a groſſer kind, and ſeeing and hearing as ſomething of a much more refined and ſpiritual nature. The former we cannot perceive without having at the ſame time an idea of the corporeal inſtruments by which they are conveyed to us; whereas we contemplate ideas of the latter kind, as if we were wholly abſtracted from the body. Hence, among other reaſons, there is a kind of ſhame annexed to the gratification of the groſſer ſenſes. Perſons of a refined taſte affect an indifference to their pleaſures, and diſſemble the ſatisfaction they receive from them; as in eating, drinking, and the like: whereas we are very differently affected towards the pleaſures of harmony, which we perceive by the ear, and the beauty of colours and proportion, which we perceive by the eye.

Another obſervation which may throw conſiderable light upon various affections of the mind, in the perception of thoſe pleaſures which we refer to the imagination, is, that ſince the mind perceives, and is conſcious of nothing, but the ideas that are

preſent to it, it muſt, as it were, *conform* itſelf to them; and even the idea it hath of its own extent, (if we may uſe that expreſſion) muſt enlarge or contract with its field of view. By this means alſo, a perſon, for the time, enters into, adopts, and is actuated by, the ſentiments that are preſented to his mind.

This takes place ſo inſtantaneouſly and mechanically, that no perſon whatever hath reflection, and preſence of mind enough, to be upon his guard againſt ſome of the moſt uſeleſs and ridiculous effects of it. What perſon, if he ſaw another upon a precipice and in danger of falling, could help ſtarting back, and throwing himſelf into the ſame poſture as he would do if he himſelf were going to fall? At leaſt he would have a ſtrong propenſity to do it. And what is more common than to ſee perſons in playing at bowls, lean their own bodies, and writhe them into every poſſible attitude, according to the courſe they would have their bowl to take? It is true, that all men are not equally affected by this remarkable propenſity. The more vivid are a man's ideas, and the greater is his general ſenſibility, the more intirely, and with the greater facility, doth he adapt himſelf to the ſituations he is viewing.

From this principle, converſing with mean and low objects gives the mind an idea of the meanneſs and narrowneſs of its own powers; and ideas of our own greatneſs, dignity, and importance, are the reſult of our contemplating large and grand objects. This will be conſpicuous when we conſider the ſublime in compoſition.

Hence the paſſions, ſentiments, and views of thoſe perſons whoſe hiſtory is written ſo as to engage our attention, become for a time (if they be not extremely oppoſite to our own general ſtate of mind) our own paſſions, ſentiments, and views; and

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particularly, the accounts of the magnanimity, generoſity, courage, clemency, &c. in our heroes, are read with a ſecret complacency and ſelf-applauſe, ariſing from our indulging the ſame temper and diſpoſition.

Hence, in part, ariſes the difficulty of reading the hiſtory of any two rival ſtates, or perſonages, with abſolute indifference and impartiality. Before we were aware, we find we have entered into the ſentiments, paſſions, and intereſts of the one or the other of them; and afterwards find it difficult to *change ſides*, as it were; notwithſtanding, in the progreſs of the hiſtory, we may ſee reaſon enough to be diſguſted with the party we at firſt adopted. We abſurdly continue to wiſh ſucceſs to thoſe we firſt attached ourſelves to, though the reaſons which attached us to them no longer exiſt. The failings on one ſide are regarded with tenderneſs and compaſſion, as the failings of a friend; and the excellencies which diſcover themſelves on the oppoſite ſide, are apt to be looked upon with envy and diſlike, as an advantage in the poſſeſſion of an enemy.

What reader, who has once been intereſted in the fortune of Athens, by reading the firſt book of the Peloponneſian war, written by Thucydides, is not diſtreſſed to the laſt degree with the miſcarriage of the flagrantly ambitious and unjuſt invaſion of Sicily, and the ſiege of Syracuſe? If any ſtriking inſtance of generoſity, or mere courage, once intereſt us in favour of a buccaneer, a highwayman, or even a dextrous cheat, how apt are we to read with pleaſure of the ſucceſs of the deſperate adventures of the former, and of the ingenious but baſe artifices of the latter? It is poſſible that perſons of age, experience, and reflection, may, in a great meaſure, have corrected this mechanical propenſity; but it will ever retain a ſenſible influence over the ge-

nerality of mankind; and theſe are almoſt the only people we have to do with in the buſineſs of the paſſions and imagination.

This obſervation ſhows us how cautious all writers ſhould be not to engage the attention of their readers too much to vicious characters; ſince, when once they have, by this means, engaged our intereſt in their favour, we are very backward to withdraw our good wiſhes; and the intereſt we take in the character and ſchemes of a bad man, cannot but leave upon the mind an impreſſion unfavourable to virtue. A natural love for virtue is a very inſufficient ſecurity againſt this influence, eſpecially in young minds. No writer, who hath at heart the intereſt of virtue, and the happineſs of his fellow-creatures, ought to truſt to it. Even the prudent and virtuous Mr. Richardſon hath intereſted his reader ſo much in the character of *Lovelace*, in Clariſſa, that, I believe, there are few of his readers who would be diſpleaſed with the ſucceſs of his baſe deſigns upon any other woman than Clariſſa herſelf, in whoſe favour we have been beforehand more ſtrongly intereſted.

In the third place, let it be noted, that when each of the pleaſures of the imagination are referred to ſome *one ſource*, I only mean, that ideas and ſenſations of that kind are the *principal* ones that enter into its compoſition. For, in fact, none of our intellectual pleaſures are ſo ſimple as to be derived from one ſingle ſource only. They are all of ſo complex a nature, and are ſo connected with one another, that, it is probable, there is not one ſentiment of pleaſure or pain that can be called *intellectual* (not being a direct impreſſion upon ſome of the external ſenſes) but what is more or leſs compounded of almoſt all the other intellectual pleaſures and pains too. The principle of aſſociation is predominant in every thing relating to our intellectual faculties:

and, in a ſituation ſo expoſed as ours is to *joint impreſſions*, from a variety of independent objects, our ſenſations cannot fail to be ſo commixed and combined together, that it muſt be extremely difficult, if not impoſſible, completely to reſolve any one of them into all their ſeparate, component parts. All that can be done, is, to place each pleaſing object, that occurs in works of taſte and genius, under that ſpecies of pleaſure which originally, or moſt eminently, entered into the compoſition of it; and, at the ſame time, not wholly to omit taking notice of other ſources from which it borrows any thing conſiderable.

Monteſquieu, in his *Eſſay on Taſte*, very ingeniouſly enumerates a variety of cauſes which contribute to excite the ſingle feeling or ſenſation which the mind perceives upon the view of a regular garden. And Dr. Gerard, in his treatiſe upon the ſame ſubject, has illuſtrated the ſame obſervation by analizing the complex ſenſation of pleaſure we perceive from a view of a fine human face.

It will anſwer my purpoſe better, and more eminently contribute to throw light upon ſeveral other important particulars relating to Taſte, to conſider the pleaſures we receive from the proſpect of a fine *country landſcape*, and conſequently from the deſcription of *rural ſcenes* in paſtorals, and books of romance. This will, likewiſe, illuſtrate the doctrine of ASSOCIATION, and the very probable opinion of Dr. Hartley, who ſuppoſed that it is the only mental principle employed in the formation, growth, and declenſion of all our intellectual pleaſures and pains.

There is no perſon, who hath paſſed much of his time in the country, but muſt have connected with the idea of it a variety of diſtinct

diſtinct pleaſures, which are now ſeparately indiſtinguiſhable; though the traces of them, ſtill remaining in the mind, contribute to ſwell the complex ſenſation of pleaſure which he feels upon the view of it. Among the principal ingredients in this complex ſenſation, we may mention the pleaſures with which our external ſenſes have a thouſand times been affected in the country; the ſweet ſmells and the fine colours of flowers, the agreeable taſte of fruits, the melody of birds, and the pleaſure we have received from rural ſports and paſtimes. Theſe, if we be advanced in life, we may have no great reliſh for; yet the ideas of the pleaſure we may formerly have received from theſe objects, ſtill adhere to the idea of the ſcenes in which they were enjoyed, and recur, in a confuſed ſenſation of pleaſure, whenever thoſe ſcenes are preſented to the mind.

To theſe we may add the ideas of the healthfulneſs, and of the comparative innocence of a country life, the apparent uſefulneſs of huſbandry; a view of the plenty of the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life which the earth affords; the ideas of novelty, beauty, and grandeur, with which we have, upon innumerable occaſions, been ſtruck in viewing the ſcenes of nature; together with the ideas of the jocundity and happineſs which our fellow-creatures muſt frequently have ſhared with us in a country life.

All theſe ſources have contributed, in a greater or leſs degree, to the complex ſenſe of pleaſure which a fine country proſpect affords; and to theſe a philoſophical and devout obſerver adds lively ideas of the power, wiſdom, and goodneſs of God, the marks of which are ſo conſpicuous in the vegetable and animal world. By him the Deity is ſeen in all his works; and though, upon the firſt view of a rural ſcene, the ideas of the Divine Be-

ing and his providence be not diſtinctly perceived, they cannot fail greatly, to heighten every complex ſenſation into which they really enter.

From the principle of aſſociation we may, likewiſe, account for the tumultuous pleaſurable ſenſation we feel upon the view of the place where we paſſed our infancy, the ſchool where we were educated, or any other place, or perſon, with whom a great number of our ideas and ſenſations have formerly been aſſociated, though they now form one complex ſenſation, and are ſeparately indiſtinguiſhable. Even painful ſenſations, as they give no pain upon reflection, unleſs they have been extremely violent indeed, only contribute to heighten the complex pleaſing emotion.

Sometimes it is obſervable, that, immediately upon feeling a tumultuous ſenſation of this kind, the idea of ſome particular affecting circumſtance will occur diſtinctly, it not having perfectly *coaleſced* with the general complex ſenſation; whereas, by degrees, it intirely vaniſhes into, and makes a part of it, and in its ſeparate ſtate is quite forgotten. Facts of this nature are circumſtances extremely favourable to this hypotheſis of the mechanical generation of our intellectual pleaſures and pains by the principle of aſſociation; and there are few perſons who attend to their feelings but muſt have obſerved them.

It is eaſy to conceive that complex ſenſations of this kind are capable of being transferred to objects which are *ſimilar* to thoſe with which they were originally aſſociated, by means of any common property. Thus the complex ſenſation, connected at firſt with one particular country ſcene, will be excited, though in a fainter degree, by the view of any other country ſcene: and thoſe feelings, which were originally aſſociated with one particular ſchool, will be revived by the ſight of any other ſchool, or even of any

thing belonging to education. And, univerſally, objects poſſeſſed of properties common to thoſe objects with which any ſenſations have been firmly aſſociated, acquire, by their analogy to them, a power of exciting the ſame ſenſations, and conſequently of affecting us in a ſimilar manner with the objects whoſe properties they poſſeſs, in proportion to their reſemblance.

For example; the properties of *uniformity*, *variety*, and *proportion*, or a *fitneſs to ſome uſeful end* having been perceived in moſt of the objects with which pleaſurable ideas and ſenſations have been aſſociated, a complex pleaſurable ſenſation will univerſally be annexed to the marks of uniformity, variety, and proportion, wherever they are perceived; ſo that by noting the properties which are common to thoſe objects which affect our imaginations in an agreeable manner, we may be enabled to give an enumeration of all the ſpecies of the pleaſures of imagination that we are capable of; or of pointing out the different properties, and qualities, in objects which are adapted to give us pleaſure, and contribute to our entertainment in works of taſte and genius.

Whether it will be allowed that the principle of aſſociation is the ſource of *all* the pleaſures which are ſuggeſted by objects of taſte, or not, it is manifeſt that it muſt have a very conſiderable influence in this affair, and will help us to account for much, if not all, of the variety that is obſervable in the taſtes of different perſons.

Had all minds the very ſame degree of ſenſibility, that is, were they equally affected by the ſame impreſſions, and were we all expoſed to the ſame influences, through the whole courſe of our lives, there would be no room for the leaſt diverſity of taſte among mankind. For, in thoſe circumſtances, we ſhould all have aſſociated preciſely the ſame ideas and ſenſations with the ſame objects,

jects, and the ſame properties of thoſe objects; and we ſhould feel thoſe ſentiments in the ſame degree. But ſince our ſituations in life, and the occurrences of our lives, are ſo very various, it cannot but have happened, that different perſons will have aſſociated different ideas and ſenſations with the ſame objects; and, conſequently, they will be differently affected upon the perception of them. Moreover, ſince mens minds are endued with very different degrees of ſenſibility, ſome perſons will be affected in a ſtronger, and ſome in a weaker manner, when their ſenſations are of the ſame kind. For the ſame reaſons, likewiſe, the ſame perſon is liable to be affected in a very different manner by the ſame objects, in different parts of his life, and in different ſituations and diſpoſitions.

There ſeems, however, to be ſo great a ſimilarity in our ſituations, as is ſufficient to afford a foundation for a conſiderable *ſimilarity in taſte*; particularly in perſons whoſe education and manner of life have been nearly the ſame. But a *ſtandard of taſte*, founded upon the ſimilar influences which perſons ſo ſituated have been ſubject to, cannot be applied to thoſe perſons whoſe education and manner of life have been very different. It is no wonder that a perſon accuſtomed to the refined ſentiments of modern times cannot reliſh ſome of the compoſitions of the ancients; that what is deemed a fine taſte in the Eaſt, ſhould not be deemed equally good in Europe; or even that what is admired in France, ſhould not always meet with the ſame approbation in England.

This diverſity of taſte would certainly be much more conſiderable at preſent, were it not for the eaſy intercourſe there is between different nations, and different univerſities, particularly by means of the art of printing; by which they communicate

their ſeveral feelings, and thereby bring their taſtes nearer to a perfect ſimilarity. It confirms this obſervation, that it is generally thought that ſomething of the ſtrength of the Engliſh writers is perceived in ſome of the later French compoſitions; and that our modern polite authors in England have acquired the delicacy and correctneſs of the French. The conſequence of a freer intercourſe between the eaſtern and weſtern parts of the world would, certainly, be their profiting by our taſte, and our manner of compoſition, if not our acquiring alſo ſomething more of theirs. And, from this principle, we may expect that, in conſequence of the growing intercourſe between all the nations of earth, and all the *literati* of them, an uniform and perfect ſtandard of taſte will at length be eſtabliſhed over the whole world.

In the mean time, juſtneſs of taſte will be determined by appealing to the general ſenſe of thoſe who have been the moſt converſant with the ſubjects of it. A deviation from this general taſte will be reckoned a fault, and a coincidence with it an excellence; and the difficulty there is in aſcertaining what is this *medium of opinion* in connoiſſeurs makes the buſineſs of criticiſm, or the ſtandard of judging in works of genius, ſo vague and undetermined as it is. Perſons who have not been converſant with the ſubjects of taſte are excluded from having any vote in this caſe, becauſe their minds have not been in a proper ſituation for receiving the ideas and ſenſations which are requiſite to form a juſt taſte.

LECTURE

LECTURE XVIII.

A general Account of the Pleaſure we receive from Objects that occaſion a moderate Exertion of our Faculties.

ALL beauties, and admired ſtrokes in compoſition, derive their excellence and fine effect, either from drawing out and exerciſing our faculties, by the views they preſent to our minds; or elſe transferring from foreign objects, by the principle of aſſociation, ideas which tend to improve the ſenſe of a paſſage. In what caſes the effect of compoſition is heightened by each of theſe means, and in what manner it is done, will be the ſubject of the following Lectures to explain.

One property eſſential to every thing that gives us pleaſure is, that it occaſions a *moderate exerciſe of our faculties.* Pleaſure conſiſts of ſenſations moderately vigorous. It is, therefore, capable of exiſting in any degree between the two extremes of perfect languor and tranquillity of mind on the one hand, and actual pain and uneaſineſs on the other. It is obſervable, likewiſe, that the more moderate any pleaſure is, the longer continuance it is capable of; and that the more intenſe any pleaſurable ſenſation is, or the more nearly it approaches to a ſtate of pain, the leſs capable it is of a long duration. Immoderate pleaſure, as it were, oppreſſes, fatigues, and exhauſts the mind.

Nothing

Nothing can be more evident than the truth of theſe principles, when applied to our external or corporeal ſenſes. Warmth, for inſtance, is a ſenſation increaſing in pleaſure in all its gradations, from the torpid and benumbed ſtate of the body, till it become actually hot and painful. Likewiſe a moderate and barely ſenſible degree of warmth is agreeable through the whole courſe of our lives; but we ſoon grow impatient of greater degrees of warmth, though for a time they may produce a more grateful ſenſation. In like manner, the limits of the pleaſures of taſte are, the inſipid on the one hand, and the acrid and pungent on the other. Alſo the moderate pleaſure which we receive from our common aliments, is always grateful; whereas viands of a high flavour, abounding with ſalts, which act forcibly upon the nerves appropriated to the ſenſe of taſte, though they yield a more exquiſite reliſh for the time, ſoon cloy and diſguſt the palate. The ſame things may be obſerved concerning the remaining ſenſes of ſmelling, ſeeing, and hearing.

To theſe affections of the external and corporeal ſenſes, thoſe of the internal and intellectual are ſtrictly analogous. Indeed, it is impoſſible they ſhould not be ſo, if the former be the only ſources of the latter; that is, if, as was hinted before, all our intellectual pleaſures and pains conſiſt of nothing but the ſimple pleaſures and pains of ſenſe, commixed and combined together in infinitely-various degrees and proportions, ſo as to be ſeparately indiſtinguiſhable, and transferred upon foreign objects, by the principle of aſſociation.

It is obſervable, likewiſe, that a moderate exertion of our active powers is attended with a continued perception of moderate pleaſure, both as it quickens the perceptive powers, and expoſes us to the influence of objects that are adapted to affect our ſenſes;

but that a violent exertion is, for ſimilar reaſons, attended with pain and uneaſineſs. That this is equally true with reſpect both to the powers of our bodies and the faculties of our minds, is too obvious to require illuſtration. Indeed, it is wiſely provided by Divine Providence, that both our minds and bodies are equally impatient of a ſtate of reſt and inactivity. Hence we are conſtantly impelled to exert ourſelves with vigour in the ſtation in which we are placed; and we can never be happy, and enjoy our being, unleſs we fulfil the great ends of it.

All perſons, indeed, have not an equal reliſh for the ſame exerciſes, but in all minds there is an appetite for ſome or other ſpecies of it; and when once, by addicting ourſelves to any kind of exerciſe, we have acquired a habit of it, from that time it becomes, in a manner, neceſſary to our happineſs.

That the preceding account of the general affections of the mind with reſpect to pleaſure, and the various degrees and gradations of it, are applicable to thoſe which we receive from the polite arts, cannot but be obvious to all perſons of reading, ſtudy, and reflection. No mind can long bear a very rapid ſucceſſion of thoſe ſcenes which, ſingly, give it the moſt exquiſite pleaſure. A judicious compoſer, therefore, is ſenſible that the moſt exquiſite beauties in compoſition may be thrown away and loſt, as it were, when they are placed too near together.

Beſides, in a very quick ſucceſſion of objects, the mind hath not leiſure to perceive and attend to all their powers and relations. They loſe therefore, of courſe, a great part of their full effect. Perhaps the fineſt circumſtances belonging to ſome of the thoughts and expreſſions in a work of genius, may not be thoſe which preſent themſelves to view at the firſt hearing or reading. If, there-

therefore, the mind be immediately, and without any reſpite, hurried to other objects equally ſtriking, it can only be affected with the groſſer ſenſations they convey. There could have been no leiſure or opportunity for its perceiving thoſe more delicate beauties, which conſtitute the chief merit of works of taſte and imagination. In like manner, the grand and exquiſite ſtrokes of expreſſion in muſic are always preceded by ſuch ſtrains as only prepare the mind for them, and are alſo followed by ſuch as do not wholly take off the attention from them.

Moreover, all compoſitions which are intended to engage our attention a conſiderable time, ſhould correſpond pretty nearly to the general and natural courſe of our own ideas and ſenſations. A writer may be as witty, or as ſublime, as he can, and he may crowd theſe graces of compoſition as cloſe as he pleaſes; his readers cannot follow him but at a certain pace. There is a degree beyond which no perſon can accelerate the ſucceſſion of his ideas. If, therefore, a writer wiſh to take his reader along with him, he muſt, of neceſſity, as we may ſay, ſlacken his pace.

On theſe accounts, the more exquiſite ſtrokes of genius ſhould either be confined to ſhort compoſitions, be ſparingly introduced into works of length, or be crowded in places where the mind may take an attentive ſurvey of them, without drawing off its attention from objects of more importance. An *epigram* may contain as much wit as the writer can crowd into it, and the *ode* may be as full of the ſublime as his imagination is capable of making it, and without any inconvenience; becauſe the whole compoſition having very moderate bounds, and the attention not being ſolicited farther, we may attend to any part of it as long as we pleaſe, and enjoy it at our leiſure: but a great number of what are called the graces and maſterly ſtrokes of compoſition

are loſt in a hiſtory, in a heroic poem, or an intereſting ſcene in a tragedy.

If theſe works be compoſed in a good taſte, the attention of the reader is fixed upon the incidents; he is *haſtening* to the cataſtrophe, and will not ſtop to examine all the beauties of the compoſition: that were an object quite foreign to the views of a perſon whoſe mind was properly engroſſed by the *ſubject* of the work. It is abſolutely impoſſible to be properly impreſſed with, and to keep in view, the greater ſentiments with which the mind is inſpired by ſuch works as the Iliad, the Odyſſee, and the Æneid, and at the ſame time give any attention to ſuch minute criticiſms as ſome commentators have deſcended to, and taken the pains to make upon them. It is a fundamental rule in all kinds of compoſition, that they ought to be more or leſs elaborate, according as they are longer or ſhorter; or, rather, according to the opportunity they give the mind to attend to all the beauties of them.

In theſe caſes, however, regard muſt be had, if poſſible, to the perſons for whoſe uſe any kind of compoſition is made, and even to the temper of mind in which it is moſt likely to be peruſed. For it is certain that the ſucceſſion of ideas, to which the tenor of a compoſition ſhould correſpond, is very different in different perſons, and in different ſituations of mind. A ſtyle adapted to the vulgar, whoſe minds are wholly uncultivated, whoſe apprehenſions are conſequently ſlow, and whoſe feelings are ſtrong, would by no means ſuit perſons whoſe apprehenſions have been quickened, and whoſe ſenſations have been refined, by education and reflection: nor would that ſtyle, which was proper to be peruſed by perſons in a tranquil and compoſed ſtate of mind, ſuit the

ſame

ſame perſon as well when the ſucceſſion of his ideas was accelerated by paſſion, or a ſtate of anxious ſuſpenſe.

An harangue to a multitude ſhould conſiſt of exceedingly ſtrong and bold images, expreſſed with great plainneſs and perſpicuity, and with conſiderable intervals of intermediate ideas; whereas the ſtrokes ſhould be both more delicate and more frequently repeated, which are intended to make an impreſſion upon an audience of cultivated underſtandings and improved taſte. And it requires a ſtyle extremely animated and conciſe to ſuit a perſon whoſe mind is in a kind of ferment, when the apprehenſion is more than uſually quick, and the ſucceſſion of ideas accelerated greatly beyond their uſual courſe.

An attention to this ſame object, viz. the exerciſe of our faculties, will direct us to the proper medium between the *conciſe* and *diffuſe* in ſtyle. By the conciſe or diffuſe in ſtyle, I do not mean one that conſiſts of ſhort or long periods; but by conciſe I mean that which leaves more, and by diffuſe that which leaves leſs to be ſupplied by the reader, whether the ſentences be long or ſhort. Theſe two kinds of ſtyle have each their proper place where they may be uſed with propriety and advantage.

We cannot go on with a work of length, if every ſentence require a conſiderable exerciſe of our own faculties. It is too fatiguing, at leaſt to the generality of readers. But all compoſitions, and particularly thoſe of ſmall length, are inſupportably inſipid, if the writer have been ſo unſeaſonably officious, as to have left nothing to the exerciſe of the active faculties of his readers, and the whole excite nothing but a train of *paſſive perceptions*.

For this reaſon, the ſtyle of Livy will be thought, by the generality of readers of hiſtory, preferable to that of Tacitus;

whereas

whereas the conciſe ſtyle of Marcus Antoninus, and even of Seneca, ſeems to be happily adapted to philoſophical meditations, which are ſuppoſed to be read with great deliberation, and with frequent pauſes for reflection.

It is no paradox to ſay, that the ſame ſtyle will ſuit a perſon when he is in a ſituation which renders his apprehenſion uncommonly quick, and the ſucceſſion of his ideas rapid, and one which gives him leiſure for reflection; though his mind be quite cool in the one caſe, and violently agitated in the other; becauſe, in both ſituations, the mind will eaſily ſupply what the writer omits. Neither doth this encomium upon the ſtyle of Antoninus imply any cenſure on the very different ſtyle of Cicero: for his philoſophical writings are *declamations*, and not *meditations*.

There is another method in which a writer may employ the faculties of his readers, but it is giving them a more diſagreeable kind of exerciſe than that which was referred to above, and which is productive of a much lower kind of pleaſure: I mean the trouble a writer may give his reader to underſtand his meaning. If the meaning of a writer be intelligible, the exerciſe he gives our faculties is employed upon his ſubject, in taking thoſe views of things and of their relations which were indiſtinctly pointed out by himſelf: and, provided theſe diſcoveries be not very difficult to make, they yield a very high kind of entertainment. But if all the difficulty of a compoſition be owing to frequent ellipſes, and a diſordered conſtruction, and, conſequently, terminate when the writer's meaning is perfectly underſtood; it is a buſineſs of *words* only, and can yield but little ſatisfaction. Is not this the caſe ſometimes with Thucydides, and Lord Clarendon?

Not

Not that a writer is, in all caſes, to be condemned when he gives his reader ſome trouble to underſtand him. Provided it be not the *chief* exerciſe he gives our faculties, it may, upon the whole, have a good effect. To this purpoſe the tranſpoſition of words and clauſes from their natural order, and occaſional parentheſes, are ſometimes well employed. Theſe, when they are uſed moderately, occaſion no greater pain from ſuſpenſe, than what is more than counterbalanced by the pleaſure we receive, the moment it terminates, in our ſeeing the ſenſe complete. It is certainly an advantage peculiar to ancient languages, that the words of them may be tranſpoſed, for this and other purpoſes, at pleaſure. However, in the generality of compoſitions, it is indiſputable, that the proper medium of excellence is much nearer the extreme of perſpicuity than of obſcurity.

Perſons who have much leiſure for reading and ſpeculation may derive great advantage from theſe obſervations, concerning the moderate exerciſe of our faculties, in the conduct of their ſtudies. Intenſe application to the abſtract ſciences, to the mathematics, and philoſophy, the reading of languages that are rather difficult to us, or the buſineſs of compoſition, is, undoubtedly at firſt, very fatiguing to all minds. Many perſons are ſoon diſcouraged from ſo ſevere an exerciſe of their faculties; and it is ouly habit that can make it eaſy, and reconcile the mind to it. But then the conſequence of a ſucceſsful application to theſe ſevere ſtudies, being attended with a continued conſciouſneſs of the *ſtrength of our faculties*, is a very high ſenſe of pleaſure, which remains very ſenſibly a conſiderable time after the exerciſe is

over; whereas the pleaſure we receive from the reading of hiſtory, romance, familiar eſſays, and poetry, though it may be very exquiſite for a time, yet, if it engroſs all our leiſure hours, it is attended with great languor and indifference; and there is ſcarce the leaſt trace of pleaſure left after our attention to them is over: nay, very often, though we read with pleaſure, we give over with diſguſt, and a ſecret diſſatisfaction with ourſelves. The reaſon is, that, in mere reading of this kind, we are little more than paſſive. Trains of ideas paſs before our minds, but no active powers of the ſoul are exerted. Life paſſed in that manner is mere indolence and inaction, to which, whether it be of the body or of the mind, no genuine and laſting happineſs was ever annexed.

To have a full enjoyment of a ſtudious life, the ſeverer ſtudies ſhould be intermixed with the peruſal of entertaining authors. In this ſucceſſion, books of entertainment are read with tenfold more avidity and ſatisfaction. Poetry and works of fiction make a high *entertainment*, when they are made nothing more of; but they make a very poor and inſipid *employment*. Infinitely preferable were it to be confined to the ſtudy of geometry, algebra, or law, without even having a glimpſe of any thing more amuſing, than be condemned to paſs one's life ſleeping over hiſtory, romances, poetry, and plays.

Application to true hiſtory ſeems to be the moſt rational of all theſe; but unleſs hiſtory be read either with a view to gain a knowledge of mankind, in order to form our own conduct; or with ſome ſcientific view, in order to determine ſome important ſubject of rational inquiry, it is nothing better than reading romance. By reading hiſtory with ſome farther view, as a *means* to a farther end, we

we make it a *ſcience.* It then engages our active powers. It is a ſerious buſineſs, and is capable of being purſued with continued and increaſing ardour. Otherwiſe, hiſtory is no more than an amuſement; and, conſidering what hath ever been the ſtate of the political world, and the general objects of hiſtorians, it muſt exhibit many ſcenes extremely diſagreeable to a reader of humanity and delicacy.

LECTURE XIX.

Of NOVELTY.

TO the general account of the pleaſures we receive from the exerciſe of our perceptive and active powers, I ſhall ſubjoin a particular account of thoſe properties of objects which derive their power of pleaſing from the ſame ſource.

To this, in the firſt place, we muſt have recourſe for the charms of NOVELTY. For the firſt perception of an object makes a much ſtronger impreſſion than any ſubſequent perception of it. This muſt neceſſarily be the caſe if perception depend upon any mechanical laws affecting the brain. Upon whatever principle we account for it, the oftener any ſenſations are repeated, the leſs we are affected by them. But the chief ſource of the charms of novelty is the exerciſe of our active powers. Both previous to the perception of any new object, if we have any intimation of it, and immediately upon the perception of it, whether it be a new ſcene in nature, a new train of adventures, or a new ſyſtem of principles, the mind is full of expectation, and is eagerly employed in ſurveying it; which keeps the attention ſtrongly awake, and gives the object an opportunity of making a deep impreſſion. Whereas when this firſt curioſity is gratified, and the object is become familiar, we view it in a more

curſory

curſory and ſuperficial manner; there being then no reaſon for ſo cloſe an attention to it, as we expect no new knowledge or information.

This conſtant appetite, as we may call it, for novelty, ſeems to be inſeparable from beings indued with the faculty of reaſon and reflection, and whoſe happineſs depends upon the uſe they make of the advantages attending their ſituation. Being habitually in queſt of happineſs, we naturally examine every new object with peculiar attention; but when once we are acquainted with all the properties and powers of it, and know how much it is capable of contributing to our main purpoſe, our examination is finiſhed, and the motive for our curioſity is at an end. Moreover, to apply a general obſervation made in a preceding lecture, as the mind conforms itſelf to the ideas which engage its attention, and it hath no other method of judging of itſelf but from its ſituation, the perception of a new train of ideas is like its entering upon a new world, and enjoying a new being, and a new mode of exiſtence.

So loud and inceſſant is the call for novelty in the pleaſures of the imagination, that the generality of readers feel little or no deſire to re-peruſe a performance which is calculated rather to pleaſe than to inſtruct. If a ſecond peruſal do give pleaſure, it is either by the diſcovery of new beauties, or a conſiderable time after the firſt peruſal, when the ſubject, or the method of treating it, hath been almoſt forgotten, and when, conſequently, it is in a manner new: for no perſon, I believe, would throw away his time upon a performance which he was beforehand ſatisfied could preſent him with no new ideas, or new views of things.

If the reaſon why we firſt engage in any new ſtudy, or undertake to read any work of genius, be not explicitly the proſpect

of being entertained with new objects, and new reflections, as is often the caſe, we, notwithſtanding, never ceaſe to be under the influence of that principle during the whole time that we are employed about it. The proſpect of advantage in general, or the expectation of receiving inſtruction and improvement, may have been our firſt and leading motive to thoſe purſuits; but the ultimate ends of our conduct are not of a nature to be attended to conſtantly, and to influence particular actions. Whatever motive it was that firſt put our faculties in motion, it is generally, in theſe caſes, the charms of novelty that keep up the vigour of their exertion. And a happy proviſion it is in our conſtitution, that when great and important motives, from the neceſſary nature of things, intermit their influence, there are a variety of other *ſubſidiary ſprings of action* at hand, which are ſufficient to carry on the work with vigour, by the help of only occaſional reinforcements from the original and firſt-moving power. Thus a perſon undertakes a journey with a view to ſome advantage he expects to derive from it, yet he may ſoon loſe ſight of this, and, notwithſtanding, continue to travel with pleaſure; not propelled by his original impulſe, but entertained with a variety of ſcenes which his change of place continually preſents him with.

This craving appetite for novelty hath produced many very whimſical and extravagant effects in works of taſte and genius. To this many new ſchemes of philoſophy, new ſpecies of compoſition, and new peculiarities of ſtyle, owe their birth. Novelty is the ſureſt and the readieſt road to fame, for all the numerous competitors for that exquiſite ſpecies of ſatisfaction; the firſt inquiry concerning any performance in literature always being, Is there any thing *new* in it?

Nor

Nor is the deſire of novelty leſs conſpicuous in other objects of taſte. What other recommendation have the *Chineſe taſte*, and the revival of the *Gothic*, in architecture, the pantomime entertainments, with all their varieties, on the theatre, and the new forms in which muſical entertainments are daily exhibited? Doth not a regard to novelty influence our choice of the furniture of our houſes, interfere in the diſpoſition of a garden, and ſuggeſt alterations in the faſhion of our cloaths? Why elſe doth a lady of taſte in dreſs, diſcover more conſcious ſatisfaction the firſt time ſhe makes her appearance at an aſſembly, among the firſt in a faſhionable dreſs, than ſhe would have done if ſhe had not been ſeen in the ſame dreſs till a month afterwards, when the *convenience*, and other properties of the habit, remain the ſame?

Even the mere *unexpectedneſs* of objects is often had recourſe to, as a ſubſtitute for abſolute novelty. A well-known object, occuring in a ſituation in which it was wholly unlooked for, makes a ſtronger impreſſion upon the mind than it would have done if it had been expected. In the latter caſe, the mind is occupied with the idea, at leaſt, of the object, before the actual perception of it; and therefore the difference in the previous and ſubſequent ſtate of mind, is only the difference between an *idea* and a *ſenſation*, a difference in degree only. In the former caſe, the ſenſation is made at once, without any previous idea, which makes a difference more than in degree only. Beſides, in this caſe, the relations and circumſtances, if not the object itſelf, are new to us. Alſo the ſenſible contraſt which hence ariſes between the two ſtates of mind, before and after the perception of an unexpected object, contributes to heighten the ſenſation.

By means of this contraſt, familiar ideas, occurring in unexpected ſituations, may occaſion a greater agitation of mind, than new ideas of a ſimilar nature. The reaſon is, that every idea which is become familiar to us, muſt have acquired a variety of aſſociations. Theſe aſſociated circumſtances, occurring to the mind at the ſame inſtant with the ideas to which they are connected, immediately ſtrike the mind with the ſenſe of any ſeeming inconſiſtency there may be, between them and the new and unexpected ſituations in which we meet with them. Thus the ſudden appearance of a friend, whom we thought to have been in a diſtant place, affects us more ſenſibly, than ſeeing any face that is quite new to us, in the ſame place and circumſtances. With the latter we have connected no ideas of any circumſtances which have the leaſt ſeeming inconſiſtency with the circumſtances in which we find them: with the other, we have connected ſuch ideas.

The ſenſation which we feel upon the unexpected appearance of a well-known object, is termed *ſurprize*; whereas an object perfectly new is ſaid to excite our *wonder*.

The gratification which the mind is ſure to receive from ſurprize, may add ſomething to the influence of thoſe other motives which carry ſome people with ſo much eagerneſs to the gaming-table. There the continual expectation of events, on which a great deal is depending, and of which we can, with no degree of certainty, form the leaſt conjecture, keeps the attention awake to an extreme degree; which always prepares the mind for receiving a ſtrong impreſſion. If we be intereſted in the event, our paſſions of hope and fear, being gratified in their turn, greatly augment the internal agitation, ſo as often to carry it beyond the limits of pleaſure, and make it terminate in the moſt painful and tormenting anxiety.

LECTURE

LECTURE XX.

Of the SUBLIME.

GREAT objects pleaſe us for the ſame reaſon that *new* objects do, viz. by the exerciſe they give to our faculties. The mind, as was obſerved before, conforming and adapting itſelf to the objects to which its attention is engaged, muſt, as it were, enlarge itſelf, to conceive a great object. This requires a conſiderable *effort of the imagination*, which is alſo attended with a pleaſing, though perhaps not a diſtinct and explicit conſciouſneſs of the ſtrength and extent of our own powers.

As the ideas of *great* and *little* are confeſſedly relative, and have no exiſtence but what they derive from a compariſon with other ideas; hence, in all ſublime conceptions, there is a kind of ſecret retroſpect to preceding ideas and ſtates of mind. The ſublime, therefore, of all the ſpecies of excellence in compoſition, requires the moſt to be intermixed with ideas of an intermediate nature; as theſe contribute not a little, by their contraſt, to raiſe and aggrandize ideas which are of a rank ſuperior to themſelves. Whenever any object, how great ſoever, becomes familiar to the mind, and its relations to other objects is no longer attended to, the ſublime vaniſhes. Milton's battle of the angels, after the prelude to the engagement, would have been read with no greater

emotions

emotions than are excited by the hiſtory of a common battle, had not the poet perpetually reinforced his ſublime, as it were, by introducing frequent compariſons of thoſe ſuperior beings, and their actions, with human combatants and human efforts. It is plainly by means of compariſon that Horace gives us ſo ſublime an idea of the unconquerable firmneſs of Cato:

Et cuncta terrarum ſubacta,
Preter atrocem animum Catonis.

For the ſame reaſon a well-conducted *climax* is extremely favourable to the ſublime. In this form of a ſentence, each ſubſequent idea is compared with the preceding; ſo that if the former have been repreſented as large, the latter, which exceeds it, muſt appear exceedingly large. The effect of this we ſee in that ſublime paſſage of Shakeſpeare, inſcribed upon his monument in Weſtminſter Abbey:

The cloud-capt towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The ſolemn temples, the great globe itſelf,
And all which it inherit, ſhall diſſolve,
And, like the baſeleſs fabric of a viſion,
Shall leave no wreck behind.

The intermediate ideas which are introduced to increaſe the ſublime, by means of compariſon with the object whoſe grandeur is to be inhanced by them, ought to be of a *ſimilar* nature; becauſe there is no compariſon of things diſſimilar. The difference between them ſhould be nothing more than that of greater and leſs: and even in this caſe, it often happens that the contraſt of things between which there is a very great diſparity (as will be explained hereafter) produces the *burleſque*, a ſentiment of a quite oppo-

oppoſite nature to the ſublime. It is not improbable but that many of Mr. Pope's readers may affix ludicrous ideas to the following lines, which, in his own conception, and that of his more philoſophical readers, were very ſublime.

> Who ſees with equal eye, as God of all,
> A hero periſh, or a ſparrow fall;
> Atoms, or ſyſtems, into ruin hurl'd;
> And now a bubble burſt, and now a world.
>
> ESSAY ON MAN. Ep. I.

Sparrows, *atoms*, and *bubbles*, do not make the ſame figure in the eye of the generality of mankind, that they do in that of a philoſopher.

It follows from theſe principles, that no conception can be ſublime which is not *ſimple*. If any ſcene preſent a crowd of ſeparate objects, the mind views them in *ſucceſſion*, though in a very quick and rapid one, and exerts no extraordinary effort to conceive and comprehend any of them. However, an idea that doth conſiſt of parts may appear ſublime, if the parts of which it conſiſts be not attended to, but the aggregate of them all be perceived as one idea. This is eaſily illuſtrated by the ideas of *numbers*. Very large numbers, as a *thouſand*, *ten thouſand*, and a *hundred thouſand*, preſent great and ſublime ideas upon the firſt naming of them, which continue ſo long as we endeavour to ſurvey the whole of them at once, without attempting to reſolve them into their component parts; but the arithmetician, who is uſed to compoſe and decompoſe the largeſt numbers, is conſcious of no ſublime idea, even when he is performing the operations of *addition* and *multiplication* upon them.

Objects of the firſt rank in point of magnitude, and which chiefly conſtitute the ſublime of deſcription, are large rivers, high mountains, and extenſive plains; the ocean, the clouds, the heavens, and infinite ſpace; alſo ſtorms, thunder, lightning, volcanos, and earthquakes, in nature; and palaces, temples, pyramids, cities, &c. in the works of men. See a fine enumeration of thoſe ſcenes of nature, which contribute the moſt to the ſublime, in Akenſide upon this ſubject:

——————— Who but rather turns
To heaven's broad fire his unconſtrained view,
Than to the glimmering of a waxen flame?
Who that, from Alpine heights, his lab'ring eye
Shoots round the wide horizon, to ſurvey
The Nile or Ganges roll his waſteful tide,
Thro' mountains, plains, thro' empires black with ſhade,
And continents of ſand, will turn his gaze
To mark the windings of a ſcanty rill
That murmurs at his feet? &c.

PLEASURES OF THE IMAGINATION, Lib. I.

But the account here given of the ſublime, by no means confines it to the ideas of objects which have ſenſible and *corporeal* magnitude. *Sentiments* and *paſſions* are equally capable of it, if they relate to great objects, ſuppoſe extenſive views of things, require a great effort of the mind to conceive them, and produce great effects. Fortitude, magnanimity, generoſity, patriotiſm, and univerſal benevolence, ſtrike the mind with the idea of the ſublime. We are conſcious that it requires a great effort to exert them; and in all caſes when the mind is conſcious of a ſimilar exertion of its faculties, it refers its ſenſations to the ſame claſs.

If

If the virtues above mentioned were more common, the idea of them would not be ſo ſublime.

Who that conſiders the ſentiments of Diomedes, when he prays to Jupiter to *give him day, and then deſtroy him*; the anſwer of Alexander to Parmenio (who had told him that he would accept the offers of Darius, if he were Alexander) *And ſo would I, if I were Parmenio*; and much more the prayer of our Saviour upon the croſs, in behalf of his perſecutors, *Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do:* who, I ſay, that attends to theſe ſentiments, can entertain a doubt that they produce feelings ſimilar to thoſe which we receive from the view of grand and elevated objects? Or a perſon need only to read the following paſſage from Dr. Akenſide, to be convinced that there is a true ſublime in ſentiment:

> Say why was man ſo eminently raiſed
> Above the vaſt creation? Why advanced
> Thro' life and death to dart his piercing eye,
> With thoughts beyond the limits of his frame;
> But that th' Omnipotent might ſend him forth,
> In ſight of mortal and immortal powers,
> As on a boundleſs theatre, to run
> The great career of juſtice, to exalt
> His gen'rous aim to all diviner deeds? &c.

There is no ſurer method of diſcovering thoſe ſenſations and ideas, which are apprehended to be analogous by mankind in general, than by obſerving the analogies of *words* in various languages; for the one will correſpond to the other. As mankind, when the bulk of any language was invented, were not in a ſituation to invent ſuperfluous terms, we may naturally conclude they would content themſelves with the ſame term when there was a

great reſemblance in the ideas they repreſented; but in no other caſe, if they could avoid ſo great an inconvenience. If this clue be allowed to be of any uſe to us, in claſſing our ideas and ſenſations, there will remain no doubt but that there are a variety of things, not material, which raiſe ſenſations ſimilar to thoſe which are excited by objects which have corporeal magnitude and elevation.

How elſe came a man of diſtinguiſhed abilities to be called a *great man?* Why do we ſay that a benevolent man is of an *open* as well as generous temper? and that a covetous man hath a *narrow* ſoul? How came the epithets *proud*, *haughty*, and *lofty*, to be ſynonymous? and how came the terms *ſuperior taſte*, *advancement in honour*, *head of the table*, *high note* in muſic, *aſcending ſeries* in numbers, and *high* and *low*, *near* or *diſtant*, with reſpect to *time*, to prevail ſo generally, and to become ſo familiar, that the figure is perfectly evaneſcent? Moreover, how came robes of ſtate to be made large and full, and thrones to be lofty, &c.? Whence comes it that largeneſs of ſize contributes to make a perſon look majeſtic? And how came the Scythian ambaſſadors to be ſurprized to find *Alexander the Great* to be a *little man?*

I might mention a great many more terms borrowed from corporeal magnitude, extenſion and elevation, applied to things which have none of thoſe qualities; but theſe are ſufficient to ſhow that the perception of the ſentiments, diſpoſitions, and circumſtances, to which they are applied, are attended with a conſciouſneſs of a feeling, ſimilar to that which is excited by the view of objects which have the qualities of corporeal magnitude, extenſion, and elevation; that is, with the ſublime.

The

The ſublime of ſcience conſiſts in general and comprehenſive theorems, which, by means of very great and extenſive conſequences, preſent the idea of *vaſtneſs* to the mind. A perſon of true taſte may perceive many inſtances of genuine ſublime in geometry, and even in algebra; and the ſciences of natural philoſophy and aſtronomy, exhibit the nobleſt fields of the ſublime that the mind of man was ever introduced to. Theorems may alſo be ſublime by their relating to great objects.

For many things which, conſidered in themſelves, and abſtracted from every thing that is foreign to them, are incapable of the ſublime, inſpire that ſentiment by their aſſociation with others that are capable of it. From this ſource it is that the ideas of wealth, honour, and power, borrow their ſublime. It is the *cauſes*, the *adjuncts*, or the *effects* of theſe things, that are contemplated, when they fill and charm the ſoul. *Wealth* carries with it the idea of a large eſtate, and abundance of every thing that can contribute to the enjoyment of life. From *honour* we never ſeparate the idea of the ſtrength of body, the capacity of the mind, or the great atchievements by which it was procured. With theſe alſo we join the number of people among whom a perſon is renowned, the extent of country through which his fame ſpreads, and the length of time to which it extends. To the idea of *power* we join ideas of the good or evil it may produce, and of the multitudes which are ſubject to its controul. In the idea of a *conqueror*, we may clearly diſtinguiſh the idea of a great extent of country ſubdued; and in the idea of *nobility*, that of a long train of illuſtrious anceſtors. A ſimilar analyſis would ſhow us the ſublime of *friendſhip*, *patriotiſm*, and many other abſtract ideas.

The

The grandeur of a *palace*, beſides what it derives from its exceeding other houſes in bulk, is derived from the ideas of the labour, expence, length of time, and number of perſons neceſſary to the erection of it; and from ideas of the wealth, honour, and power of him who inhabits it. Celebrated buildings and cities *in ruins*, along with theſe ideas, preſent that of the length of time that hath elapſed ſince they flouriſhed; and the whole ſenſation is greatly magnified by a compariſon of their former magnificence with their preſent deſolation. The grandeur and peculiar awfulneſs with which we are ſtruck upon the view of a *temple* is, in a great meaſure, derived from the ideas we have annexed to it of the power of the Deity to whom it is ſacred; as all that is ſublime in the idea of a *ſenate-houſe*, or other public building, ariſes from the idea of the *uſe* to which it is appropriated.

The *contempt* of power, wealth, and grandeur, is more ſublime than the *poſſeſſion* of them; becauſe, after a view of thoſe great objects, it preſents us with the view of a *mind* above them. So that it is not true, that "nothing is great the contempt of "which is great."

Though, in ſome caſes of this ſpecies of *transferred ſublimity*, the analyſis of a complex idea ſhould preſent no one idea which, ſingly taken, could be called ſublime; yet, ſo long as thoſe ideas continue ſeparately indiſtinguiſhable, the mind perceives not a number of ſmall objects, but one great one; as in the caſe before explained of the ſublime of numbers.

As moſt of our emotions are of a complex nature, we are in great danger, unleſs we be extremely attentive, of making miſtakes in the diſtribution and analyſis of them. Hence emotions of *terror* have been often claſſed with the ſublime. But terror

is

is a mixed ſenſation, compoſed of the very different ſenſations of *fear* and *grandeur*, to the latter of which it owes all its ſublimity. For, when we are in a ſituation in which we have nothing to fear, the ſight of a monſtrous beaſt, of a giant, or of the ſea in a ſtorm, &c. preſents little more than the pure ſublime, heightened by the ſecret pleaſure we take in the idea of our own ſecurity. The pure ſublime partakes nothing of fear, or of any other painful emotion.

Moreover, the pure ſublime, by ſtrongly engaging, tends to fix the attention, and to keep the mind in a kind of *awful ſtillneſs*; whereas it is of the nature of every ſpecies of the pathetic to throw it into an *agitation*. Hence the ſenſations we feel from *darkneſs* and *profound ſilence*, reſembling the ſtillneſs the mind is thrown into when the attention is ſtrongly fixed by a ſublime object, partake of the nature of the ſublime; as we may perceive in the following excellent paſſage of Dr. Young.

> Night, fable goddeſs, from her ebon throne,
> In rayleſs majeſty, now ſtretches forth
> Her leaden ſceptre o'er a ſlumb'ring world.
> Silence how dead! and darkneſs how profound!
> Nor eye nor liſt'ning ear an object finds.
> Creation ſleeps. 'Tis as the general pulſe
> Of life ſtood ſtill, and Nature made a pauſe—
> An awful pauſe, prophetic of her end.
> And let her prophecy be ſoon fulfill'd:
> Fate, drop the curtain. I can loſe no more.
>
> NIGHT-THOUGHTS, I.

Hence alſo deep and ſlow notes in muſic bear a nearer relation to the ſublime than ſhrill and quick ſounds.

It may be obſerved, that the account here given of the Sublime confines it to the *ſentiment*. However, as the term (which hath been uſed in a more vague ſenſe than almoſt any other term in criticiſm) is frequently applied to *language*, I ſhall briefly explain how the ſublime is affected by language.

Ideas in themſelves ſublime may intirely loſe that quality by being expreſſed in terms which have connexions with trivial and mean objects, or in metaphors borrowed from ſuch objects. In this caſe the *ſecondary aſſociations* which accompany thoſe words are transferred upon the object deſcribed by them, and deſtroy the ſublime they would otherwiſe have. Though, therefore, in general, the *plaineſt terms* are the moſt favourable to the ſublime, as they exhibit the moſt juſt and the ſtrongeſt idea of the object; yet every term, however plain and intelligible, that hath ever had the leaſt connexion with *mean ſubjects*, or even which hath been chiefly uſed by perſons of a low and illiberal claſs of life, ſhould be carefully avoided. What can be more ſublime than the following paſſage in the Pſalms? "He looketh on the earth, and it trem-" bleth. He toucheth the hills, and they ſmoke," But it is greatly lowered by ſome ludicrous images in the following paraphraſe.

> The hills forget they're fix'd, and in their fright
> Caſt off their weight, and eaſe themſelves for flight.
> The woods, with terror wing'd, outfly the wind,
> And leave the heavy, panting hills behind.

On the other hand, the *mock-heroic* is introduced when words which have generally been annexed to great and important ſubjects, are uſed to expreſs mean or trivial things. The oppoſition of ideas ſo contrary to one another makes a high burleſque.

Some-

Sometimes a *periphraſis* comes ſeaſonably in aid of the ſublime, by giving the mind an opportunity to dwell upon the idea, and ſee the whole extent of it. Thus the phraſe, *Nine times the ſpace that meaſures day and night to mortal men*, in Milton, ſuits the following ſublime paſſage in which it is introduced, much better than if he had barely ſaid ſo many *days*. The former mode of expreſſion, as it were, detains the idea of the *angels rolling in the fiery gulph*, longer in the mind; during which time our wonder and aſtoniſhment are continually riſing higher and higher.

——— Him th' Almighty Power
Hurl'd headlong flaming from th'ethereal ſky,
With hideous ruin, and combuſtion, down
To bottomleſs perdition, there to dwell
In adamantine chains and penal fire,
Who durſt defy th'Omnipotent to arms.
Nine times the ſpace that meaſures day and night
To mortal men, he with his horrid crew
Lay vanquiſh'd, rolling in the fiery gulph,
Confounded, though immortal.

PARADISE LOST, Book I.

Proper names of great objects are often preferable to general terms, as they realize the ideas, and fix the attention to them. Thus, to mention the *Alps*, the *Andes*, or *Teneriffe*, preſents a greater idea than ſaying, *very high mountains*; and to ſay, the *Nile*, the *Ganges*, or the *La Plata*, is to ſpeak more magnificently than to ſay, *great rivers* only. Thus, the ſimple and ſublime Oſſian affects the imagination of his reader much more ſtrongly by the hill of *Cromla*, the *waves of Iniſtore*, the reeds of the *lake of Lægo*, than he could have done by the uſe of any more general and abſtract terms. This effect would be more ſen-

ſible, if we were acquainted with the objects introduced in this manner.

Next to the *pathetic*, of all the excellencies of good compoſition, the *ſublime* promiſes the moſt laſting reputation to an author. Compoſitions which are calculated only to *pleaſe* and to *divert*, are beings of a day. Few of them, even by the favour of a very extraordinary coincidence of circumſtances, reach poſterity, in compariſon of thoſe which *ſhake* and which *elevate* our ſouls. Let us only look into our own breaſts, and we ſhall find that we are very differently affected to the writer who pleaſes the imagination, and to the poet or orator who either raiſes and enlarges our conceptions, or who thoroughly intereſts our paſſions. The former we may *admire*, but we may alſo ſoon *forget*. Our eſteem for the latter riſes to *reverence*; and when the pathetic and the ſublime are joined (as they are capable of the moſt intimate union, and are perhaps never found in a very high degree intirely ſeparate) they produce the ſtrongeſt and the moſt laſting attachment.

A genius formed for the ſublime is a mind which is naturally diſpoſed to take the moſt extenſive views of things, whoſe attention is turned to view every thing in the grandeſt and nobleſt point of light; whereas other minds are more inclined to attend to what is *little* and *beautiful* in the objects they view. And as every thing we are converſant with hath various, and very different properties, every mind hath an opportunity of indulging its own taſte, by contemplating thoſe forms of things which afford it the moſt pleaſing gratification.

I cannot conclude this article without obſerving, that inſtances of the true ſublime abound no where more than in the Scriptures.

Never were grander ideas preſented to the human mind, than we find in the repreſentations of the Divine Being in Iſaiah, particularly chapter XL. in the book of Job, in ſeveral places in the Pſalms, and in the writings of Moſes.

The falſe ſublime, or the *bombaſt*, will be conſidered when I treat of the Hyperbole.

LECTURE XXI.

Of the Pleaſure we receive from Uniformity, *and* Variety; *and firſt of* Compariſons.

THE pleaſure we receive from the view of objects in which there is a viſible mixture of *uniformity and variety*, hath, no doubt, more ſources than one: however, as one of its ſources is the moderate exerciſe which ſuch objects give to our faculties, I ſhall treat of it in this place.

To comprehend an object, the parts of which have no ſort of analogy to one another, we muſt of neceſſity go over the whole of it; and after this ſurvey, which (from the uniform manner in which our minds are employed when we attend to it) muſt be very tedious, nothing but the *memory* is exerciſed, to connect and retain the idea of the whole: whereas the moment we perceive that the parts of any object are analogous to one another, and find, or are informed, what that analogy is, the ſight of a part, without any farther inveſtigation, ſuggeſts the idea of the whole; and the *judgment* is moſt agreeably and ſucceſsfully employed in completing the image.

This is very evident upon the view of a part of any thing the proportions of which are known, as of an animal body, of a regular curve, or polygon, a regular building, a regular

gular garden, or of a conſiſtent ſet of political, philoſophical, or theological principles. With what ſatisfaction may we often hear perſons ſay, upon ſeeing part of ſuch an object, or ſuch a ſcheme, "You need ſhew me no more: I ſee the whole." When being ſhewn ſo little of an object ſuffices to comprehend it, it ſhews conſiderable experience, and an extenſive acquaintance with the forms and properties of things.

To diſcern the analogy of the things we are converſant with, is to become poſſeſſed of the clue of knowledge, by which we are led, with unſpeakable eaſe and ſatisfaction, through the ſeeming labyrinths of nature. In this manner, by the help of a few general principles, we become maſters of a great extent of valuable ſcience: whereas, without ſuch general principles, which are derived from the knowledge of the analogy or uniformity of things, our ſpeculations preſent nothing but a ſcene of confuſion and embarraſſment.

Moreover, wherever we ſee analogy in objects, we ſee the marks of *intelligence* and *deſign*; which will be mentioned hereafter as another ſource of pleaſure in works of genius and imagination: and the more complex is the object we view, or the greater the variety we perceive, conſiſtent with ſtrict analogy, the more doth it employ our faculties to comprehend it, and the higher idea do we conceive of the intelligence of the being who formed it. Beſides, the *contraſt* there is between two properties ſo different as *uniformity* and *variety* in the ſame object, contributes not a little to increaſe the pleaſure reſulting from a view of the whole.

But perhaps it is to *aſſociation* that we are indebted for the greateſt part of the pleaſure we receive from the view of uniformity and variety. In fact, almoſt every pleaſing object in nature

nature or art is poſſeſſed of it. The human body, all animal bodies, and all vegetable nature, infinitely various as thoſe objects are, have their parts formed with perfect analogy to one another. Theſe properties are, likewiſe, for reaſons of convenience, imitated in our houſes, in our gardens, in our furniture, utenſils, and, in ſhort, in every thing in which the ingenuity or induſtry of men are employed. Can it be any wonder then, when every thing around us, that is adapted to give us pleaſure, hath theſe properties, that even the firſt appearance of them in objects, the uſes of which we are wholly unacquainted with, ſhould be pleaſing?

The pleaſure we receive from what is called the *juſt proportions* of objects, is borrowed, by aſſociation, from the idea of the *uſes* to which ſuch proportions are ſubſervient. What is a well-proportioned plough, a well-proportioned houſe, or a well-proportioned ſhip, but things, or inſtruments, of ſuch a form as is found by experience to be the moſt proper and convenient for the purpoſes to which they are applied? If proportion be any thing different from this, it muſt coincide with the idea of uniformity and variety.

From this ſource of uniformity and variety, is derived the pleaſure which *compariſons*, *metaphors*, and *allegories*, in works of genius and imagination, give us. This is a conſideration diſtinct from that of the light they throw upon a ſubject. Compariſons give us clear ideas of things, by means of the reſemblance between the ideas they exhibit and thoſe which a writer hath occaſion to introduce; in which it is evident that the property of ſimilarity or uniformity alone is concerned; though we may conſider it as heightened by its contraſt with thoſe properties in the objects which are not ſimilar. But uniformity alone, however heightened

ened, doth not affect the imagination with any ſenſe of pleaſure. In order to produce this effect, it is neceſſary that variety be joined to it.

Let us take for an example the following celebrated ſimile in Addiſon's Campaign.

> So when an angel, by divine command,
> With riſing tempeſts ſhakes a guilty land,
> (Such as of late o'er pale Britannia paſt)
> Calm and ſerene he guides the furious blaſt;
> And, pleaſed th' Almighty's orders to perform,
> Rides in the whirlwind, and directs the ſtorm.

The light which this ſimile throws upon the principal object in the poem, can only ariſe from the *reſemblance* there is between the ſituation of the hero and that of the angel, diſpenſing death and deſtruction, at the command of a ſovereign, with perfect calmneſs. Theſe are the only points in which we perceive any conſiderable reſemblance in the two objects. But if there had been no circumſtances in which they had *differed*, the ſimile would never have met with that applauſe with which it hath almoſt univerſally been received. For where would have been the advantage of comparing Marlborough to any other hero in exactly ſimilar circumſtances? In this caſe, there would have been a much nearer reſemblance, but no poetical beauty, becauſe no variety. Nay, in reality, in the moſt ſtriking circumſtance in the ſituation of Marlborough, we perceive no ſort of reſemblance in that of the angel, viz. in his intrepidity in braving danger; yet, perhaps, this capital difference contributes more to the pleaſure which theſe two views jointly give to the imagination, than any other circumſtance

cumſtance belonging to either of them. For what could give us a higher idea of the courage of Marlborough, in danger, than to repreſent him to be as calm as an angel in no danger at all? yet this circumſtance would have appeared quite foreign to the purpoſe, and have given no pleaſure at all, if the angel had not been employed in a ſimilar manner, viz. *directing the courſe of death.*

It is evident, therefore, that it is to the joint influence of thoſe circumſtances in which two objects agree, and of thoſe in which they differ, that we muſt aſcribe the power of compariſons to raiſe pleaſing ideas in our minds. In other words, the pleaſure we receive from them is of the ſame nature with that which we receive from a view of thoſe objects in which there is a due mixture of uniformity and variety. Conſequently, the chief excellence of a compariſon (and, for the ſame reaſon, of a metaphor and allegory) muſt depend upon the proportion there is between the degrees of uniformity and variety, or the points of reſemblance and difference, in the principal object, and that to which it is compared.

The following ſimile of Homer neither illuſtrates the object he is deſcribing, by exhibiting the ſame idea in greater ſtrength, nor are the circumſtances of the two caſes ſufficiently different to give any pleaſure to the imagination.

> This juſt rebuke inflamed the Lycian crew,
> They join, they thicken, and th' aſſault renew.
> Unmoved th' embodied Greeks their fury dare,
> And fix'd, ſupport the weight of all the war.
> Nor could the Greeks repel the Lycian powers,
> Nor the bold Lycians force the Grecian towers.

As,

As, on the confines of adjoining grounds,
Two ſtubborn ſwains with blows diſpute their bounds;
They tug, they ſweat, but neither gain nor yield
One foot, one inch of the contended field:
Thus obſtinate to death, they fight, they fall,
Nor theſe can keep, nor thoſe can win the wall.

ILIAD XII. 505.

That there can be no merit in a ſimile in which there is little or no reſemblance between the objects compared, is too obvious to require an example. For it is manifeſt that the primary, the proper, and direct uſe of a ſimile, is to give clearer and ſtronger ideas of a thing than the plain deſcription of it would ſuggeſt; and this end is not anſwered, unleſs the objects, or the circumſtances in which they are placed, be ſimilar. Indeed, if we conſider only this primary uſe of compariſons, ſeparate from the pleaſure they give to the imagination (which is all along ſuppoſed to be only a ſecondary and ſubordinate conſideration) in no caſe whatever would there be any real uſe of variety in a ſimile, if uniformity alone would ſuggeſt the ideas we want to illuminate (as we may ſay) more diſtinct and vivid. For, conſidering ſimiles as ſerving the purpoſe of *illuſtration*, the uſe of thoſe circumſtances of diverſity, which are exhibited in two objects that are compared together, is to heighten, by their contraſt, the ideas of thoſe circumſtances in which they reſemble one another.

Hence, perhaps, it is, that when the object introduced in a compariſon preſents the idea we want to illuſtrate in a very full and clear light, writers (perhaps without attending to the reaſon of it) content themſelves with mentioning thoſe circumſtances of reſemblance; and that they do not diſtinctly point out the circumſtances of diverſity, but in caſes where the ideas of reſemblance

would not be ſufficiently vivid without a contraſt. Nay, if the reſemblance be very ſtrong, it is reckoned ſuperfluous, and often abſurd, to proceed beyond a ſimple *metaphor*, which is a ſimile contracted to its ſmalleſt dimenſions.

If we only conſider that the primary uſe of a ſimile is to give clearer and ſtronger ideas than we could convey without it, and that an explicit and direct ſimile ſuppoſes an excurſion of the mind from the object it is intended to illuſtrate, we may eaſily determine both the cirumſtances in which the uſe of ſimiles is juſt and natural, and fix proper bounds for the length of them.

Let a perſon be in whatever ſituation he will, if he be in a condition to make uſe of language at all, he will endeavour to give as clear an idea as he can of every thing that he would preſent to the mind of another. Though, therefore, a man be in the greateſt agitation of mind poſſible, and wholly occupied with any train of ideas, he will ſeize upon any circumſtance in nature that will help him to give a clear idea of whatever he would wiſh to communicate to another perſon. The difference between a perſon whoſe mind is wholly ingroſſed with any train of ideas, and another whoſe attention may be eaſily diverted from it, is, that the former will dwell no longer upon foreign objects than is neceſſary, in order to their ſupplying him with proper terms by which to expreſs his own ideas: whereas, in the mind of another perſon, when once a foreign object is brought into view, ſome of its attributes, and other circumſtances aſſociated with it, may not be prevented from following it (as they naturally tend to do) by the ſudden recurrence of the former train of ideas.

For example, a perſon in extreme pain will naturally cry out to his friend, *Oh, I burn, I am torn to pieces, I am upon the rack*, &c. but then his mind is ſo wholly and intenſely ingroſſed

with the ſenſations of pain, that though the foreign circumſtances of *burning*, *tearing to pieces*, and *being upon the rack*, do, from their reſemblance to his ſituation, occur to his mind, and ſuggeſt to him the ſtrongeſt language by which to expreſs his own feelings, they have no power of introducing any other circumſtances connected with them; and therefore the previous train of ideas and ſenſations returns inſtantly. A perſon in ſuch a ſituation would never think of the *flame*, *ſmoke*, and *aſhes* that attend burning, or think of the *coup de grace* when he mentioned the rack. But a perſon who is merely deſcribing an intereſting ſcene, or a perſon who, after his firſt tranſports of grief are ſubſided, is at leiſure to contemplate his calamitous ſituation, when he knows the whole extent of it, can hardly be ſuppoſed to have his mind ſo wholly engroſſed with the ſubject, as not to admit and give ſome attention to a few circumſtances the moſt cloſely connected with thoſe images which were introduced to illuſtrate his ideas.

From the preceding account of ſimiles, viz. that they are uſed in order to give clearer ideas of things than any terms ariſing from the ſubject itſelf would convey, it follows, that they are ſuperfluous and ridiculous upon trifling occaſions, as in common diſcourſe, where the plaineſt language is quite ſufficient; and ſince direct ſimiles ſuppoſe a conſiderable excurſion of the mind from the principal ſubject of its thoughts, it is manifeſt, as was hinted before, that they muſt be very unnatural in the mouth of a perſon in great *diſtreſs*, or any kind of *agitation of mind*. Shakeſpeare, through the luxuriance of his imagination, frequently errs in the former caſe; and Dryden, Lee, and moſt of our other tragedians, in the latter: for which they are finely ridiculed in the *Rehearſal*. This is owing to their not entering ſufficiently

into the paſſions they deſcribe. A perſon who repreſents another as under the influence of any paſſion, ſhould almoſt forget that he is only deſcribing, and ſhould feel himſelf: otherwiſe his mind will be in ſo different a ſituation from that of the perſon he is deſcribing, that it will be abſolutely impoſſible that the ſame thoughts ſhould occur to him; at leaſt that they ſhould occur in the ſame order, or engage the attention equally. And, particularly, he will be in danger of giving part of that attention to *foreign* and *incidental circumſtances*, which a perſon really intereſted gives wholly to his own feelings.

The following paſſage from Shakeſpeare may ſerve for an example of the improper uſe of ſimiles upon trivial occaſions. A gardener ſays to his ſervant,

> Go, bind thou up yon dangling apricocks,
> Which, like unruly children, make their ſire
> Stoop with oppreſſion of their prodigal weight.
> Give ſome ſupportance to the bending twigs.
> Go thou, and, like an executioner,
> Cut off the heads of too-faſt-growing ſprays,
> That look too lofty in our commonwealth.
> All muſt be even in our government.
>
> RICHARD II. Act III. Scene 7.

And in the following paſſage from the Mourning Bride, we ſee the unſeaſonableneſs of direct ſimiles in great agitation of mind:

> *Zara.* The mute not yet return'd. Ha, 'twas the king.
> The king that parted hence, frowning he went.
> His eyes like meteors roll'd, then darted down
> Their red and angry beams; as if his ſight
>
> Would,

Would, like the raging Dog-ſtar, ſcorch the earth,
And kindle ruin in its courſe.

Act V. Scene 3.

On the other hand, who doth not readily excuſe, in Oſſian, the eaſy extenſion of the following ſimile to a cloſely-connected circumſtance, though it be foreign to his immediate purpoſe, and in the midſt of a very intereſting ſcene?

"Where are the mighty kings? Nor by the ſtream nor wood "are they. I hear the clanging of arms. Their ſtrife is in the "boſom of that miſt. Such is the contention of ſpirits in a "nightly cloud, when they ſtrive for the wintry wings of the "winds, and the rolling of foam-covered waves."

TEMORA, Book VIII.

Or who, that conſidered the ſituation of Cardinal Wolſey, was ever offended at the following mixture of compariſon and metaphor which he uſeth?

Farewel, a long farewel to all my greatneſs!
This is the ſtate of man. To-day he puts forth
The tender leaves of hope, to-morrow bloſſoms,
And bears his bluſhing honours thick upon him:
The third day comes a froſt, a killing froſt,
And when he thinks, good eaſy man! full ſurely
His greatneſs is a ripening; nips his root;
And then he falls as I do. I have ventured,
Like little wanton boys that ſwim on bladders,
Theſe many ſummers on a ſea of glory,
But far beyond my depth. My high-blown pride
At length broke under me, and now hath left me,

Weary and old with ſervice, to the mercy
Of a rude ſtream that muſt for ever hide me.

SHAKESPEARE'S HENRY VIII.

And if, in any circumſtances, there be nothing forced and unnatural in a perſon's making a ſmall excurſion from the ideas of his own calamitous ſituation, or in another perſon's turning his eye for a moment from the view of an intereſting ſcene, much more natural is it to make thoſe digreſſions in the deſcription of *ſtill ſcenes*. And theſe principles ſhow us the reaſon why extended ſimiles give univerſally more ſatisfaction in the deſcription of a ſtill ſcene, than in the repreſentation of a very active and buſy one. In the former caſe, the mind is in no haſte, as we may ſay, to return to the principal ſubject; in the latter, it is often impatient of the leaſt diverſion from it. Hence it is, with pleaſure, that we hear the following extended ſimile of Milton, in the deſcription of Paradiſe:

——————— Now gentle gales,
Fanning their odoriferous wings, diſpenſe
Native perfumes, and whiſper whence they ſtole
Thoſe balmy ſpoils. As when to them who ſail
Beyond the cape of Hope, and now are paſt
Mozambic, off at ſea, north-eaſt winds blow
Sabean odours from the ſpicy ſhore
Of Araby the bleſt; with ſuch delay
Well pleaſed they ſlack their courſe, and many a league
Chear'd with the grateful ſmell, old ocean ſmiles.

PARADISE LOST, Book IV.

To

To this I ſhall add another, of a parallel nature, from Virgil, becauſe the propriety of it hath been diſputed.

> Regina ad templum forma pulcherrima Dido
> Inceſſit, magna juvenum ſtipante caterva.
> Talis in Eurotæ ripis, aut per juga Cynthe,
> Exercet Diana choros, quam mille ſecutæ
> Hinc atque hinc glomerantur Oreades. Illa pharetram
> Fert humero, gradienſque deas ſupereminet omnes.
> Latonæ tacitum pertentant gaudia pectus.
> Talis erat Dido, talem ſe, læta ferebat
> Per medios. ———

ÆNEID, Lib. I. 496.

In this example the compariſon is certainly quite completed before the laſt circumſtance reſpecting Latona; but it is a circumſtance ſo cloſely connected with the ſcene in which it is introduced, and the mind of the reader is, from the nature of the ſcene, ſo much at liberty, as to admit it with great eaſe. The ſcene in which it is introduced doth not return with ſo much violence as to make us impatient of that unneceſſary circumſtance. And when this is the caſe, theſe little excurſions from the principal ſubject make an agreeable kind of epiſodes. The mind, as it was naturally led into them by their connection with the ſcene introduced in the compariſon, can feel no want of connection or propriety in the circumſtance, and it returns to the principal ſubject agreeably refreſhed, and with renewed ardour.

Provided the reader feel no impatience at the mentioning of thoſe foreign circumſtances, the digreſſion to take notice of them can hardly be pronounced faulty, till the laſt-mentioned circumſtance be ſo remote from the principal object, that the mind cannot,

not, at one eaſy glance, ſee the connection; for then, indeed, the *unity of the whole* is loſt. They are two quite different and diſtinct ſcenes that we are preſented with. It is a ſtill greater fault to make ſo much of a ſimile, that the attention of the reader ſhall be more engroſſed by it than by the principal and original figure.

However, to take but little notice of any circumſtances that are foreign to the principal deſign of the compoſition, though pretty cloſely connected with objects which are introduced for the ſake of giving clearer ideas of it, ſhows that the mind of the writer was very much intent upon his ſubject. We may add, that it generally ſhows more of *nature*; whereas a writer, who frequently purſues trains of ſuch foreign ideas, diſcovers more attention to *art*, and a fondneſs for *ornament*.

But this remark is by no means to be extended to thoſe ſimiles in which, though they be long, there is no excurſion from the points of reſemblance; as the following of Homer:

> Fierce they drove on, impatient to deſtroy,
> Troy charged the firſt, and Hector firſt of Troy.
> As from ſome mountain's craggy forehead torn,
> A rock's round fragment flies, with fury borne,
> (Which from the ſtubborn ſtone a torrent rends)
> Precipitate the pond'rous maſs deſcends:
> From ſteep to ſteep the rolling ruin bounds,
> At every ſhock the crackling wood reſounds.
> Still gathering force, it ſmokes, and, urged amain,
> Whirls, leaps, and thunders down impetuous to the plain,
> There ſtops.—So Hector, their whole force he proved,
> Reſiſtleſs when he raged, and when he ſtop'd unmoved.
>
> ILIAD, Book XIII. 187.

Neither

Neither can Oſſian, in the two following ſimiles, be ſaid to be carried away by his imagination beyond the points of reſemblance in the objects with which he preſents us Speaking of a general engagement, to which the armies deſcended from two oppoſite hills, he adds;

" At once they plunge in battle. Steel pours its gleam on " ſteel. Like the fall of ſtreams ſhone the field, when they mix " their foam together from two dark-browed rocks." TEMORA, Book V.

Deſcribing a hero in the ſame field of battle, he ſays;

" Through the hoſt are the ſtrides of Foldath; like ſome dark " ſhip on the wintry waves, when it iſſues from between two " hills, to ſport on the echoing ſeas." *Ibidem.*

Perhaps it may be the moſt adviſeable, that writers ſhould endeavour to expreſs nothing more than the points of reſemblance in ſimiles. If the objects be conſiderably different, points of difference enow, for any uſeful purpoſe, will neceſſarily force themſelves into the deſcription.

In conſidering where ſimiles may be uſed with propriety, it may, perhaps, be laid down as a maxim, that they are the moſt complete, and give the moſt pleaſure to the imagination, when the two objects compared have a ſtrict reſemblance in thoſe points in which the ſenſe of the paſſage, in which they are introduced, requires that they ſhould reſemble, and are as different as poſſible in every other. In this caſe, there will be the ſtrongeſt contraſt produced, and the ſenſe of uniformity will be heightened by the contiguity of the points of diverſity.

Hence the peculiar ſtrength of the ſimiles of *Oſſian*, who almoſt always illuſtrates human actions by the appearances of inanimate nature. His *woods*, his *headlong torrents*, his *miſts*, his *clouds*, and his *tempeſts*, make a greater figure, and impreſs the mind much more ſtrongly than any ſimilar alluſions to any thing in the brute creation. In what ſituations can we imagine any thing approaching nearer to human life, could, with advantage, take the place of the *ſun* and the *clouds*, in the following paſſage, by which he illuſtrates the manner in which Cathmor ſilences the anger and contention of two of his chiefs?

"They ſunk from the king on either ſide, like two columns "of morning-miſt, when the ſun riſeth between them on his "glittering rock. Dark is their rolling on either ſide, each "towards its reedy pool." TEMORA, Book IV.

I am aware of but one exception to this maxim, which is, that an object may be compared to another, which, by the principle of aſſociation, will transfer upon it ideas that ought by no means to be connected with it. Thus, when a very great object is compared to a very trifling and mean one, though they may reſemble in the circumſtances in which the purport of the paſſage, in which the ſimile is introduced, requires them to reſemble; yet, beſides that the deſcent, as it were, of the mind from a great to a mean object, is diſagreeable; thoſe ideas of meanneſs and littleneſs in the object to which the great object is compared, will adhere, in ſome meaſure, to the great object itſelf. Whoſe ideas of the Greeks are not leſſened by the following compariſon, though very juſt, if we conſider the principal deſign of it?

Mean

Mean while the troops, beneath Patroclus' care,
Invade the Trojans, and commence the war.
As waſps, provok'd by children in their play,
Pour from their manſions by the broad high-way,
In ſwarms the guiltleſs traveller engage,
Whet all their ſtings, and call forth all their rage:
All riſe in arms, and with a gen'ral cry
Aſſert their waxen domes, and buzzing progeny.
Thus from the tents the fervent legion ſwarms,
So loud their clamours, and ſo keen their arms.

ILIAD, Book XVI. 312.

For the ſame reaſon, if we intend to give an agreeable repreſentation of any object, we ſhould carefully avoid comparing it to any thing diſagreeable or diſguſting.

It is, therefore, an uſeful general rule, that no object ſhould be compared to any thing but what is, in point of greatneſs or dignity, of nearly equal rank with itſelf; and that, in grave and ſerious compoſition, all compariſons ſhould be rather *above* than *below* the rank of the object to be illuſtrated. To compare a grand object to a low one, as will be obſerved hereafter, makes the *burleſque*; and to compare a low object to a grand one, makes the *mock-heroic*.

It hardly needs be mentioned, in this place, that in no ſimile ſhould any object be introduced that is not *well known*: for if the alluſion be obſcure, how is the ſubject illuſtrated by it?

As the uſe of compariſons is to give ſtrength and colour to ideas, compariſons that are merely *verbal* are certainly abſurd in all ſerious compoſitions. To try whether any be ſo, change the terms for others that are ſynonymous to them. By this means we diſcover the following compariſon in Shakeſpeare to be merely ver-

bal. " In breaking oaths he is ſtronger than Hercules:" becauſe, if we read, In *forſwearing* himſelf he is ſtronger than Hercules, there is not the leaſt appearance of ſimilitude in the two ideas left.

But the ſame reaſon will not lead us to condemn thoſe compariſons which are termed *figurative:* for, if ideas have obtained the ſame name on account of their *ſimilarity*, the one may really illuſtrate the other. Of this nature are many compariſons in Virgil, Ovid, and all the ancient claſſics; as alſo in Pope, and others the moſt correct of our modern poets. Thus Galatea, in Virgil, is ſaid to be *ſweeter than the honey of Hybla.* In this caſe, ſince the object of the paſſion of love hath obtained the name of *ſweet*, from its raiſing in us ſenſations ſimilar to thoſe excited by things which affect the external taſte with the ſenſe of ſweetneſs, we are certainly aſſiſted to conceive more ſtrongly of the pleaſure the ſpeaker took in the object of his love, by his comparing it to the ſweetneſs of honey.

Indeed, compariſons of this kind occur ſo frequently in the moſt ſerious writers, of all nations, and all ages, that from this circumſtance only I think we may reaſonably conclude there is a foundation for them in nature. The Pſalmiſt David ſays, that " the law of God was ſweeter to him than honey and the honey-" comb;" and that " the poiſon of aſps was under the tongue " of his enemies."

However, as we probably catch the firſt hint of theſe compariſons from the *words*, they may lead an incautious writer into thoſe compariſons which are merely verbal.

LECTURE

LECTURE XXII.

Of the Nature *of* METAPHORS.

A Metaphor hath already been defined, to be a ſimile contracted to its ſmalleſt dimenſions. Hence, in uſing metaphors, the mind makes the leaſt ſenſible excurſion from the ideas that engage its attention. So ſhort is the excurſion, that when a metaphor is uſed, the moment the mind hath catched the idea of any reſemblance to the thing which it is about to expreſs, it immediately transfers the terms belonging to the foreign object to it, as if they were one and the ſame thing. So that, in fact, uſing metaphors is nothing more than giving new names to things.

The advantage of uſing metaphors is, that we can borrow a name from a thing which contains the quality we mean to expreſs in a greater degree than the ſubject to which we aſcribe it; and by this means can often ſuggeſt a ſtronger idea of a quality than any terms orginally appropriated to our ſubject could convey. Beſides, along with the name, other ideas, as of dignity or meanneſs, agreeableneſs or diſagreeableneſs, and the like, will be transferred to the object to which it is applied. So that, by means of the complex ideas which accompany the names of

things, we can give juſt what ſize and colour we pleaſe to any thing we are deſcribing.

Moreover, as metaphors are moſt naturally taken from ſenſible things, and particularly from viſible objects, in peruſing a diſcourſe abounding with well-choſen metaphors, the mind is entertained with a ſucceſſion of agreeably-varied *views* and *landſchapes*. And though theſe proſpects be extremely tranſient, they cannot fail to contribute conſiderably to a reader's entertainment.

I may add that, though, in ſome of theſe reſpects, a compariſon hath the advantage of a metaphor; yet, in one reſpect, a metaphor gives a more ſenſible pleaſure than a compariſon. This ariſes from the harſhneſs and impropriety there, for a moment, appears to be in the uſe of a metaphorical inſtead of a proper term; which increaſes the ſatisfaction we inſtantly receive from approving of the new application of the word. That this contraſt between the uſual and unuſual ſenſe of words is a neceſſary ingredient in the pleaſure we receive from metaphors, is evident; becauſe, when metaphors have, by frequent uſe, become evaneſcent, they have no more pleaſing effect than the proper names of things; and becauſe, in order to become fully ſenſible of all the beauty of metaphorical expreſſions, we muſt diſtinctly attend to the original meaning of ſuch terms, at the ſame time that we perceive their figurative application in the paſſage before us.

I ſhall exemplify theſe obſervations by that ſtrong and happy metaphor of Virgil, I have mentioned once before, by which he calls the two Scipios *the thunderbolts of war*. This image might have been extended to a long ſimile; but the ſituation of the hero did not admit of ſo great an excurſion from his principal

ſubject. The poet, therefore, having firſt laid hold of the idea of reſemblance as it occurred to his mind, without multiplying the objects of his attention, by expreſsly comparing his heroes to thunderbolts, calls the heroes themſelves the thunderbolts. This was evidently only giving a new name to his heroes, but with this great advantage, that the ideas we conceive of the *rapidity* and *deſtructive power* belonging to thunderbolts are hereby transferred upon them. At the ſame time, likewiſe, the ideas of grandeur accompanying a ſcene of thunder and lightning, throw a conſiderable degree of the *ſublime* into their characters, and the mind of the reader is entertained with a momentary *proſpect* of ſo ſolemn and grand a ſcene in nature. Moreover, along with this, the *oppoſition* between the two very different ſenſes of the word (which, however harſh it may appear for a moment, we preſently ſee the propriety of) heightens the pleaſureable ſenſation.

Highly ornamental as metaphors are in diſcourſe, it is to *neceſſity* that we are indebted for the firſt uſe of them. It was neither poſſible, nor convenient, that every different object ſhould have a diſtinct name. That would have been to multiply words, both to the overburthening of the memory, and the prejudice of ſcience. For it greatly favours the propagation of knowledge to call things that are ſimilar to one another by the ſame name. Without this there could have been no ſuch thing as general principles, or general knowledge. Now it is one and the ſame proceſs by which we make general or abſtract terms, and by which figurative expreſſions are invented. The difference is only in degree, not in kind.

Suppoſe, for inſtance, we had never ſeen but one *horſe*; unleſs we give the ſame name to things that are ſimilar, and even

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to things that are not in all reſpects ſimilar, we muſt have given another name than *horſe* to every other animal we ſhould afterwards have met with of the ſame ſpecies: becauſe, not only is it abſurd to ſuppoſe that any two things are the ſame, but that any two individuals of the ſame ſpecies ſhould be exactly alike.

If objects differ but little, we give them the ſame name in what we call a *literal ſenſe*; as, to the *heads*, the *mouths*, the *eyes*, the *hearts*, &c. of men and other animals. To theſe the ſame names are ſo conſtantly applied, that it is impoſſible to ſay to which they originally and properly belonged. In calling theſe, therefore, by the ſame names, we ſay we uſe no figure; whereas the term *figure* begins to be applied when, however commonly a name may be applied to any thing, it is well known to have been applied to ſomething elſe originally. For example; it is equally proper and literal to ſay the *foot of a man*, or the *foot of a beaſt*, though they differ conſiderably in form; but the moment we attend to it, we perceive that the *foot of a chair*, or the *foot of a mountain*, is a figurative expreſſion, though it be as common as the other; and we uſe it a thouſand times without being ſenſible of the figure. In this caſe the figure is ſaid to be *evaneſcent*.

When any term is conſtantly applied to a variety of objects, and it is impoſſible to ſay to which of them it belonged originally, though they be conſiderably different, the definition of that term muſt be framed ſo as to comprehend all thoſe ideas. Thus if we define the terms *head*, *mouth*, *eye*, or *foot*, we muſt expreſs our definition in ſuch a manner, as to be equally applicable to the heads, the mouths, the eyes, or the feet of brute or other animals, as well as to thoſe of men; for the literal meaning of thoſe terms extends to both. But the definition of the

words

words muſt not be extended to take in their figurative applications. Thus, it is not neceſſary that the term *foot* ſhould be defined ſo as to be applicable to the lower part of a mountain, though the lower part of a mountain be univerſally called the *foot* of it.

In many caſes, however, it will not be eaſy to determine where the literal ſenſe of a word ends, and where the figurative ſenſe begins; as in the terms *face*, *voice*, *cheeks*, and many others, which have been applied to men and brute animals ſo promiſcuouſly, that ſome perſons may be inclined to call the application of them to brute animals figurative, while others will contend that it is literal: whereas, in other caſes, the analogy is ſo faint, that the ſame term cannot, without a ſenſible harſhneſs, be applied to the different objects; as when trees are called the *hair of mountains*, or the walls of cities their *cheeks*.

This harſh metaphor is by philoſophers called *catachrêſis*. Of this kind we may term that expreſſion of Milton's denoting the paſſage of Satan from hell to this world, *ſails between world and world*.

From this it appears that there is a gradation in metaphors, proceeding from thoſe in which the analogy between two objects is ſo great, that the figure is evaneſcent, through all the different degrees of reſemblance, till we come to thoſe in which the analogy is ſcarce perceptible, and conſequently the metaphor is harſh and unnatural: and all the rules concerning the uſe of metaphors muſt have reſpect to this gradation.

It is worth while, however, to take notice, how much it is in the power of cuſtom to ſoften the harſhneſs of metaphors. And in nothing, perhaps, is the authority of cuſtom more arbitrary and capricious. In ſome caſes the application of the ſame name

to things is quite familiar, where the reſemblance is very obſcure; and, in other caſes, where there is the ſtrongeſt reſemblance between the two things, it would give the greateſt offence to an ear formed by cuſtom to hear them called by the ſame name. Who would not make himſelf ridiculous by confounding the terms appropriated by uſe to the voices of different animals; as the *lowing of the ox*, the *bleating of ſheep*, and the *barking of the dog?* And yet who ever calls a part of the ſea running up into the land by any other name than that of *an arm of the ſea*, though the reſemblance it bears in ſhape, or uſe, to the human arm is extremely faint? In like manner, have we any other name for the two extremities of an army than the figurative one of *wings*, though they reſemble wings no more than they do *horns*, by which, indeed, the Greeks and Romans moſt frequently expreſſed them?

In arranging figures, therefore, according to their ſeveral degrees, between the extremes of what hath been termed evaneſcence on the one hand, and what is called bold and harſh on the other, we muſt by no means be governed by a regard to the *analogy of things* only; but muſt, along with this, conſider the arbitrary deciſions of *cuſtom*, in the idioms of particular languages. Thus we muſt ſay, that ſuch expreſſions as *an arm of the ſea*, and the *wings of an army*, are nearly literal, and ſcarce deſerve the name of figures, though the reſemblance be very ſmall; as well as the *wings of the flying fiſh*, and the *horns of an altar*, where the reſemblance is very great; but that ſuch phraſes as the *wings of the wind*, and the *boſom of the ſea*, are highly figurative, though they have a much better foundation in the analogy of nature. The caſe is, that the former are uſed ſo frequently, that, whether the reſemblance be greater or leſs, they

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are little more than common names of things, and when we uſe them, we never think whence they were borrowed; whereas the latter are ſeldom uſed, and never without our perceiving whence they were borrowed. And it was obſerved before, that it is eſſential to the pleaſure we receive from a metaphor, that we, at the ſame time, perceive diſtinctly the two different applications of the ſame term.

LECTURE XXIII.

Rules for the Uſe of METAPHORS; *and of* ALLEGORIES.

HAVING explained the nature of metaphors, and traced the ſources of the pleaſure we receive from them, I proceed to lay down rules for the proper *uſe* of them. Theſe will be eaſily deduced from the preceding account of their nature and end.

Since metaphors are uſed to give ſtrength and colour, as it were, to ideas, we naturally uſe them when our own ideas are peculiarly *vivid*, and when, conſequently, we wiſh to communicate the ſame ideas, in the ſame ſtrength, to the minds of others. They are, therefore, very properly put into the mouth of a perſon under any emotion of mind; and the ſtronger are his emotions, the bolder figures he naturally uſes. The truth of this obſervation may be verified every day: for, if we take notice, we ſhall find that we never hear any man either ſpeak with vehemence, or converſe when his mind is in a gay and lively humour, without uſing frequent metaphors. When our own ideas are very vivid, they naturally, by aſſociation, ſuggeſt ideas of objects in which they exiſt in greater ſtrength; and theſe we inſtantly transfer upon the objects we are deſcribing, in order to give ideas of them to others more ſimilar and adequate to our own. Thus ſome kinds of *pain* will often ſuggeſt the ſimilar idea of *burning*, and

and we inſtantly cry out, *we burn.* In ſuch a ſituation of mind, terms appropriated to the objects we are deſcribing, would not ſuggeſt our ideas of them to another perſon in ſufficient ſtrength. Without looking abroad, it is curious to obſerve in what different manners we feel ourſelves diſpoſed to ſay things according to the humour we are in; in what plain terms we ſpeak when our minds are languid, and how metaphorically when we have a flow of ſpirits.

Metaphors muſt, for this reaſon, be abſurd, when a man's ideas and ſenſations are not peculiarly vivid. For a man to uſe figures then, would be to endeavour to convey ſtronger (which is, in fact, *other*) ideas to the minds of the perſons he is ſpeaking to, than he conceives himſelf. Of this we have ſome diverting examples in the *Treatiſe on the Bathos.* It will, likewiſe, be found exemplified in the paſſage which was quoted to ſhow a like improper uſe of compariſons.

The moſt important rule reſpecting the choice of metaphors, where they are proper, is, that different metaphors ſhould not be confounded together in the ſame ſentence: becauſe, in this caſe, the ſenſe, if it be realized in the imagination, will appear to imply an *abſurdity.* And, ſince every new application of a word that hath the effect of a metaphor, doth raiſe an idea of the object to which it was primarily affixed, for the ſame reaſon that every ſcene preſented to the mind of the reader ſhould be, at leaſt, *poſſible*, and conſiſtent, theſe pieces of ſcenery, though ever ſo tranſient, ſhould be ſo too; and when there is a manifeſt inconſiſtency in ſuch little pictures, a reader of taſte is juſtly offended. Out of the numberleſs examples I might produce of this fault in writers, I ſhall ſelect the following from Shakeſpeare, in which the marriage of King John with Conſtance is referred to.

For

> For by this knot thou ſhalt ſo ſurely tie
> Thy now unſured aſſurance to the crown,
> That yon green boy ſhall have no ſun to ripe
> The bloom that promiſes a mighty fruit.
>
> KING JOHN.

Here it may juſtly be aſked, how can the *tying a knot* prevent the ſun's *ripening fruit?* The King's marriage with Conſtance is certainly very properly expreſſed by tying a knot; and, as that event would cut off the reaſonable hopes that Arthur might otherwiſe entertain of ſucceeding to the throne, this is likewiſe beautifully deſcribed by ſaying he would then have *no ſun to ripen the bloom which promiſed a mighty fruit.* But though theſe metaphors, when viewed aſunder, appear proper and beautiful, when they are joined, the reſult is a manifeſt abſurdity.

Not only ſhould writers avoid the near union of different terms which are highly metaphorical, they ſhould alſo favour the imagery which metaphors raiſe in the mind, by intermixing no plain and natural expreſſions with them. Thus, in the paſſage quoted above, the *boy* ſhould have been kept out of ſight, and the *tree* or *plant* have been ſubſtituted in its place for the *ſun* to act upon. In this view, likewiſe, the author of the Bathos juſtly cenſures the following lines of Blackmore:

> A waving ſea of heads around them ſpread,
> And ſtill freſh ſtreams the gazing deluge fed.

For when *a croud of people* are, by the power of figure, metamorphoſed into a *deluge*, it is deſtroying the agreeable illuſion too ſoon, and raiſes an inconſiſtency in our ideas, to give *eyes* to it; though the objects that compoſed this metaphorical deluge really had eyes.

And yet, to ſhow how delicate this affair is, and what extreme attention it requires wholly to avoid this fault, we may obſerve, that this ſame hypercritical writer, even while he is upon the ſubject, falls into it himſelf.

" Thus an ingenious artiſt, painting the ſpring, talks of a " ſnow of bloſſoms, and thereby raiſes an unexpected picture of " winter."——But how can a *picture be raiſed* by a perſon's *talking* of any thing while he is painting?

Indeed, the frequency of inaccuracies of this kind, where the figure is not ſtrong, and the little notice that is, notwithſtanding, taken of them by the generality of readers, ſhow that they are of very little conſequence. The caſe is, that the images which ſuch metaphors preſent, are ſeen but for a moment, and then very obſcurely; ſo that, though there may be ſome little inconſiſtency in them, in ſuch a tranſient view they eaſily paſs unnoticed. It is only when we expreſsly *attend* to theſe faint metaphors, and by a direct effort of the mind draw out the ſcene at large, and thereby, as we may ſay, raiſe and heighten all the colours of it, that the impropriety is obſerved. But how few do this? and, are critics ſo minutely employed worthy the notice of a writer?

When a figure is become abſolutely evaneſcent, and long uſe hath made the metaphorical term more familiar than the proper name of the thing, or circumſtance denoted by it, it is pains employed to very little purpoſe to trace out the long-forgotten alluſion, in order to ſhow its *latent inconſiſtency* with any thing it is connected with. Who can expect that ſuch phraſes as theſe, *fallen into an error*, to *ſpend time* upon a thing, to be *incenſed at* a perſon, &c. ſhould be uſed with any regard to the latent figure they contain.

contain. It is impoſſible however for any perſon to conſtruct many ſentences without expoſing himſelf to the ſame cenſure; terms which are ultimately figurative abound ſo much in all languages. All our intellectual ideas are expreſſed in terms borrowed from ſenſible things; but who, in uſing them, attends to the ſenſible images they may ſuggeſt? Or, whoever attends to ideas of *local poſition*, which every *prepoſition* implies?

I may add, that the perſons who are the moſt liable to theſe inaccuracies, are thoſe who are the moſt perfectly acquainted with a language, and to whom the terms and idioms of it are the moſt familiar. For, by frequent uſe, the latent figurative ſenſe of a word is wholly overlooked, and ſuch a figurative expreſſion ſuggeſts nothing but the idea of the object intended to be illuſtrated by it. However, nothing in criticiſm requires leſs judgment and ability than to diſcover theſe little inaccuracies, if a man will look ſo low. Such minute critics are finely expoſed in a paper of the Tatler.

So remote are the two extremes in the vividneſs of metaphors, that the evaneſcent require no attention at all to their connection with other ideas; whereas the boldeſt and ſtrongeſt require ſo much, that not only do they introduce confuſion when they are *intermixed*, but they even give pain and diſguſt when they *ſucceed* one another at very ſhort intervals. When metaphors raiſe very vivid and diſtinct ideas of foreign ſcenes, to change them very faſt, is like hurrying us from one part of the creation to another, with a rapidity that gives us pain.

An eaſy and good teſt, in moſt caſes, of the propriety of ſtrong metaphors, is to imagine them reduced to *painting*, and conſider how the images would look in that mode of expreſſion. A perſon of a lively

lively imagination naturally doth this, and conſequently to him improprieties in metaphors appear much more diſguſting than they do to other perſons, to whom they ſuggeſt the idea of the ſcene, from which they were borrowed, very faintly. To a perſon of this lively turn of mind, who eaſily recurs to the original ſcenes from which metaphors are drawn, the following ſtring of metaphors, in an exquiſite poem of Pope's (though, ſingly taken, they be uncommonly happy) as they ſucceed one another without any interval, may poſſibly have a diſagreeable effect:

> What is this *abſorbs* me quite,
> *Steals* my ſenſes, *ſhuts* my ſight?
> *Drinks* my ſpirits, *draws* my breath?
> Tell me, my ſoul, can this be death?

Though there ſhould be no inconſiſtency in imagining the ſame thing to have the different properties of *abſorbing*, *ſtealing*, *ſhutting*, *drinking*, and *drawing*; yet the ideas of theſe ſeveral actions can hardly be brought ſo near one another without confuſion, if the images be a little raiſed by an attention to them.

As metaphors are contracted ſimiles, they muſt neceſſarily have many excellencies and defects in common with them. Of this kind are the following. The moſt ſtriking metaphors, or thoſe which give the moſt ſenſible pleaſure, are thoſe in which there is perceived at firſt the greateſt difference between the two ideas that are ſignified by the ſame word, and afterwards the greateſt reſemblance. From this ſource, chiefly, is derived the charm of the following metaphors, a *gay thought*, a *bright expreſſion*, the *wings of the wind*, the *impervious ocean*: though the two firſt have the additional advantage of being alluſions to *objects of ſight*, which are always peculiarly diſtinct and pleaſing; and the laſt gives us, likewiſe, the idea of

human ſentiments, which will be mentioned hereafter as a diſtinct pleaſing object. This rule is to be underſtood with the ſame exception, as the rule ſimilar to it reſpecting compariſons.

Shakeſpeare uſes a low and degrading metaphor when he makes King John exhort the people of Angiers to *ſave unſcratched their city's threatened cheeks*; meaning that they ſhould ſave their walls from being battered.

The alluſion is merely verbal, when, in the ſame play, Conſtance, lying on the ground, is made to ſay,

——— For my grief's ſo great,
That no ſupport but the huge firm earth
Can bear it up.

Figures of this ſort are nothing more than *puns*; for the ſenſe of the paſſage depends upon the double-meaning of the word. Grief is ſaid to be ſupported in a figurative ſenſe, but the earth ſupports things in a literal ſenſe.

ALLEGORIES are continued metaphors; that is, they are deſcriptions of certain objects in terms borrowed from others: ſo that though one ſet of objects only be named, whenever allegories be uſed, there muſt be a conſtant attention to the ſimilar properties of them both. The following account of the ſons of Edward in Shakeſpeare's Richard the Second is allegorical:

Edward's ſeven ſons, whereof thyſelf art one,
Were ſeven fair branches ſpringing from one root.
Some of theſe branches by the deſtinies cut:
But Thomas, my dear lord, my life, my Glo'ſter,
One flouriſhing branch of his moſt royal root,
Is hacked down, and his ſummer leaves all faded,
By Envy's hand, and Murder's bloody axe.

All

All the rules reſpecting propriety and conſiſtency that are neceſſary to be obſerved in metaphors, are equally requiſite in allegories! They differ only in this; that allegories, in common with compariſons, imply a conſiderable excurſion of the mind from the principal object of its thoughts; and therefore, though a man in the greateſt agitation of mind would not refuſe a metaphor, he may eaſily be ſuppoſed to have his thoughts ſo much engaged as not to be at liberty to attend ſo particularly to a foreign object, as is neceſſary in order to note *many points of reſemblance*, and make an allegory. Allegories, therefore, as well as compariſons, are the language of men tolerably compoſed, or only moderately elevated. The following allegorical ſpeech of Caliſta, in the Fair Penitent, is unnatural:

> Is it the voice of thunder, or my father?
> Madneſs! confuſion! Let the ſtorm come on;
> Let the tumultuous roar drive all upon me;
> Daſh my devoted bark. Ye ſurges, break it.
> 'Tis for my ruin that the tempeſt riſes.
> When I am loſt, ſunk to the bottom low,
> Peace ſhall return, and all be calm again,
>
> FAIR PENITENT, Act IV.

It requires uncommon ſkill and caution to conduct a long allegory with propriety; becauſe few things are analogous in many reſpects, at the ſame time that they are ſufficiently different to make the analogy pleaſing. Moreover, it is very difficult to make an alluſion intelligible, and at the ſame time never name the thing we mean in direct terms, which we muſt by all means avoid; as it would introduce the greateſt confuſion into the metaphor.

Bunyan, whoſe invention was certainly very fertile, has often forgotten himſelf, and helped out his wire-drawn allegories by the thing allegorized. Thus, deſcribing the paſſage of Chriſtian and Hopeful through the river which repreſents death, he introduces ſome perſons telling them they would find it deeper or ſhallower " according to their faith in the Lord of the place to " which they were going."

Dryden's Hind and Panther contains much of the ſame abſurd mixture of allegory and the thing allegorized. " What rela- " tion" (ſays Lord Halifax in his remarks upon it) " has the " Hind to our Saviour? or what notion have we of a Panther's " title? If you ſay he means the Church, how doth the Church " feed on lawns, or range in the foreſt? Let it be always a " Church, or always a cloven-footed beaſt; for we cannot bear " this ſhifting the ſcene every line."

LECTURE XXIV.

Of CONTRAST *in general, and particularly of* Wit, *the* riſible, *and the* ridiculous.

HAVING conſidered the pleaſure we receive from the *exerciſe of our faculties*, and all thoſe pleaſures of taſte in which it is a principal ingredient, we paſs to another medium of pleaſure in works of genius and imagination, viz. CONTRAST. And it the more naturally ſolicits our attention in this place, as we have ſeen that it hath a conſiderable ſhare in the pleaſure ariſing from compariſons and metaphors, which were laſt treated of.

Indeed, I ſhall have no objection to any perſon's conſidering contraſt as one particular manner in which our minds are ſtrongly affected.

If two objects, in any reſpect ſimilar, preſent themſelves to our view at the ſame time, we naturally expect, and, as it were, wiſh to find a *complete reſemblance* in them; and we are, in ſome meaſure, ſurprized and diſappointed to find them different. This diſpoſition to make every thing perfect and *complete in its kind*, will be taken notice of, and farther illuſtrated, in its proper place hereafter. Here then, as in all other caſes of *ſurprize* and *diſappointment*, our attention is ſtrongly engaged to the circumſtances in which the two objects differ, as ſtrongly as it was at firſt engaged

gaged to thoſe in which they agreed; ſo that the ſame principle, by which we are led to make every thing *complete*, now leads us to enlarge and extend the circumſtances in which they differ. Theſe, in their turn, will make the circumſtances of reſemblance appear ſurprizing. And thus the mind will naturally turn its attention alternately to the circumſtances of *reſemblance* and thoſe of *difference* with great celerity, and both will have the advantage of being conſiderably augmented. In all this time, the *ſurprize*, the quick *ſucceſſion of thought*, and the *enlargement of our ideas*, cannot fail to introduce a pleaſureable ſtate of mind. I may add, that the greater is the reſemblance in ſome things, and the greater the difference in others, the more ſenſible will the effect be, and the greater the pleaſure reſulting from it. Theſe obſervations any perſon may exemplify to himſelf, by viewing at the ſame time even two houſes, two gardens, or two trees of the ſame kind, that are very different in ſize. In this poſition they both affect us more ſenſibly and more pleaſurably than if they had been viewed ſeparately, when their reſemblance and their difference had not been ſo apparent, or ſo perfectly aſcertained.

A familiar example will ſerve to make us ſenſible how neceſſary ſtrong circumſtances of reſemblance are to make us feel the greateſt effect of the circumſtances of difference. A *dog* is not conſidered as diminutive with reſpect to an *elephant*; though, therefore, they be placed ever ſo near together, our ideas of the elephant are not raiſed, nor our ideas of the dog diminiſhed. We did not expect they ſhould be equal. But upon introducing another dog conſiderably larger than the former, we immediately cry out, What a prodigious large dog! while the other appears to our imagination leſs than he did before. Our ſurprize, and, conſe-

conſequently, the imagined diſproportion between the two dogs becomes greater, if we be told, or perceive, that they are of the ſame kind, as both maſtiffs, both greyhounds, &c.; and both theſe effects are ſenſibly greater ſtill, if we be told they are of the ſame litter. The ſame uſe may be made of our obſervation of the differences in the perſons, the abilities, the fortunes, and tempers of men of the ſame nation, the ſame family, the ſame parents, the ſame education, and the ſame external advantages.

In all theſe caſes, any extraordinary quality of an object is, in a great meaſure, loſt upon us, unleſs it be perceived in conjunction with a very different degree of the ſame quality. Indeed, if we only conſider that the ideas of *great* and *little* are only relative, and the terms comparative, we might conclude, that they muſt have their moſt ſenſible effect, whatever it is, when they are viewed in circumſtances the moſt favourable for that compariſon, and where the relation of which they conſiſt may be perceived with the moſt advantage.

We ſee, likewiſe, that the effects of all kinds of contraſts are the ſtrongeſt in perſons of a lively imagination, and to the ſame perſon when his apprehenſion is the quickeſt; becauſe, by a lively and vigorous imagination, two different objects are comprehended with the moſt eaſe: conſequently the ideas of their relation are peculiarly ſtrong, and make the greateſt figure.

I ſhall add another obſervation or two. Our reliſh for *novelty* and *ſurprize* contributes not a little to the pleaſure we feel upon perceiving ſtrong reſemblances in things that differ, and differences in things that reſemble one another. For it is very obſervable, that every ſpecies of contraſt affects us much more ſenſibly the firſt time we perceive it, than ever it doth afterwards. We are ſenſible, likewiſe, that it requires conſiderable *ſagacity*

and

and *ingenuity* to diſcern many of thoſe unexpected *reſemblances* and differences, which, in a manner that will be explained hereafter, is another conſiderable ingredient in the pleaſure we receive from thoſe contraſts.

One remarkable conſequence of perceiving ſome ſpecies of contraſts, particularly in perſons of an irritable conſtitution, is *laughter*; of which it will be proper, therefore, to give ſome account in this place. Laughter, when it firſt appears in children (according to that profound obſerver of human nature, Dr. Hartley) is a *naſcent cry*, raiſed by pain, or the apprehenſion of pain, ſuddenly checked, and repeated at very ſhort intervals. Theſe alternate momentary fears and momentary joys are very obſervable in the laughter of young children when they are tickled. Afterwards, the ſame automatic motions and geſtures of which laughter conſiſts become aſſociated with leſs and leſs *ſimilar cauſes* perpetually. Then almoſt any briſk emotion or ſurprize, ſuddenly checked, and recurring alternately, will produce it; and at laſt any ſtrong oppoſition, or contraſt, in things, whether they be perſonally intereſted in them or not. When we are advanced in life, a variety of paſſions, and a regard to decorum, check the propenſity to laughter; whereas many idiots continue to laugh upon the ſlighteſt occaſions imaginable.

This progreſs is exactly ſimilar to many other proceſſes in human nature, whereby a variety of the ſame motions and geſtures become aſſociated with cauſes that are ſlighter and ſlighter continually, till at laſt any thing bearing the fainteſt reſemblance to the original cauſe will be ſufficient to excite them. In this caſe, the extreme celerity with which the attention is reflected from the circumſtances of reſemblance to thoſe of difference, al-

ternately,

ternately, upon the perception of a contraſt, coincides remarkably with the quick ſucceſſive pulſes in a fit of laughter.

The laughter, and all the pleaſure ariſing from the contraſt, ceaſes, when the mind, after vibrating, as it were, between the points of reſemblance and difference, at length reſts in the medium; and then the inconſiſtency, which was ſo ſtriking at the firſt view, no longer affects us. Theſe effects may, however, be revived after ſome interval, eſpecially if, by an expreſs effort of our minds, we endeavour to magnify the circumſtances of reſemblance and difference. But when the bounds of the reſemblance and of difference are perfectly known, and every idea belonging to the ſubject is anticipated by the mind, the moment they are mentioned, the repetition of them produces very languid effects, in compariſon of the firſt ſenſation. The *ſurprize* is then over. Hence, books of jeſts, apophthegms, or any ſpecies of mere *wit*, are ſeldom read a ſecond time. They will only bear to be repeated in *company*, and in freſh company, for a reaſon that will be mentioned preſently.

This *contraſt*, the nature and general effects of which have now been explained, human genius hath diverſified, and branched out, into a great variety of pleaſing ſcenes, by varying the *ſubjects* and the *degrees* of it. To this we muſt not only allow the conſiderable ſhare that hath been aſcribed to it in *metaphors*, and other ſources of pleaſure in works of genius, that have been or will be mentioned, but muſt acknowledge that we are principally indebted to it for the pleaſure we receive from *antitheſis*, from objects that are *riſible*, or *ridiculous*, from the *mock-heroic*, *burleſque*, *parody*, *irony*, *repartee*, *wit*, *humour*, *riddles*, and *puns*; with many other entertainments of the ſame kind, for which we have no diſtinct name.

Indeed, the terms of criticiſm do ſo little correſpond to all the varieties of the diviſions and ſubdiviſions of this copious ſubject, and have been uſed with ſo little uniformity and preciſion by critics; that, in order to avoid confuſion, I ſhall generally deſcribe the ſeveral feelings and occaſions of them, in the firſt place, and afterwards mention terms by which I apprehend they may be moſt conveniently denoted. In this caſe, the terms may be applied differently at pleaſure, without controverting the principles advanced in theſe lectures; which will be laid down, independent of the uſe of any *words* whatever. And as a great part of what has been written upon this ſubject has been to fix the uſe of words, this method will reduce the ſubject, thus ſeparated from the diſputes about words, into a ſmall compaſs, and we ſhall have a much clearer and more beautiful view of all the degrees and variations of it.

To make the eaſier tranſition to this ſubject of oppoſition or contraſt, from that of metaphors, which derive a conſiderable part of their beauty from this ſource, I ſhall try the effect of contraſt in a ſingle epithet, in which a word is uſed in a meaning ſeemingly quite contrary to its uſual ſenſe, and yet with ſufficient analogy to make it extremely pleaſing.

Mr. Spence, in his excellent eſſay upon the Odyſſee, ſpeaking of the candour and generoſity of the ancient critics, and of the envy, ill-nature, and captiouſneſs of thoſe among the moderns who bear that name, ſays, *Zoïlus was the only modern critic among the ancients.* That the beauty of this expreſſion depends upon the ſeeming oppoſition between the uſual ſenſe of the word *modern*, and that which muſt be given to it here, is very evident; for only change the words, and ſay, "Zoïlus was the only cri-

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" tic among the ancients whoſe temper reſembled that of the " moderns;" and though the ſenſe remains the ſame, the ſpirit and poignancy of the expreſſion is gone.

If it will aſſiſt us to analize our thoughts and feelings upon this ſubject, I ſhall cite a few more thoughts and expreſſions which have a ſimilar effect. Pliny, in his panegyric addreſſed to Trajan, ſays, *Solus omnium pater patriæ eſſes antequam fieres.* The ſame author, ſpeaking concerning Trajan's entry into Rome, ſays, that *ſome* proclaimed aloud that *they had ſeen enough after they had ſeen you*; and others, again, *that they muſt live longer.* The peculiarly-fine effect of this paſſage ariſes from ſuch different ſentiments being formed, with equal appearance of reaſon, from the ſame event. It is as if the ſame cauſe produced oppoſite effects. To mention only one example more; Cicero ſays to Cæſar, *You forget nothing but injuries.* We ſee where the beauty of this thought lies, the moment we reflect that other men forget every thing elſe ſooner than injuries.

In the two former of theſe examples, there is an oppoſition both in the *ſenſe* and in the *words*; in the two latter there is nothing verbal. Such oppoſitions of ideas, or of the different ſenſes of words, may tend to produce a *ſmile*, but I think not ſenſibly enough to make them be termed *riſible.* If the ingenuity capable of diſcovering ſuch oppoſitions as appear in theſe expreſſions, will not be termed *wit*, it is becauſe the ſubject of them is too *ſerious*, and not diverting enough to entitle them to it.

It is certain, that if the ſubject be very *ſerious*, notwithſtanding there be the happieſt mixture of reſemblance and diverſity, and the moſt unexpected in the world, we never *ſmile* or think

of applying the term *wit* to it. Of this we may make experiment in the following admirable lines of Mr. Pope:

> All nature is but art unknown to thee;
> All chance, direction which thou can'ſt not ſee.
> All diſcord, harmony not underſtood;
> All partial evil, univerſal good.

In this paſſage, the ſame objects preſent us, in one view, with the idea of *nature*, in another of *art*; in one of *chance*, in another of *deſign*; in one of *diſcord*, in another of *harmony*; in one of *evil*, and in another of *good*. This paſſage, therefore, by the ſtrong oppoſition which it exhibits of the properties, not only of ſimilar, but of the ſame objects, as viewed by different minds, and in different lights, bears a conſiderable reſemblance to the paſſages quoted above, in which the ſame things are called by different names; but the extreme ſerioufneſs of the ſubject checks every tendency to ſmile, and with this, I think, the paſſage will loſe the name of *wit*, in the modern uſe of the word. For it muſt be noted, that formerly the uſe of this term was much more extenſive, and was applied, without ſcruple, to every obſervation which ſhewed ingenuity, whether diverting or ſerious.

I ſhall readily allow the following paſſage, quoted before from Mr. Pope, to be truly ſublime:

> Who ſees with equal eye, as God of all,
> A hero periſh, or a ſparrow fall;
> Atoms, or ſyſtems, into ruin hurl'd;
> And now a bubble burſt, and now a world.

I quote it again, in order to ſhow, by comparing it with the following paſſage, the very different effects of contraſts, ſimilar in every reſpect, except the *dignity of their ſubject*.

> This day black omens threat the brighteſt fair,
> That e'er deſerved a watchful ſpirit's care.
> Some dire diſaſter, or by force or ſlight;
> But what, or where, the Fates have wrapt in night.
> Whether the nymph ſhall break Diana's law,
> Or ſome frail china jar receive a flaw;
> Or ſtain her honour, or her new brocade;
> Forget her prayers, or miſs a maſquerade;
> Or loſe her heart, or necklace at a ball;
> Or whether heav'n has doom'd that Shock muſt fall?
>
> RAPE OF THE LOCK, Canto II.

The *oppoſition of ideas* is equally ſtrong and pointed in both theſe paſſages. But, in the former, the tendency to *ſmile*, which the oppoſition of ideas ſimply conſidered would raiſe, is overruled by the *ſublime*, which the grandeur of the ſubject excites; in the latter, which, if I miſtake not, will be univerſally acknowledged to be a ſpecimen of refined *wit* and *humour*, it is not. Moreover, is not the term *humour* applied to it, on account of its being *diverting under the appearance of gravity*, ſeeming to repreſent trifles as of the ſame importance with things of infinitely greater conſequence? as it is termed *wit*, becauſe the ſubject is *gay*, and eaſily admits a *ſmile*.

An object that is purely and ſimply *riſible*, is any thing in which there is perceived a great *incongruity* or *diſproportion*, provided the object, at the ſame time that it is of ſome conſequence, be not capable of exciting a more ſerious emotion. As a man with

with an immoderate long noſe, or a very ſhort one (no noſe at all would raiſe our horror) a rich dreſs with a dirty rag tied to it, and a group of riſible objects, may be ſeen in the following paſſages from Hudibras, Canto I.

> When of his hoſe we come to treat,
> The cupboard where he kept his meat.
> His puiſſant ſword unto his ſide
> Near his undaunted heart was tied;
> With baſket-hilt that would hold broth,
> And ſerve for fight and dinner both.
> When it had ſtabb'd or broke a head,
> It would ſcrape trenchers, or chip bread,
> Toaſt cheeſe or bacon; though it were
> To bait a mouſe-trap, 'twould not care:
> 'Twould make clean ſhoes, and in the earth
> Set leeks and onions, and ſo forth.

It is needleſs to point out the oppoſition between the proper uſes of the things here mentioned, and thoſe they are ſuppoſed to be put to, which makes a ſcene ſo highly diverting. It is ſaid above, that the circumſtances which occaſion laughter muſt be of *ſome conſequence:* for we frequently ſee the greateſt inconſiſtencies in things that are wholly *indifferent* to us, without feeling the leaſt provocation to laugh.

But the moſt frequent, and the moſt abundant ſcenes of mirth and laughter, are incongruities relating to *human ſentiments*, which ſome diſtinguiſh by the name of *improprieties*. Such are the blunders and miſtakes, the falſe taſte, the abſurd ſpeeches and actions of ſome of our own ſpecies. Whenever *deſign* enters into any

any thing that occaſions mirth, the perſon that laughs ſeems to entertain a ſlight degree of *contempt* for the object of his mirth, and in that reſpect feels an agreeable conſciouſneſs of his own ſuperiority over him. This circumſtance of a degree of contempt conſiſtent with laughter, added to a riſible object, ſeems to intitle it to the character of *ridiculous*.

That a conſciouſneſs of *ſelf-eſteem* really enters into the feeling of *ridicule*, I think is manifeſt, from the peculiar pleaſure that is univerſally taken in repeating diverting incidents *in company*. Very often the ſame perſon will hardly ever be weary of entertaining different companies with the ſame diverting ſtories; and ſuch ſtories ſeem to be told with the ſame kind of ſatisfaction with which perſons obliquely hint their own praiſes. This ſuppoſition is, likewiſe, favoured by the obſervation, that perſons, who are remarkable for their vanity and love of praiſe, take the moſt ſenſible pleaſure in every thing into which ridicule enters; and that men of very great humility, candour, and benevolence, are not eaſily provoked to laugh at the foibles of their fellow-creatures. And ſince all valuable *politeneſs* is founded upon humility and benevolence; hence, directly to ridicule any body is now thought, by perſons of the beſt taſte, to be inconſiſtent with true politeneſs.

Objects truly ridiculous are ſuch as *pride in rags*, *conceit in ignorance*, and *hypocriſy in gravity*, *a violent paſſion raiſed by a trifling cauſe*, and *great diſproportion between the means and the ends* of human actions. Hence we laugh at the ſchemes of the Laputans, to extract ſun-beams from cucumbers, to make books by a machine, and to ſoften marble for pillows and pincuſhions. Alſo it is the oppoſition between words and ſenſe, that raiſes the laugh at thoſe blunders in ſpeech which are known by the name

of *bulls*; and it is the oppoſition between the ſubject and the language, that makes us conſider a ſublime ſubject treated in a low ſtyle, and a mean ſubject in a lofty ſtyle, as equally ridiculous.

In reality, *men* can hardly be the object of a laugh, that is not more or leſs a laugh of *deriſion*, and is excited by the ridiculous ſtrictly ſo called; becauſe we connect the idea of *deſign* with every thing belonging to men. Thus a little man wearing a long ſword, or a rich coat covering dirty linen, are objects that are rather ridiculous, than merely riſible.

Even in a mere *perſonification*, if but a diſtant reſemblance of the ſentiments, actions, and characters of human beings, be perceived in brute creatures, we may have feelings very ſimilar to thoſe excited by *the ridiculous* among our own ſpecies. This we may have been ſenſible of in our obſervation of the *pride of a turkey-cock*, the *gravity of the owl*, and the *tricks of a monkey*, and of a variety of animals trained up for diverſion. To a lively imagination, prone as we are to perſonification, there may occur objects really ridiculous, even in the inanimate creation. It is, perhaps, owing to our imagination being ſo prone to perſonification, that objects riſible and ridiculous have been ſo generally confounded. Or perhaps, rather, we never do laugh (except we be provoked to it mechanically) but when we, ſecretly at leaſt, perſonify the object of our laughter, and ſo the riſible and ridiculous may differ only in degree, and not in kind.

It ſeems to favour this hypotheſis, that we view many objects and ſcenes in which are great incongruities, and which are neither adapted to excite any great or ſerious emotion, nor can be ſaid to be abſolutely of no conſequence to us, at which we, notwithſtanding, perceive no inclination to laugh; as when a botaniſt

niſt finds a well-known plant in an unexpected place. And, in general, though the attention of the curious be ſtrongly drawn to ſuch objects as we call *luſus naturæ*, and they ſeem to excite no ſentiment capable of ſtifling a laugh, if it were ſtrongly prompted; yet, though in the eye of a virtuoſo, a *luſus naturæ* bears every characteriſtic that is uſually given of a riſible object, no inclination to laugh is felt; unleſs, in a gay humour, we ſecretly perſonify ſuch objects, and wonder how the *ſtrangers came there*, and what is their *buſineſs*.

If this obſervation be juſt, we ſhall be able to determine what particular kind and degree of conſequence an object, in other reſpects riſible, muſt be of, in order to move laughter; viz. it muſt produce a *perſonification*. Then, if any incongruity attend it, and it be not capable of exciting a ſerious emotion, the tendency to laugh will be inevitable. However, leſt this obſervation ſhould not be found to be univerſally juſt, the definition in the former part of the lecture is left to ſtand in more general terms.

To ſhew that any ſerious emotion will deſtroy the property we call either riſible or ridiculous in objects, we may conſider the caſe of *Sancho Panca* fallen into a hole, which he took to be a deep pit, in the dark, and clinging to the ſides with his hands and feet, in the utmoſt dread of being daſhed to pieces, and all the while within a foot of the bottom. This, eſpecially conſidering the character of the man, is certainly an object highly *riſible*. Perhaps no perſon could have refrained from laughing, if he had found him in that ſituation; yet, if we had ſeen him in the ſame poſture, and his danger had been real; or, perhaps, if we had found any perſon for whom we entertained a higher kind of reſpect, in the ſame ſituation, and without danger, we ſhould not

have been diſpoſed to laugh at all. Our *anxiety* and *concern* in the former caſe, and our *reſpect* in the latter, would have overpowered it.

We, likewiſe, ſee that, in perſons of little ſerious religion, and great levity of mind, nothing will excite more profuſe laughter, than the application of paſſages of Scripture to very foreign and ludicrous purpoſes; whereas the ſame thing will ſtrike every ſerious perſon, who entertains a profound veneration for the Scriptures, with the greateſt horror; or if the greatneſs and unexpectedneſs of the contraſt ſhould, in ſpite of himſelf, as it were, ſurprize him into a laugh, he will ſoon recollect himſelf, and be very uneaſy about it. We, likewiſe, ſee every day, that the ſame views provoke only the laughter and ridicule of ſome perſons, and the ſerious indignation of others.

LECTURE

LECTURE XXV.

Of BURLESQUE, PARODY, *the* MOCK-HEROIC, HUMOUR, *and* IRONY.

TO make a ſudden tranſition from a very high to a very low object that is ſimilar to it, though ſuch a tranſition be in itſelf diſagreeable, yet, by means of the contraſt which it produces, it may affect the mind with a lively ſenſe of pleaſure. This we may perceive in the following lines of Butler:

> The ſun had long ſince in the lap
> Of Thetis taken out his nap;
> And, like a lobſter boil'd, the morn
> From black to red began to turn.
>
> HUD. Part II. Cant. II. Ver. 29.

This effect is called *burleſque*; and a great object degraded in this manner, and placed in the ſame light with a mean and contemptible one, is ſaid to be burleſqued; the meaning of which is, that the ideas of meanneſs annexed to the leſſer object are, by this compariſon, transferred to the greater, and adhere to it by aſſociation. Theſe transferred ideas, being the reverſe of the ſublime, deſtroy the effect of every thing ſimilar to it in the idea

of a great object; and the conſequence is, that the great object is afterwards mentioned with leſs reſpect and reverence than it was before.

A *Parody*, which is the application of a paſſage of any author to a foreign, and generally lower purpoſe, is a kind of burleſque of a grave and ſerious writer: and conſequently parodies have often an unfavourable effect upon the original author. For thoſe foreign alluſions will often occur in reading the original paſſage, and prevent it from having its proper and intended effect.

For this reaſon, if it be a matter of importance to preſerve our reverence for any writings (as, for inſtance, the ſcriptures) it is adviſeable not to liſten to ſuch ludicrous applications of them. The unhappy effect of ſuch applications is never wholly loſt, till the alluſion be forgotten. Should the alluſion even miſs of its uſual effect upon light minds, and raiſe horror and indignation at the firſt hearing, it may not find the mind in ſo favourable a diſpoſition every time that it occurs; or if it do, ſtill, as the ſentiments of *indignation* are foreign to the deſign of the paſſage, it is deſirable that nothing even of that kind come in view when we read it.

Neither art, ſcience, profeſſion, character, nor any thing elſe, however venerable or reſpectable, is exempt from the power of ridicule; becauſe there is no ſetting bounds to thoſe analogies in nature or art which give riſe to it. We ſee the greateſt things analogous to the leaſt, and the leaſt to the greateſt, without end or limit: inſomuch that it is impoſſible to name an object in any claſs of things (let us make the diſtribution of them as we pleaſe) but ſome other object may be found analogous to it in any other claſs, even the moſt remote we can think of. And whenever

theſe analogies are brought into view, the reſult is an alteration in the ideas of both the objects in which the analogy is perceived, occaſioned by the reciprocal influences of the one upon the other. They are univerſally either increaſed or diminiſhed, raiſed or depreſſed, &c. and the effect is more or leſs permanent, in proportion as the analogy is more or leſs ſtriking. This effect is the ſame, whether the objects be brought together in order to be *compared* or *contraſted*, becauſe *analogy* is the foundation of both, and they differ only in this, that when things are compared, the points of *reſemblance* are chiefly attended to; whereas, when they are contraſted, the circumſtances of *difference* are principally noted. But it is neceſſary, in order to their producing their reſpective effects, that the circumſtances of difference be attended to in the former caſe, and thoſe of reſemblance in the latter.

Conſidering how far and how wide analogies extend themſelves through all the parts of nature; how poſſible is it, that an object, the moſt reſpectable in the world, may be diſcovered to be ſo analogous, in ſome reſpects, to another, even the moſt contemptible, that the oddneſs of the contraſt ſhall produce a laugh? May not the moſt ſerious and ſenſible paſſage of any author whatever be applied to a purpoſe ſo foreign, and yet ſo ſimilar to its original uſe, as infallibly to produce the ſame effect? But ſhould we, notwithſtanding this, in our *judgments* (however our *imaginations* might, for a time, be impoſed upon) entertain a lower idea either of the object, or of the paſſage that was thus burleſqued? How then is *ridicule the teſt of truth?* It requires only an attention to the nature of contraſt to refute the fallacy. Ridicule can only diſcover contraſts capable of producing a laugh; and, conſidering the levity and irritability of ſome perſons minds, there

there is nothing in nature but what hath connections and analogies which produce contraſts capable of doing it.

The grave and reſpectable character of Socrates was ſo effectually turned into ridicule by Ariſtophanes, that it was not in the power of any of his friends to forbear laughing at his expence. It is even ſaid that he himſelf could not refrain from ſmiling: though that might be affected in him, in order to turn off the edge of the ridicule. However, there ſeems to be no reaſon why a perſon, in whom pride or vanity doth not greatly predominate, may not laugh at himſelf; ſince it is only the ſenſe of *honour* being wounded that makes us inſenſible of the pleaſures of contraſt, when we ourſelves are the ſubject of it.

If nothing affected the ſenſe of ridicule but inconſiſtencies of *opinions* with *truth*, it would bid fair to be the teſt of truth. It is true, that ſuch inconſiſtencies *do* affect that ſenſe, and appear ridiculous; but what makes it indeterminate, and of no uſe in this caſe, is, that a variety of analogies, contraſts, and compariſons, which imply no inconſiſtency with truth, do likewiſe affect us in a ſimilar manner. For it requires nothing but that two objects, or two parts of the ſame object, ſeen at the ſame time, be very like in ſome things, and very unlike in others, in order to excite the ſenſe of ridicule. The dreſs and cuſtoms of Aſiatics appear ridiculous to Europeans, and thoſe of Europeans to Aſiatics; but doth it follow from thence that there is any *real impropriety* in either, any thing contrary to the nature, fitneſs, and truth of things?

Beſides, we ſee that the ſame things affect different perſons in in a very different manner, according to the previous ſtate of their minds: ſo that, before nothing but *falſehood* could affect the mind with the ſenſe of ridicule, it is neceſſary that all a perſon's previous

previous notions be juſt. For it is an inconſiſtency with what we apprehend to be truth that appears ridiculous to us. Thus, no doubt, the opinion of Copernicus, that the earth had a revolution both about its own axis, and about the ſun, would be received with ridicule when it was firſt publiſhed; and if mankind had acquieſced in that teſt, that certain truth would have been exploded, without farther examination. It is reverſing the order of nature to *judge* in conſequence of *laughing*. It is evident, we ought rather to forbear laughing till we have employed our judgment, to ſee whether we have reaſon to laugh or not.

But though ridicule be not the teſt of truth, it hath very conſiderable uſes. For as every laugh is made at the expence, and to the prejudice of the thing, or character, that is ridiculed, it makes us ſolicitous to keep ourſelves, and every thing we revere, from the edge of it, which can only be done by ſeparating from every venerable object every thing which, on account of its connections and analogies, would ſuggeſt the idea of any thing low and contemptible. The conſequence of which is, that ſuch objects are made more of a piece, and more perfect in their kind, at leaſt more agreeable to *common opinions*, and the *prevailing taſte*. What a ridiculous mixture of great and low images would every mode of religion, every ſcheme of philoſophy, every ſpecies of compoſition, and every human character preſent, if the fear of ridicule did not make men ſolicitous to avoid ſuch incongruous circumſtances?

The reverſe of paſſing from a *high to a low* object, is to paſs from a very *low to a high* one. This tranſition, at the ſame time that (for a reaſon which will be given hereafter) it is in itſelf agreeable, lays the mind open to the ſame ſpecies of pleaſure (ariſing

(ariſing from contraſt) with the pleaſures of ridicule; with this difference in the effect, that, in this caſe, the low object being that to which the mind hath been attentive, and conſequently that to which it will refer all the related ideas that ariſe in the ſcene in which it is introduced, will have an air of grandeur and importance given to it, by being exhibited in the ſame light with the ſublime object. It is true, that, as in the caſe of ridicule, the ſublime object is liable to be degraded by the ſame means; but not being kept ſo long in ſight, the effect is more tranſient.

Mr. Pope aggrandizes an altercation between a company of gentlemen and ladies, by the following magnificent compariſon:

> So when bold Homer makes the gods engage,
> And heavenly breaſts with human paſſions rage;
> 'Gainſt Pallas, Mars, Latona, Hermes arms,
> And all Olympus rings with loud alarms:
> Jove's thunder roars, heav'n trembles all around,
> Blue Neptune ſtorms, the bellowing deeps reſound;
> Earth ſhakes her nodding tow'rs, the ground gives way,
> And the pale ghoſts ſtart at the flaſh of day!
>
> RAPE OF THE LOCK, Cant. V. v. 45.

Low images, aggrandized in this manner, by pompous language and ſublime compariſons, produce what is called the *mock-heroic*.

The ſame air of gravity and ſerioufneſs is preſerved through the whole of what is called *humour*; which differs from the *mock-heroic* in nothing, but that the ſubject and ſtyle of it are lower, and therefore it ſuits better with the tone of converſation; whereas we never apply the term *mock-heroic* but to compoſitions, and generally to poetic compoſitions, becauſe they are generally

nerally intended to be an imitation of, and parody upon, the true *heroic*.

There is a ſtroke of genuine humour in the following anſwer of Falſtaff to young Harry.

Harry. "Ay, a good amendment of life in thee, from pray-
" ing to purſe-ſtealing.
Fal. "Why, 'tis my occupation, Hal; 'tis no ſin for a man
" to labour in his vocation."

First Part of HENRY IV. Act I. Scene 2.

The following paſſage, from Arbuthnot's account of what paſſed in the city of London when the comet was expected, is, likewiſe, an excellent ſtroke of humour, but of that ſpecies of it which is called *ironical*.

" If the reverend clergy ſhowed more concern than others, I
" charitably impute it to their great charge of ſouls; and what
" confirmed me in this opinion was, that the degrees of appre-
" henſion and terror could be diſtinguiſhed to be greater or leſs,
" according to their ranks and degrees in the church."

I cannot, however, help remarking upon this paſſage, that the humour of it would be much improved if the word *charitably* were dropped; ſince that word doth but too plainly point to a very different conſtruction upon the conduct of the clergy, which ought by all means to have been kept out of view: ſince, in every inſtance of true humour, the ſenſe intended to be conveyed, and which makes the contraſt with that which is expreſſed, is always ſufficiently obvious, to occur of itſelf, without the help of any thing in the expreſſion to point to it.

A piece of perfect *irony* is the ſpeech of Elijah to the prieſts of Baal, in the following paſſage: 1 Kings xviii. 26, 27.

"And they called on the name of Baal, from morning until "noon, ſaying, Oh Baal, hear us! But there was no voice, "nor any that anſwered. And they leaped upon the altar which "was made. And it came to paſs, at noon, that Elijah mocked "them, and ſaid, Cry aloud; for he is a god: either he is talk-"ing, or he is purſuing, or he is in a journey; or peradventure "he ſleepeth, and muſt be awaked."

If the above inſtances of humour and irony be admitted, theſe two ſpecies of wit (at the ſame time that they muſt both be allowed to be of the nature of the mock-heroic, but lowered, as we may ſay, to the tone of converſation) muſt differ in this reſpect, that the term *Humour* is applied to every thing that is diverting, under the appearance of gravity; whereas *Irony* is always meant to expoſe, and turn into ridicule. All irony therefore is humour, but all humour is not irony.

If there were no other ſigns of our ideas, and indications of ſtates of mind, than *words*, it might juſtly appear ſurprizing, that a perſon ſhould ſay one thing, and mean another, and yet his real meaning be perfectly underſtood. But the *tone of voice*, the *geſture*, and a variety of other *circumſtances*, may ſufficiently indicate a man's real meaning, without regard to words, and even by the help of words of a contrary meaning; becauſe tones, geſtures, and other circumſtances, have, by uſe, acquired as fixed aſſociations with *ſtates of mind* as articulate words. Some of theſe ſigns of ideas, which are independent of words, are univerſal; ſo that any perſon, uſing them, may ſpeak ironically,

and

and yet be ſure of being underſtood: but there are particular methods which particular perſons have adopted, or have fallen into, which is the reaſon why ſtrangers cannot be ſo certain when a perſon ſpeaks ironically, as thoſe who are well acquainted with him, and know his peculiar ſentiments and manner. However, if a perſon who ſpeaks ironically be miſunderſtood for a time, it is a circumſtance that hath often no unfavourable effect, as it often occaſions the greater diverſion at laſt. In reality, a new contraſt is hereby produced, between our firſt and our latter apprehenſions of the perſon's meaning. Perhaps, the moſt complete ſcene of irony and ridicule is, when a conceited coxcomb in a company ſhall interpret that to be a compliment, which every body elſe ſees was intended to expoſe him; which, in this caſe, it moſt effectually doth.

Though it appears, by the preceding account of the *burleſque* and the *mock-heroic*, that there is a conſiderable reſemblance between them, the latter hath this great advantage over the former; that, in burleſque, there is an avowed attempt to divert and promote laughter, by odd combinations of ideas; whereas in the mock-heroic, and in ſtrokes of humour, we are preſented with the ſame odd combinations, but the attempt to divert, by means of them, is concealed under an air of gravity and ſerioufneſs, which is a high additional contraſt. The writer of burleſque is to be underſtood literally; the author of the mock-heroic, or the writer of humour, ſays one thing, and means another. The former is like a perſon who ſays, "I will tell you a comical "ſtory, that will make you laugh." The latter ſays, of the ſame ſtory, "It is a ſerious affair, and not to be laughed at." Though, therefore, the effect of the mock-heroic and the burleſque differ

only in degree, they are of ſo *different a character*, that it is a great offence againſt propriety to confound them.

Notwithſtanding this manifeſt impropriety, there are few writers who aim at the mock-heroic, that can help putting themſelves, now and then, in the place of their hearers, and laughing at their own ſtory; ſo that we have few pieces which are throughout in the ſtyle of the genuine mock-heroic. *Cervantes* is univerſally confeſſed to be the beſt model for this ſpecies of writing, and he hath been happily imitated by Mr. *Cambridge* in the *Scribleriad.*

Pope's Rape of the Lock, notwithſtanding its great merit, is not altogether free from the forementioned inconſiſtency. Who would imagine that the poet, who affects to be ſo ſerious as he doth in the greateſt part of his work, even when he ſpeaks in his own perſon, ſhould introduce it by telling us, almoſt in ſo many words, that he will tell us a very ridiculous and diverting ſtory?

What can have a greater appearance of gravity than the following exclamation of the poet, in his own perſon, upon Belinda's triumphing too ſoon upon a ſucceſsful throw of her cards?

> Oh thoughtleſs mortals! ever blind to fate,
> Too ſoon dejected, and too ſoon elate;
> Sudden theſe honours ſhall be ſnatch'd away,
> And curs'd for ever this victorious day.
>
> Cant. III. Ver. 101.

The

The greater part of the poem is in the ſame ſerious ſtrain; but how unſuitable to this are the very firſt verſes?

> What dire offence from am'rous cauſes ſprings,
> What mighty conteſts riſe from *trivial things*,
> I ſing.—This verſe to C—— much is due;
> This e'en Belinda might vouchſafe to view.
> *Slight* is the ſubject, but not ſo the praiſe,
> If ſhe inſpire, and he approve my lays.

How much more propriety is there in the following ſerious introduction to the Scribleriad:

> The much-enduring man, whoſe curious ſoul
> Bore him with ceaſeleſs toil from pole to pole,
> Inſatiate, endleſs knowledge to obtain,
> Through woes by land, through dangers on the main,
> New woes, new dangers, deſtin'd to engage,
> By wrathful Saturn's unrelenting rage,
> I ſing.

It is hardly neceſſary to obſerve, that, both with reſpect to the mock-heroic, and in every other caſe in which objects that are very different are contraſted and compared, the reſemblance ſhould be as great and as ſtriking as the difference: otherwiſe the contraſt or compariſon will not be borne with any pleaſure. A want of this ſeems to render Mr. Pope's attempt to parody that ſublime paſſage of Moſes, *Let there be light, and there was light*, weak and ineffectual.

The

> The ſkilful nymph reviews her force with care,
> Let Spades be trumps, ſhe ſaid; and trumps they were.
> RAPE OF THE LOCK, Cant. III. ver. 45.

Such poor attempts at parody as this affect only the perſons who make them. The original paſſages themſelves ſuffer no injury from them, as they were obſerved to do from a happy and ſucceſsful parody.

LECTURE

LECTURE XXVI.

Of RIDDLES, PUNS, *and the ſerious* ANTITHESIS.

THE pleaſure we receive from the ſolution of *riddles* may not improperly be mentioned under this head of Contraſt. The generality of riddles are nothing more than very ſtrong and harſh metaphors, or rather allegories, and the pleaſure we receive from them is in proportion to the greatneſs of the analogy between two things which are very different. Of this nature is the famous riddle of the Sphynx, " What creature is " that which walks upon four legs in the morning, upon two at " noon, and upon three at night?" Every thing that ſtrikes us in the application of this to a *man*, is to find that *hands* and a *ſtaff* are called *legs*, when, like them, they reſt upon the ground, and ſupport a perſon; that *infancy* is the *morning*, *middle age* the *noon*, and *old age* the *evening* of life.

Some other riddles are of another kind, and particularly that of Samſon; " Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the " ſtrong came forth ſweetneſs." The figure in this riddle is not a metaphor, becauſe *a lion* is not called *the eater*; nor *honey*, *ſweetneſs*, on account of their reſemblance to one another; but on account of another relation which will be explained when I treat of the *Metonymy*.

A con-

A contraſt of *ideas* is not always neceſſary to pleaſe and to divert: a *verbal contraſt*, ariſing from the different meanings of the ſame term, is often ſufficient. A word uſed in different ſenſes is called *a pun*, or a play upon words; ſuch is that upon the word *grace*, in the following paſſage of Shakeſpeare, who abounds in this ſpecies of wit:

Fal. "God ſave thy grace; majeſty I ſhould have ſaid, for "grace thou wilt have none.

Henry. "What none!

Fal. "No, by my troth, not ſo much as will ſerve to be a "prologue to an egg and butter."

First Part of HENRY IV. Act I. Scene 2.

The word *grace* is, in fact, uſed in three ſenſes in this paſſage; and it is true that the three ideas ſignified by it, viz. a *title of honour*, *goodneſs of heart*, and *a grace before meat*, have no real reſemblance, as they agree in nothing but that they happen to be ſignified by the ſame term; which is no relation founded in nature, but is merely accidental, and arbitrary. Yet, ſince the reſemblance in expreſſion appears to be, in fact, ſufficient to make the difference in ſenſe very ſtriking and diverting, it ſeems to be enough to intitle it to the name of *wit*, in common with other diverting contraſts, which the ingenuity of men hath hit upon.

Sometimes we meet with a *double contraſt*, viz. both in the ideas, and in the words; as in the following paſſage of Mr. Pope:

Here thou, great Anna, whom three realms obey,
Doſt ſometimes counſel *take*, and ſometimes tea.

RAPE OF THE LOCK, Cant. III. v. 7.

If

If the ambiguous word *take* be changed in this paſſage, the contraſt in ſenſe is ſufficiently ſtriking: but the uſe of that word, which happens to be equally applicable to *counſel* and *tea*, though in very different ſenſes, ſeems to give an additional beauty, of this lower kind, to the paſſage.

There is a like double contraſt in the old inſcription,

> Beneath this ſtone my wife doth lie:
> She's now at reſt, and ſo am I.

The reaſon why puns have been ſo much condemned of late, notwithſtanding both the *ingenuity* requiſite to diſcover them, and their well-known *effects*, ſufficiently prove them to be a ſpecies of *wit*, ſeems to be, that they have been generally miſapplied; that is, the pleaſure they give us is of a nature unſuitable to the proper effect of the works in which they have often been introduced. To ſay they are no ſpecies of wit, becauſe they will not bear *tranſlating* into another language, is too weak to need any refutation. But when they have occurred in ſermons, in tragedies, in a variety of ſerious compoſitions, and in converſations upon ſerious ſubjects, it is no wonder they have been perceived to have a diſagreeable effect, and that the groſs abuſe of them hath made the uſe of them to be univerſally condemned. Indeed, puns accord only with the tone of compoſitions which abound with the ſlighteſt and moſt trifling contraſts; inſomuch that they have an ill effect when intermixed in many ſpecies of wit. They can only pleaſe in a peculiarly gay humour, when the mind is uncommonly irritable, and diſpoſed to be diverted with any thing.

Indeed, for the ſame reaſon that we condemn the uſe of puns, we alſo condemn the uſe of any ſpecies of wit, of any contraſts

intended to divert; ſince theſe, with regard to their effects, differ only in degree, and not in kind. They are univerſally improper when they do not accord with the reſt of the piece in which they are introduced; that is, when the temper of mind which is requiſite to reliſh them is not naturally produced by the general ſtrain of the compoſition. In all ſerious compoſitions, therefore, of whatever kind, they ought carefully to be avoided; as alſo the frequent uſe of the grave *antitheſis*, when we would appear to be in earneſt, and more intent upon the ſubject than the manner of compoſition. The ſtrong and pointed antitheſis occurs ſo ſeldom in real ſerious life, and hath ſo remarkable an effect whenever it doth occur, that the frequent uſe of it never fails to ſuggeſt the appearance of *art*, and *ſtudied introduction*. And *affectation*, of all kinds, is univerſally diſguſting. This is the reaſon why the frequent and unneceſſary uſe of it in compoſitions hath always been looked upon, by the beſt writers, as a ſymptom of the declenſion of juſt and natural taſte; as when it appeared in the works of Lyſias among the later Greeks, and of Seneca among the later Romans.

In times when writings were not common, as at the dawn of genius and knowledge, no perſon would think of compoſing any thing, unleſs he had ſomething of importance to communicate: conſequently his attention would be engroſſed by his *ſubject*, and he would introduce the antitheſis, and the other more ſtriking beauties of compoſition, no oftener than they naturally occurred. But later writers, obſerving the uncommonly-fine effect of theſe forms of expreſſion, would naturally have their attention divided between their *ſubject* and thoſe beauties which adorn *compoſition*; or, rather, they would be apt to ſuit their ſubject to thoſe forms of expreſſion. And ſince the attention of the writer

himſelf was chiefly engaged by them, the performance muſt appear beautiful to himſelf, and his judgment be perverted. Whereas, to a reader whoſe mind was attentive to the ſubject of the treatiſe, the ſame things would appear unnatural and diſguſting. And it is certain, that no forms of expreſſion, or the frequent recurrency of any, can ſtand the teſt of ſound criticiſm, and the judgment of ages, which are improper with regard to the profeſſed nature and purport of the work in which they are introduced. For, however they may be admired by the authors themſelves, or thoſe who read with a view to obſerve the particular beauties of compoſition, they can never be generally and long admired.

The admirers of ſuch glittering compoſitions have narrow views; their attention is withdrawn from the ſubject, and conſequently from the true beauties and proprieties of it. And it is only the moſt *general views*, thoſe which comprehend the whole of a ſubject, and every thing that bears any relation to it, that can lead to a right judgment of a work. Whenever, therefore, ſuch compoſitions are ſeen in their true point of light, and the general purport of them is compared with the natural effect of their particular parts, their want of propriety muſt be ſeen and expoſed.

We ſee here, then, one reaſon of the great admiration in which the ancient writers of any nation are almoſt univerſally held. As they had no beauties of compoſition to copy after, they have more of nature and true propriety in them. This is remarkably the caſe with reſpect to Homer and other very ancient Greek poets, and Oſſian the ancient Gallic poet.

But this obſervation is not applicable to the late revivers of learning in this weſtern part of the world. They had Greek and

Roman models of compoſition to copy after. In fact, we no where ſee ſtronger inſtances of *affectation* than in their writings. Shakeſpeare himſelf, notwithſtanding the ſtrong bent of his genius to *natural propriety*, abounds with miſplaced wit. In ſome of the graveſt paſſages in his works, we meet with ſtrokes which tend to raiſe a laugh, inſtead of correſponding with the more ſerious emotions that ariſe from the ſcene with which he preſents us. Perhaps it is this palpably ridiculous extravagance of wit in that age, and more eſpecially ſtill in the ſucceeding one of Charles the Second, that hath contributed more than any thing elſe to the eſtabliſhment of the good taſte that ſeems to prevail at preſent.

As there is no fault in compoſition which there is ſo much danger of falling into, in a pretty advanced ſtate of literature, and eſpecially by young writers, who are apt to be prodigiouſly ſtruck with every appearance of *ingenuity*, and whoſe comprehenſion of mind is not ſufficiently large to judge of the propriety of their introduction, I ſhall ſelect a paragraph or two from the ſermons of Dr. South, an admired writer in the age of Charles the Second, which will make the meaning of theſe obſervations, and the reaſon of them, very evident.

Diſcourſing concerning man in a ſtate of innocence, he ſays: "As it is reaſonable to imagine that there is more of deſign, "and conſequently more of perfection, in the laſt work, we "have God here giving his laſt ſtroke, and ſumming up all into "man; the whole into a part, the univerſe into an individual.— "We might well imagine that the great artificer would be more "than ordinarily exact in drawing his own picture.—Theſe were "notions not deſcending from us, but born with us; not our "offſpring, but our brethren; and (as I may ſo ſay) ſuch as

"were

" were taught without the help of a teacher.—Could any diffi-
" culty have been propoſed, the reſolution would have been as
" early as the propoſal. It could not have had time to ſettle into
" doubt. Like a better Archimedes, the iſſue of all his enquiries
" was an ευρηκα, an ευρηκα, the offspring of his brain, without
" the ſweat of his brow. Study was not then a duty. Night-
" watchings were needleſs. The light of reaſon wanted not the
" aſſiſtance of a candle. This is the doom of fallen man, to la-
" bour in the fire, to ſeek truth *in profundo*, to exhauſt his time
" and impair his health, and perhaps to ſpin out his days, and
" himſelf, into one pitiful controverted concluſion.—Certainly
" that muſt needs have been very glorious, the decays of which
" are ſo admirable. He that is comely when old and decrepid,
" ſurely was very beautiful when he was young. An Ariſtotle
" was but the rubbiſh of an Adam, and Athens but the rudi-
" ments of paradiſe."

It is needleſs to point out the paſſages I ſhould particularly object to in theſe paragraphs. Theſe, and ſuch-like ſtrokes, certainly ſhow ingenuity, and, ſingly taken, might be thought excellent: The fault is, that they are often miſplaced and unſeaſonable.

The ſerious Dr. Young is by no means free from this kind of affectation. The pointed antitheſis abounds too much in his celebrated poem *the Night-Thoughts*. Some of his antitheſes are little more than verbal. The tendency of the following, and a variety of other ſingle ſtrokes, ſeem to have an effect unfavourable to the deſign of the whole work, and of the particular places in which they are introduced.

Even ſilent night proclaims my ſoul immortal,
Even ſilent night proclaims eternal day:

For

For human weal heaven huſbands all events,
Dull ſleep inſtructs, nor ſport vain dreams in vain.

NIGHT THE FIRST.

Such ſtrokes as theſe make the generality of readers admire a writer while they are reading him; but that writer alone will ſecure the laſting admiration of the judicious, who diſappears, and is loſt in his ſubject while we are reading, and occurs only to our reflection afterwards. Thoſe after-reflections, however, will do him ample juſtice, and more than make him amends for our ſeeming to have loſt ſight of him for a time.

LECTURE

LECTURE XXVII.

Of METONYMY.

WE have ſeen the extenſive influence of *aſſociation* in forming all the pleaſures of imagination that we have hitherto enumerated, and we have ſeen the probability of that opinion, which repreſents all our *intellectual pleaſures* as derived originally from *ſenſible impreſſions*, variouſly mixed, combined, and tranſferred from one object to another, by that principle. Some of theſe were remote, and perhaps, to perſons unuſed to ſuch ſpeculations, *obſcure* effects of that great and univerſal agent in the affections of the human mind. We ſhall now take a view of ſome of the more manifeſt and immediate effects of it, in tranſferring ideas belonging to ſome words upon others related to them.

From hence, in particular, reſults the ſtriking effect of the rhetorical figures called *metonymy* and *ſynecdoche*. Theſe terms are applied when, inſtead of the proper name of any thing or attribute, a name is borrowed from another object, which ſtands in any other relation to it than that of actual *reſemblance*, which is referred to *metaphor*.

It is almoſt endleſs to enumerate all the relations of things which afford a foundation for this figure of ſpeech. Some of the principal of them are thoſe of *cauſe and effect*, in all its varieties,

rieties, *the ſubject and its attributes*, or circumſtances; the *agent and the inſtrument*; *general and particular*, *abſtract and concrete terms:* and *the whole and its part*, which alone is referred to *ſynecdoche*. For example, we put the effect for the cauſe when we ſay *day aroſe*, inſtead of ſaying the *ſun aroſe*; an attribute, or circumſtance, for the ſubject in *cedant arma togæ*; a particular for a general term, when we ſay *a Mæcenas* for a *patron of learning*, and *a Nero* for a *tyrant*; an abſtract for a concrete term, when we ſay, *favours conferred upon inſenſibility*, rather than *upon the inſenſible*. Examples might eaſily be given of the converſe of all theſe, and of many others.

The advantage of uſing ſuch terms, borrowed from related objects, inſtead of proper terms, is that, at the ſame time that the new name ſufficiently characteriſes the object we intend to expreſs, ſo that it is impoſſible to miſtake it, the figurative expreſſion transfers upon it ſome foreign idea, which will ſerve to improve the ſenſe of the paſſage. Moreover, it tends agreeably to engage and exerciſe the faculties of a reader to take him a little out of the way of common expreſſion. This figure, likewiſe, greatly aſſiſts *perſonification*, by which a compoſition is greatly animated, as it exhibits living and thinking objects.

When Virgil ſays, *Bibet Germania Tigrim*, uſing the name of a *country* for that of the *inhabitants*, it is impoſſible the reader ſhould heſitate a moment about the true ſenſe of the paſſage (for were there the leaſt danger of a miſtake the term would have been improper) ſeveral ideas, particularly that of *immobility*, neceſſarily adhering to the name of the country, augment the improbability of the fact, and thereby heighten and improve the expreſſion. A ſimilar effect is produced, and a ſimilar advantage is gained by Herodotus, when he ſays, *the whole*

theatre,

theatre, inſtead of the perſons in the theatre, *burſt into tears*. There is alſo the ſame happineſs in thoſe familiar expreſſions, *the eloquence of the bar, and of the pulpit*.

When a perſon is called *a Mæcenas*, ideas of honour and eſteem are more readily tranferred to him, than if he were called in plainer terms *a promoter of learning*, and *a patron of learned men*. Every pleaſing idea of this kind hath been ſo long and ſo intimately connected with the name of that favourite of Auguſtus, that we thereby convey more definite and ſtronger ideas than we could by any other, though longer form of expreſſion. With the ſame advantage is a tyrant called *a Nero*, a poet a *ſecond Homer*, and a philoſopher a *ſecond Sir Iſaac Newton*. There is a kind of *accumulation of meaning* in theſe expreſſions, by means of long, extenſive, and repeated aſſociations of ideas. In all theſe caſes, likewiſe, the conſciouſneſs a reader hath of his being ſenſible of the force of theſe expreſſions, in conſequence of his being acquainted with the characters alluded to, gives no ſmall pleaſure.

We ſee that, in many caſes, the name of a *part* of a thing will ſuggeſt the idea of the *whole* with greater clearneſs and ſtrength than the name of the whole itſelf. For the idea of ſome principal part may have a cloſer connection with the idea of the whole, than even the *name of the whole* hath with its own proper correſponding idea. Nor will this appear to be any paradox, if we conſider that the name of any thing cannot raiſe a diſtinct idea of the whole, without raiſing that of its ſeveral parts. It is evident that theſe ſcripture-expreſſions, *Give us this day our daily bread*; and, *Having food and raiment be therewith content*, ſuggeſt a ſtronger, and, in fact, no leſs determinate an idea of all that is intended by them, than any more general and comprehen-

ſive terms would have done. Alſo when Æneas, in Virgil, ſays only, *Hoſtis habet muros*, though the *walls* were but a part of the *city*, and, in themſelves conſidered, the leaſt valuable part; yet, as they were that part of it in which its *ſtrength* chiefly conſiſted, to ſay that the enemy were in poſſeſſion of them, ſignifies their being maſters of the whole town, more fully than if the whole town had been expreſsly mentioned.

By the help of this figure, a writer may very happily introduce, and keep in view, thoſe peculiar properties of perſons and things which his ſubject requires him to pay a particular attention to. To do this, he may denominate things from thoſe particular properties or relations which he has in view. Thus Virgil, treating of *corn*, with reſpect to the cultivation of it, very happily, upon the mention of a ſhower, ſays, *boum labores diluit*. An author, after repreſenting his hero in diſtreſs by the darkneſs of the night, might very properly ſay, at length *the light*, or *the day*, rather than *the ſun*, *aroſe*; and any writer, treating of the eloquence of Cicero, would frequently uſe the term *orator*, and *our orator*, inſtead of his proper name. Or if a dialogue were made between any particular philoſopher, and any particular ſoldier, for inſtance, upon the ſubject of their ſeveral profeſſions, one would naturally, inſtead of repeating their proper names often, call them *the philoſopher* and *the ſoldier*. With equal propriety the ancients uſed the term βιη ηρακλειη, *the force of Hercules*, the quality he was moſt remarkable for, inſtead of the direct proper name *Hercules*; and with equal beauty might a ſpeech of Neſtor have been introduced, by ſaying, Thus ſpake *the wiſdom of Neſtor*.

If it require more words than one to denominate an object from its properties or circumſtances, the figure is called a *peri-*

phraſis. Thus, *boum labores* is properly a periphraſis to expreſs *corn.* It is with great propriety that Shakeſpeare makes King John ſay, when he ſurrendered his crown, " Thus I yield up " into your hand the circle of my glory;" becauſe the *crown* was only valuable as an emblem, or badge of *glory.*

The metonymy, in common with the metaphor (though not generally in ſo great a degree) may have the advantage of increaſing the pleaſure that any expreſſion gives us, by bringing in view a ſhort *ſcene* or *landſchape* relating to an object. Thus, *a well-fought field* ſuggeſts a greater and ſtronger idea than a well-fought *battle*; becauſe, the battle being fought upon the field, the idea of the field introduces the picture of a battle upon it more readily and effectually than the proper term *battle*, which hath a more remote connexion with thoſe particular ſcenes. The term *battle* muſt firſt raiſe the idea of a *field*, before it can exhibit any thing that paſſed upon the field.

That metonymy aſſiſts *perſonification*, is not only very evident, when the name of an author is put for his invention, &c.; as, *Ceres* for *bread*, *Bacchus* for *wine*, *Venus* for *love*, in the old adage, *Sine Cerere et Baccho Venus friget*; but it is ſufficiently apparent in many other inſtances, when no actual names of perſons are mentioned; as in the following expreſſions, in which the properties only of thinking beings are attributed to unthinking ſubſtances; *jovial wine*, *giddy brink*, *drowſy night*, *muſing midnight*, *panting height*, *advent'rous ſong*, or in this,

Why peep your coward-ſwords half out their ſhells?

It is often with peculiar elegance that qualities are perſonified, inſtead of the perſons poſſeſſing them; as when Milton repreſents Satan ſaying,

——— Or have ye choſe
This place, after the toils of battle, to repoſe
Your wearied virtue?

PARADISE LOST, Book I.

There is the ſame happineſs in the following expreſſions, *When youth and beauty ſhall be laid in duſt. Favours are often conferred upon inſenſibility.* In theſe expreſſions the abſtract terms, *youth*, *beauty*, and *inſenſibility*, have a much finer effect than the words *young*, *beautiful*, and *inſenſible*, would have had. It is exhibiting an unmixed inſtead of a mixed character, and that perſonified. If by the change of the term *inſenſible* for *inſenſibility*, for inſtance, the advantage of perſonification had been loſt, amends could hardly have been made for it by any other circumſtance; but as that advantage is not loſt, much is gained by the change from an *inſenſible man* to *inſenſibility itſelf in perſon.* An inſenſible man, as he is ſtill *a man*, might be made ſenſible of an obligation, but *inſenſibility* cannot.

It is pleaſing to obſerve how the ſenſe of an expreſſion improves, by being *concentrated*, as it were, in the change of an attribute, firſt from the plural to the ſingular number, and then from the ſingular number to an abſtract idea perſonified. If, for inſtance, inſtead of ſaying *Old men are venerable*, we ſay, *An old man is venerable*; our idea becomes leſs vague, more determinate and clear. And the advantage of perſonification may be preſerved, while the idea is freed from every thing foreign to it, and which might ſpoil its effect, when we ſay, *Old age is venerable.*

Epithets are ſometimes beautifully tranferred from one ſubject to another by means of this figure, as may have been obſerved in the examples that were given of this figure's aſſiſting perſonification.

fication. It is, likewiſe, obſervable in the following expreſſions, *pale death, a ſtupid moment motionleſs they ſtood:* THOMPSON. *Cæcis erramus in undis:* VIRGIL. The connexion of ideas ought to be very ſtrict, to make this transferring of epithets eaſy and natural; the impropriety, when theſe expreſſions are literally taken, is ſo great: for nothing can be more evident, than that it is abſurd to ſay, that *death* itſelf is *pale*, or that the *waters* themſelves were *blind.*

As no other relation of ideas affords ſo eaſy and natural a foundation for giving new names to things, as that of *reſemblance*, more caution is requiſite in the uſe of the metonymy than of the mataphor. Metaphors more often improve upon reflection than metonymies. Even the name of an object for the *ſound* of it is barely tolerable in the following line of Thompſon:

> The ſudden waterfall ſwells in the breeze.
>
> WINTER, Line 738.

And, perhaps, we ſhould not bear ſo well with the expreſſion laſt quoted from Virgil, and indeed many other of his metonymies (in which he abounds more than moſt other writers) if we attended to them a little. It is often particularly harſh to uſe the name of the *effect* for that of the *cauſe*. Thus *panting height*, and *aſtoniſhed thought*, have been juſtly obſerved to be ſtrained and uncouth expreſſions.

Notwithſtanding the metonymy be, in its own nature, a harſher figure than the metaphor, it is remarkable what power cuſtom hath to reconcile us to it. Witneſs theſe common expreſſions, a *happy ſtate*, a *blind way*, to *drink a glaſs of wine*, or a *diſh of tea*; to keep a *good houſe*, or a *good table*; to *write a fine hand*,

to

to *read any author*. Theſe, and many other expreſſions of the ſame nature, are ſo familiar, that the figure is abſolutely evaneſcent; ſo that they hardly deſerve to be conſidered as figures, as it is only by an expreſs attention to them that we diſcover them to be figurative. However, it can hardly be ſaid of any metonymy, as it may be of ſome metaphors, that they are ſo wholly evaneſcent, that a perſon may heſitate before he can determine whether an expreſſion contain the figure, or not. To *write a good hand*, is as common an expreſſion as any that is in uſe, and the figure it contains approaches as near to evaneſcence as any I can now recollect; and yet no perſon can think that the *writing* can be called the *hand*, without a figure.

The general rule for the uſe of the metonymy is plainly this; that in all caſes, provided the ſenſe be in no danger of being miſtaken, a writer is at liberty to ſubſtitute, inſtead of a proper term, any word which, by its aſſociations, can bring along with it ideas that can ſerve to heighten and improve the ſentiment. But it follows from this obſervation, that when the ſenſe doth not require to be heightened and improved, as in the ordinary forms of expreſſion in converſation, on which no emphaſis is ever laid, the figure is impertinent and uſeleſs: as when Proſpero, in the Tempeſt of Shakeſpeare, ſpeaking to his ſiſter Miranda, ſays,

> The fringed curtains of thine eyes advance,
> And ſay what ſeeſt thou.

To mention the *eye-lids* at all, much more to denominate them by ſuch a figurative periphraſis, was quite ſuperfluous.

This figure is worſe than impertinent and uſeleſs, when the figurative expreſſion exhibits any idea that is unfavourable to the ſentiment; as when Æneas, in Virgil, ſays,

Tres

Tres adeo incertos cæca çaligine ſoles
Erramus pelagi. ÆNEID.

The poet ought by all means, in this place, to have contented himſelf with ſaying that they wandered *three days* in darkneſs. To ſay that they wandered *three ſuns* in black darkneſs, hath too much the air of a contradiction, though, in many other ſituations, the term *ſuns* might have a happy effect when put for days.

Periphraſes and epithets, as they ſerve to denominate and characterize objects, come under this general rule, that nothing ought to be put for, or enter into the name of any object, or be uſed to diſtinguiſh it, that hath no relation to thoſe properties of it which we have principally in view. The reaſon is, that, by this means, a writer would lead his reader from his own views and purpoſe. Thus it is improper to add the epithet *mortal* to *man*, unleſs man be conſidered in the paſſage in which it is introduced with regard to his mortality, and that idea would give ſtrength to the ſentiment. In every epithet a regard ought to be had to the general deſign or purport of the paſſage in which it is introduced. For example, when Neptune is ſpoken of as a *perſon*, no attribute ought to be aſcribed to him which agrees to nothing but *the ſea*; as in the following paſſage of Pope's Odyſſee:

Hear me, oh Neptune, thou whoſe arms are hurl'd
From ſhore to ſhore, and gird the ſolid world.
ODYSSEE, B. IX. v. 617.

In like manner, in prayer, we ought not to invoke the Divine Being by the mention of any attribute, as *almighty*, *infinitely wiſe*, and *gracious*, promiſcuouſly; but chuſe thoſe which there

is

is the greateſt propriety in our having a view to, in the ſubſequent petition.

There is almoſt a tautology in epithets when they convey no idea that is not expreſſed, or implied, in ſome other words in the ſentence. This is certainly faulty, as in the following line:

And impious ſons their *mangled* fathers *wound.*

In the following, and perhaps in the preceding, there is an impropriety with reſpect to the order of time, which is apparent upon a little attention to them:

Submerſas obrue puppes. ÆNEID I. 73.

And mighty ruins fall. ILIAD V. 411.

LECTURE XXVIII.

Of the HYPERBOLE, *and* BOMBAST.

WHEN any thing that is aſſerted in a diſcourſe exceeds the truth, an *hyperbole* is ſaid to be uſed. In fact, in every ſpecies of metonymy (and the ſame may be ſaid of all the other figures) there is a departure from *literal truth*; but, as was explained in the caſe of Irony, it is in ſuch a manner as that nobody can be impoſed upon, or miſled by it, and it is attended with advantages to the ſenſe, which could not have been had by a rigorous adherence to truth.

The reaſon why the hyperbole is, in appearance, a greater violation of truth than moſt other figures, is only this, that in the hyperbole the untruth lies in the *affirmation itſelf*, whereas in moſt other figures it is concealed in an *epithet*, which however (were the ſentence reſolved into its conſtituent parts) would alſo be a direct untruth in the affirmation.

The advantage of uſing an hyperpole, is, that the idea of one object may be heightened and improved by ideas transferred from other objects, and aſſociated with it. Thus when the Divine Being ſays to Abraham, " I will make thy ſeed as the duſt of " the earth; ſo that if a man could number the duſt of the earth, " then ſhall thy ſeed alſo be numbered," Gen. xiii. 16; the

idea of a number almoſt infinite is transferred from the duſt of the earth to the children, or deſcendants, of Abraham; and by this means we are enabled to conceive a greater idea of them than we could have done by the help of any plain and literal expreſſion.

This manner of expreſſion, though not ſtrictly agreeable to truth, is extremely natural when the imagination is raiſed, and a perſon is labouring for an expreſſion adequate to his ideas. In ſuch a ſituation of mind, as no expreſſions literally true ſufficiently anſwer his purpoſe, a writer is obliged to have recourſe to objects which can ſupply him with ſuch as will do it. The expreſſions to which theſe views give riſe, are, however, ſo circumſtanced, that we inſtantly enter, as it were, into the mind of the writer, we feel the difficulty he was under, and ſee the reaſon why he made choice of ſuch hyperbolical language; and as we are led into no miſtake by ſuch terms, they are, in fact, to us who enter into his ſituation and feelings, more true and juſt expreſſions of thoſe feelings than any plainer terms could have been.

Beſides, if we conſider that, by reaſon of the narrowneſs of our faculties, terms expreſſing the greateſt magnitudes and numbers, yea terms denoting infinities themſelves, raiſe only indeterminate and finite ideas in our minds, we may eaſily conceive that the *ſtate of mind* produced by an attempt to realize hyperbolical expreſſions, may not be more than barely adequate to the ideas intended to be conveyed. Let us, for example, endeavour to form an idea of a number equal to that of the *duſt of the earth*: the conception may not, in fact, reach to a juſt idea of the vaſt numbers of the poſterity of Abraham. So that hyperboles, thus properly circumſtanced, may, by the appearance of falſehood, lead the mind nearer to the truth than any expreſſions more literally true. In this caſe it ſeems to be very evident, that if the Divine

Being

Being had only ſaid that the ſeed of Abraham ſhould be *exceedingly numerous*, or had even aſſigned the *preciſe number* of them, the idea excited in the mind of Abraham, by ſuch an expreſſion, would not have been ſo near the truth, as that which is produced by the attempt to conceive a number equal to that of the *duſt of the earth*.

It may perhaps, therefore, be no great paradox, if it be laid down as a maxim, that hyperboles are then only proper where they ſerve to lead our conceptions nearer to the truth than any other forms of expreſſion; and that they muſt be condemned, as ſtrained and *unnatural*, when the idea they excite in our minds really exceeds the idea that ought to be excited by the object deſcribed by them. The following account of the valour of Henry the Fifth, in Shakeſpeare, is certainly extravagantly hyperbolical:

> England ne'er had a king until his time:
> Virtue he had deſerving to command:
> His brandiſh'd ſword did blind men with its beams:
> His arms ſpread wider than a dragon's wings:
> His ſparkling eyes, replete with aweful fire,
> More dazzled and drove back his enemies
> Than mid-day ſun fierce bent againſt their faces.
> What ſhould I ſay, his deeds exceed all ſpeech;
> He never lifted up his hand but conquer'd.
>
> First Part of HENRY VI. Act I. Scene 1.

In many caſes the generality of readers may be apt to think an hyperbole overcharged, for want of entering into an author's ſentiments and views of things. A perſon, for inſtance, who

had ſeen a ſtorm at ſea might not think the following lines in Virgil's deſcription of one much overcharged:

——— Atque imo barathri ter gurgite vaſtos
Sorbet in abruptum fluctus rurſuſque ſub auras
Erigit alternos, et ſidera verberat unda.

ÆNEID. lib. III. ver. 421.

Likewiſe, if we only make proper allowance for the notions which the common people of all countries ſtill entertain of *murder*, and how much they imagine a particular providence is concerned to detect and puniſh murderers, we may not, perhaps, be very ſevere upon the following ſpeech of the Baſtard to Haſtings, upon his ſuſpecting him to have murdered prince Arthur:

——— If thou didſt but conſent
To do this moſt cruel act, do but deſpair,
And if thou want a cord, the ſmalleſt thread
That ever ſpider twiſted from her womb
Will ſtrangle thee. A ruſh will be a beam
To hang thee on. Or would'ſt thou drown thyſelf,
Put but a little water in a baſon,
And it ſhall be as all the ocean,
Enough to ſtifle ſuch a villain up.
I do ſuſpect thee very grievouſly.

KING JOHN, Act IV. Scene 7.

The extravagant hyperbole is the common fault of thoſe writers who aim at the ſublime, and the ſtyle that abounds with it is generally termed the *bombaſt*. As the hyperbole is a figure that has a very ſtriking effect, and is extremely eaſy in itſelf (for what can be eaſier than to exceed the truth in deſcription?) writers whoſe

whoſe aim was to elevate and aſtoniſh their readers have often adopted it, without conſidering how few circumſtances there are in which it can be admitted with propriety. They have not always conſidered whether every thing preceding, and accompanying that figure, would contribute to make it carry along with it a conviction, that no other form of expreſſion could ſo clearly convey the proper idea. For if it be the *expreſſion*, and not the *idea*, that ſurprizes a reader, it is a ſure mark that the expreſſion was improper; ſince, when it is proper, it only conveys the idea, and doth not draw any attention upon itſelf.

Had theſe things been conſidered, we ſhould not, perhaps, have ſeen many hyperboles at the beginning of a compoſition, introduced in places where the ideas did not require to be elevated or enlarged by any foreign aſſiſtance, or put into the mouths of perſons who were not under the influence of any ſtrong paſſion, or a very lively imagination. Of all our late writers of character, Dryden and Lee ſeem to have been the moſt intemperate in the uſe of the hyperbole.

As great a departure as an hyperbole is from truth, and conſequently as ſtriking as this figure muſt be, cuſtom has perfectly reconciled our minds to many very extraordinury inſtances of it; particularly when the hyperbole flows from a lively imagination, and is not uttered in the vehemence of paſſion. Any perſon may amuſe himſelf in ſeeing this verified, if he only take a turn upon a bowling-green, and obſerve when a bowl is ſaid, by ſome perſons engaged in the diverſion, to be *a mile*, or *a hundred*, or *five hundred miles*, *from the jack*. Beſides, how many familiar expreſſions, in common converſation, paſs without cenſure, which yet are extravagantly hyperbolical; as when we ſay, *A man is nothing but ſkin and bone*, &c.

Perſons

Perſons of little reading, and conſequently groſs conceptions, have little feeling of, or reliſh for, any thing but what is very extravagant. Nothing but the marvellous and ſupernatural hath any charms for them; but as their taſte refines, in conſequence of a greater attention to, and more exact knowledge of, human nature and the world, they learn to diſtinguiſh and reliſh the more delicate beauties of compoſition; they become diſguſted with every thing that is extravagant, and can admire nothing that deviates far from ſtrict propriety.

Accordingly, we ſee that the ſtyle of the generality of writers (which muſt keep pace with the general improvement of taſte) approaches nearer to a medium. The books which took with the generality of readers in the laſt age are little read, and are little capable of pleaſing, now. Indeed, ſomething ſimilar to this may be obſerved in every individual. Few perſons, when they are advanced in life, and their judgment ripened, can reliſh the compoſitions which charmed them when young. We are told that Milton would read, with the greateſt avidity and rapture, all the books of chivalry and romance that he could meet with, when he was young; but we can never imagine that he would have borne with any patience thoſe extravagant fictions, and the bombaſt ſtyle in which they were generally compoſed at the time that he wrote the Paradiſe Loſt.

LECTURE XXIX.

Of PERSONIFICATION.

ANOTHER ſource of pleaſure in works of genius and imagination, is the views which writers take frequent opportunities of preſenting to us of *human ſentiments*, *human paſſions*, and *human actions*. As the ſentiments and actions of our fellow-creatures are more intereſting to us than any thing belonging to inanimate nature, or the actions of brute animals, a much greater variety of ſenſations and ideas muſt have been excited by them, and conſequently adhere to them by the principle of aſſociation. Hence it is of prodigious advantage, in treating of inanimate things, or merely of brute animals, to introduce frequent alluſions to human actions and ſentiments, where any reſemblance will make it natural. This converts every thing we treat of into thinking and acting beings. We ſee *life*, *ſenſe*, and *intelligence*, every where. The effect of this figure is ſo pleaſing, that when there is no kind of deception in the caſe, if the reſemblance be ſufficiently ſtrong, and other circumſtances favour the figure, the impropriety of the perſonification gives not the leaſt offence.

In fact, this figure is become ſo general, that it is almoſt impoſſible to diſcourſe about any thing, in the calmeſt manner in the

world, without borrowing ſome part of our language from the regions of life and ſenſe. Even the moſt abſtruſe mathematicians and metaphyſicians cannot always ſo far abſtract themſelves from human life, as not to retain many terms borrowed from the actions and paſſions of mankind. The metaphyſical terms *agent* and *patient*, always carry along with them ideas which the definitions of them do not include. And, provided the foreign ideas do not affect the propoſition formed out of them (as was perhaps the caſe in the old philoſophy) they give ſome degree of *colour* and *life* to thoſe abſtract ideas, without being attended with any inconvenience.

The ideas of *male* and *female* are, in the Engliſh language, ſo ſtrictly confined to objects that have *ſex*, and conſequently *life* and *ſenſe*, that I queſtion whether any term implying ſex, to whatever it be applied, do not excite a momentary idea of thoſe qualities. Can the following paſſage in Milton be read without a mental perſonification?

> Firſt in his Eaſt the glorious lamp was ſeen,
> Regent of day, and all th' horizon round
> Inveſted with bright rays, jocund to run
> His longitude thro' heaven's high road: the grey
> Dawn and pleiades before him danced,
> Shedding ſweet influence. Leſs bright the moon,
> But oppoſite, in levell'd Weſt, was ſet,
> His mirror, with full face borrowing her light
> From him, for other light ſhe needed none.
>
> PARADISE LOST, Book VII. l. 370.

Perhaps it may not appear quite chimerical to ſuppoſe, that the extenſion of ſex in moſt ſouthern languages, to almoſt all inanimate things, may have taken its riſe from a lively imagination, perſonifying almoſt every thing. The

The ſlighteſt perſonification is that which proceeds no further than a ſimple metaphor, or metonymy, in which a new name is borrowed from the affections of ſenſible and thinking beings, and transferred upon thoſe that are inſenſible; as in ſuch phraſes as the following, *imperious ocean*, *thirſty ground*, *furious dart*, &c. Such expreſſions as theſe are uſed by perſons under no emotion of paſſion, and with very little elevation of fancy. Yet, even in theſe caſes, the imagination muſt, for a moment, aſcribe ſenſibility to thoſe inſenſible objects, or we could never bear the epithets while we were reading them. A perſonification is, at leaſt, a metaphor derived from the idea of ſenſible and thinking beings; and every metaphor is ſomething more than a bare compariſon. In compariſons (as was obſerved before) the difference between any two objects is preſerved, whereas in metaphors they are confounded, and one of the things is changed as it were, in idea, into the other. The firſt hint of a perſonification, like that for a metaphor, may be a compariſon; but, by the power of imagination, it ends in ſomething more.

I ſee no difficulty in the perſonification of paſſions, qualities, and other things of an abſtract nature, which have no real exiſtence; as of *pleaſure* and *revenge*, in the following paſſage of Shakeſpeare:

——————— For pleaſure and revenge
Have ears more deaf than adders, to the voice
Of any true deciſion.——

TROILUS AND CRESSIDA, Act II. Scene 4.

Or of ſlander:

——————— No, 'tis ſlander,
——————— Whoſe tongue

Out-venoms all the worms of Nile, whoſe breath
Rides on the poſting winds.——

CYMBELINE, Act III. Scene 4.

Our ideas, in this caſe, it is true, are not abſtract; but the ideas of *perſons* with the characters of the paſſion or quality deſcribed, which are not difficult to form.

Ideas of the properties and affections of thinking beings are ſo familiar to our minds, and the animate and inanimate parts of nature abound ſo much in mutual analogies, ſtronger or weaker, that no perſon, of the leaſt imagination, can help being frequently ſtruck with thoſe reſemblances. The very circumſtance of our being obliged to have recourſe to ſenſible ideas, and the terms which expreſs their relations, when we ſpeak of intellectual things, cannot fail greatly to extend thoſe analogies. As intellectual ideas are conſtantly denoted by terms originally borrowed from ſenſible things, theſe terms will carry back with them their new aſſociations, and transfer them upon the objects to which they originally belonged; and as there are few terms which have not been thus applied, we can hardly ſelect a ſentence but a lively imagination might find in it ſome hint for perſonification.

From this ſlight and momentary perſonification, which doth no more than juſt give a hint for an *epithet*, and will not bear to be extended beyond it, we may perceive, in different examples of this figure, the images transferred from the regions of life and ſenſe growing more and more lively, till at laſt inanimate things ſhall be ſo effectually perſonified, as to excite very ſtrong *emotions* and *paſſions* in the human mind; which could not be effected without our previouſly imagining them to be ſo far endued with ſenſe and deſign, as to have become the proper authors of

ſome good or harm that hath befallen us. It is neceſſary, likewiſe, that the inanimate object be viewed for ſome ſenſible ſpace of time in this light, if the paſſion it excites be expreſſed in words or actions; for thoſe effects are not momentary.

As the reliſh for this figure muſt depend upon the livelineſs of the imagination, which is extremely various in different perſons, and indeed very variable in the ſame perſon, it muſt be impoſſible for any one perſon to give rules whereby to judge in what caſes any preciſe degree of it is proper. All that can be done is to note, by a regard to the general ſtate and feelings of the human mind, the circumſtances in which we imagine they will be generally judged proper or improper.

One obſervation, I think, is pretty obvious, that a long-continued perſonification is more natural when it is ſuppoſed to be the work of a lively imagination, than the mechanical effect of a ſtrong and ſerious paſſion; and that it is of importance to preſerve a diſtinction between theſe two kinds of perſonification. To ſome it may, perhaps, appear hardly probable, that a man who preſerves the uſe of his ſenſes ſhould be really angry with a *tempeſt* ſo long, as was neceſſary to make the following ſpeech, which Shakeſpeare hath put into the mouth of King Lear upon that occaſion:

> Rumble thy belly-full; ſpit fire, ſpout rain;
> Nor rain, wind, thunder, fire, are my daughters.
> I tax you not, you elements, with unkindneſs,
> I never gave you kingdoms, call'd you children;
> You owe me no ſubſcription. Then let fall
> Your horrible pleaſure.—Here I ſtand your brave,
> A poor, infirm, weak, and deſpiſed old man.
> But yet I call you ſervile miniſters,

That have with two pernicious daughters join'd
Your high-engendered battles 'gainſt a head
So old and white as this. Oh! oh! 'tis foul.

Act II. Scene 3.

It leſſens the improbability (if there be any) of a man's being ſerious all the while, that the tempeſt, and conſequently the provocation, was continued through the whole of it. There is, however, a manifeſt impropriety in Congreve's repreſenting Almeria, when ſhe was exceedingly exaſperated at her father's unkindneſs, making the following long and ſerious invocation of the earth:

Oh earth, behold, I kneel upon thy boſom,
And bend my flowing eyes to ſtream upon
Thy face, imploring thee that thou wilt yield
Open thy bowels of compaſſion, take
Into thy womb the laſt and moſt forlorn
Of all thy race. Hear me, thou common parent,
—I have no parent elſe—Be thou a mother,
And ſtep between me and the curſe of him
Who was—who was, but is no more, a father,
And brands my innocence with horrid crimes;
And for the tender names of child and daughter,
Now calls me murderer and parricide.

Mourning Bride, Act IV. Scene 7.

If we conſider, beſides, that the earth was no way concerned in her grief, this ſpeech will appear more unnatural, ſuppoſing the ſpeaker quite ſerious; and ſhe was much too ſerious to make it in the gaiety of her imagination.

Whereas

Whereas the following much longer perſonification of Sleep, being merely *ideal* (as it may be called, in oppoſition to the ſerious and real perſonification) and put into the mouth of a perſon whoſe mind was neither too ſerious nor too languid for it, is extremely agreeable:

How many thouſands of my pooreſt ſubjects
Are at this hour aſleep! Oh gentle Sleep,
Nature's ſoft nurſe, how have I frighted thee,
That thou no more wilt weigh my eyelids down,
And ſteep my ſenſes in forgetfulneſs!
Why rather, Sleep, lieſt thou in ſmoaky huts,
Upon uneaſy pallets ſtretching thee,
And huſh'd with buzzing night-flies to thy ſlumber,
Than in the perfumed chambers of the great,
And lull'd with ſounds of ſweeteſt melody?
Oh thou dull god! why lieſt thou with the vile
In loathſome beds, and leaveſt the kingly couch,
Beneath rich canopies of coſtly ſtate;
A watch-caſe to a common larum-bell?
Wilt thou upon the high and giddy maſt
Seal up the ſhip-boy's eyes, and rock his brains,
In cradle of the rude imperious ſurge,
And in the viſitation of the winds,
Who take the ruffian billows by the top,
Curling their monſtrous heads, and hanging them
With deaf'ning clamours in the ſlippery ſhrouds,
That with the hurly death itſelf awakes.—
Canſt thou, Oh partial Sleep, give thy repoſe
To the wet ſea-boy, in an hour ſo rude;
And, in the calmeſt and the ſtilleſt night,
With all appliances and means to boot,

Deny

Deny it to a king? Then happy, lowly clown,
Uneaſy lies the head that wears a crown.
Second Part of HENRY IV. Act III. Scene 1.

Such perſonification as this is the exerciſe, or rather the *play*, of a mind at eaſe, which firſt of all ſeeing things to be what they really are, is afterwards ſtruck with their reſemblance in point of form, ſituation, cauſe, effect, &c. to thinking beings, and amuſes itſelf with compleating the reſemblance, and thus tranſforms them, as it were, by a voluntary effort of imagination, into real perſons. Whereas in the *ſerious perſonification* the mind is under a temporary deception, the perſonification is neither made nor helped out by the ſpeaker, but it obtrudes itſelf upon him; and, while the illuſion continues, the paſſions are as ſtrongly affected, as if the object of them really had the power of thought. It is impoſſible we ſhould be affected in this manner by objects that we ourſelves perſonify, and conſequently cannot but know that we perſonify. The effect of a real perſonification is a real paſſion; but an ideal, or *rhetorical perſonification*, preſents only the *ideas* of thought, ſenſe, and paſſion; which are ſufficient to enliven a compoſition, and pleaſe the *fancy*, but can never reach the *heart*. Thoſe emotions can hardly be called real paſſion, which a perſon works himſelf into by the force of his own imagination.

For this reaſon a writer who is greatly in earneſt will not uſe this figure. If he introduces a perſon greatly agitated with paſſion, he may put the ſerious perſonification into his mouth; but whatever objects he himſelf perſonifies, he will do it with more delicacy, and with a view to *enliven*, and never to *move* and *affect*, by a real illuſion. No perſon in the circumſtances of a writer can be ſuppoſed to be under ſuch an illuſion himſelf. It would

be

be highly abſurd, therefore, to write as if he were. Though we are moved in reading ſome fine and ſtriking inſtances of perſonification in Plato and Cicero, it is not that the objects perſonified inſpire any paſſion: they only ſerve to introduce, in a lively manner, ſentiments which, on account of their native force and propriety, are adapted to affect us.

It requires a greater ſtrength of imagination, after having given life to inanimate objects, to conceive them to *act* or *ſpeak* in their new characters, and yet it hath been very often done with great ſucceſs. The imagination, either exhilarated and enlivened, or, as we may ſay, *attendered* with paſtoral ſcenes in particular, eaſily admits, not only that all the parts of inanimate nature ſhould have life and ſenſe, but likewiſe that they ſhould act and ſpeak in conſequence of it. Do not all paſtoral writers, from Theocritus down to the preſent times, exhibit ſuch ſcenes as the following of Mr. Pope:

No more the mounting lark, while Daphne ſings,
Shall liſt'ning in mid air ſuſpend her wings.
No more the nightingales repeat their lays,
Or huſh'd with wonder, hearken from the ſprays:
No more the ſtreams their murmur ſhall forbear,
A ſweeter muſic than their own to hear.
But tell the reeds, and tell the vocal ſhore,
Fair Daphne's dead, and muſic is no more.
Her fate is whiſper'd by the gentle breeze,
And told in ſighs to all the trembling trees.
The trembling trees, in ev'ry plain and wood,
Her fate remurmur to the ſilver flood.
The ſilver flood, ſo lately calm, appears
Swell'd with new paſſion, and o'erflows with tears.

The

The winds and trees, and floods, her death deplore,
Daphne our grief, our glory, now no more.

In the ſame ſtrain are the following lines of Virgil:

Illum etiam lauri, illum flevere myriæ,
Pinifer illum etiam, ſola ſub rupe jacentem,
Mænalus et gelidi fleverunt ſaxa Lycæi.

and have not all readers eaſily adopted and reliſhed ſuch ſentiments?

With what ſucceſs doth Plato give life to the dead, in his celebrated funeral oration, and aſcribe a long ſpeech to them. Equally happy was Cicero in introducing Rome as a venerable matron expoſtulating with Catiline, who was engaged in a conſpiracy againſt his country. And who hath not been charmed with the behaviour and ſpeeches of *virtue* and *vice* perſonified in the *Choice of Hercules?*

Theſe are all inſtances of *ideal perſonification*, which admits of being drawn out to a greater length than that which is ſerious. The only queſtion, with regard to the propriety of theſe deſcriptive perſonifications, is, whether the nature of the work in which they are introduced will admit of ſuch a play of the imagination. For if any inanimate object affect a writer in ſo lively a manner, as to ſuggeſt to him the appearance of thought and ſenſe, and his ſubject admit his mind to be at liberty to attend to that reſemblance, and to indulge the fiction, it is with as much propriety that he aſcribes *actions* and *language* to ſuch objects as that he admitted the firſt idea of their having *life*. For the very ſame reaſon that a perſon might ſay, "the pleadings of virtue, with "difficulty, prevented a youth from being allured with the

" charms of vice," he might draw out the ſcene at full length, with every circumſtance and decoration ſuitable to it, as in the *Choice of Hercules*. In ſerious perſonification, indeed, he would not proceed ſo far, becauſe no illuſion of this kind can laſt ſo long; but in ideal perſonification there is no more illuſion at the firſt than in the laſt part of the allegory. That works of this kind will admit of being drawn out to a very great length is manifeſt from Spenſer's *Fairy Queen*, the *Dunciad*, and many other allegorical works.

It is neceſſary, indeed, that every object perſonified ſhould make a figure in the work in which it is introduced, in proportion to the extent of the perſonification. The *hand*, in the following lines of Virgil, is not of importance enough to bear ſo minute a perſonification.

> Te deciſa ſuum, Lecide, dextera quærit
> Semanimeſque micant digiti, ferrumque retractant.
>
> ÆNEID. X. 395.

The *earth* is kept too long in view, and made of too much importance, by the perſonification in the following lines of Shakeſpeare:

> She ſhall be dignified with this high honour,
> To bear my lady's train, leſt the baſe earth
> Should from her veſture chance to ſteal a kiſs,
> And, of ſo great a favour growing proud,
> Diſdain to root the ſummer-ſwelling ſhower,
> And make rough winter everlaſtingly.
>
> THE TWO GENTLEMEN OF VERONA, Act II. Scene 7.

The perſonification of our *native country* ſeems to be tedious and diſguſting in the following ſpeech of King Richard upon his landing in England, to ſuppreſs the rebellion of Bolingbroke:

——— I weep for joy,
To ſtand upon my kingdom once again.
Dear earth, I do ſalute thee with my hand,
Though rebels wound thee with their horſes hoofs.
As a long-parted mother with her child
Plays fondly with her tears, and ſmiles in meeting;
So weeping, ſmiling, greet I thee, my earth,
And do thee favour with my royal hands.
Feed not thy ſov'reign's foe, thou gentle earth,
Nor with thy ſweets comfort his rav'nous ſenſe;
But let thy ſpiders, that ſuck up thy venom,
And heavy-gaited toads, lie in their way,
Doing annoyance to the treach'rous feet,
Which with uſurping ſteps do trample thee.
Yield ſtinging-nettles to mine enemies;
And when they from thy boſom pluck a flower,
Guard it, I pray thee, with a lurking adder,
Whoſe double tongue may, with a mortal touch,
Throw death upon thy ſov'reign's enemies.
Mock not my ſenſeleſs conjuration, lords.
This earth ſhall have a feeling, and theſe ſtones
Prove armed ſoldiers, ere her native king
Shall faulter under foul rebellious arms.

RICHARD II. Act III. Scene 2.

That this was not intended to be a ſerious perſonification, is evident from the addreſs to the lords, which ſucceeds it. Indeed, if it had, it would have been much too long; and yet, the mind of

of the ſpeaker ſeems to have been too ſeriouſly engaged to be at liberty for ſo long an *excurſion of fancy*.

We are often offended with a perſonification, when it is not merely the perſonification that occaſions our diſguſt, but the extravagance of the ſentiment conveyed by it. We are not ſo much offended that the *air* is perſonified, or that actions are aſcribed to it in conſequence of the perſonification, in the following paſſage; as that the air in the market-place ſhould be in love with Cleopatra, and be reſtrained from quitting its place to go to her, by the dread of a vacuum.

——————— The city caſt
Its people out upon her, and Antony
Inthroned i' the market-place did ſit alone,
Whiſtling to them; which, but for vacancy,
Had gone to gaze on Cleopatra too,
And made a gap in nature.

ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA, Act II. Scene 3.

So natural is this figure of ſpeech, that it requires but little elevation of fancy to admit it even very near the beginning of a work. In ſome compoſitions it is quite eaſy in the very firſt ſentence. No perſon can be ſuppoſed to ſit down to write or read a poem upon the *Seaſons*, with leſs elevation of fancy than is ſufficient to make him reliſh Thompſon's invocation of them at the opening of each:

Come, gentle Spring, ethereal mildneſs, come,
And from the boſom of yon dropping cloud,
While muſic wakes around, veil'd in a cloud
Of ſhad'wing roſes, on our plains deſcend.

From bright'ning fields of ether fair diſcloſed,
Child of the ſun, refulgent Summer comes.

Crown'd with the ſickle and the wheaten ſheaf,
While Autumn, nodding o'er the yellow plains,
Comes jovial on, the Doric reed, once more,
Well-pleaſed, I tune.

See Winter comes to rule the vary'd year,
Sullen, and ſad, with all his riſing train,
Vapours, and clouds, and ſtorms.

I ſhall only add one remark more on this ſubject of perſonification, which is, that no object perſonified ought to have attributes aſcribed to it unſuitable to its nature, conſidered as not perſonified. Thus it ſeems to be abſurd in Mr. Pope to repreſent any perſons worſhipping the goddeſs *Dullneſs*; ſince dulneſs is a thing which all perſons, not excepting the dulleſt, profeſs a contempt for.

I cannot conclude this article without obſerving, that the ſtructure of the Engliſh language is peculiarly favourable to diſtinct perſonification. In languages in which every thing is male or female, there can be no diſtinction between what hath real ſex and what hath none: ſo that, in ſuch language, it will not appear when a writer means to perſonify, and when he doth not. Whereas in Engliſh, the words *he* or *ſhe*, being appropriated to things which have *ſex*, immediately intimate when a writer paſſes from plain language to the perſonification of things without life.

LECTURE

LECTURE XXX.

Of IMITATION, *and the Satisfaction we receive from the* Completeneſs *of things.*

TO the account of the pleaſures we receive from the introduction of *human ſentiments* into compoſition, we may conveniently ſubjoin an account of thoſe we receive from a perception of the effects of the *human underſtanding*; a ſpecies of pleaſure nearly related to the former, but ſomething different from it.

The idea we univerſally conceive of the excellency of reaſon, of the innumerable advantages of it, and the ſenſe of honour and dignity which from hence attends the conſciouſneſs of it, furniſh a ſource of pleaſing ideas, which are excited by the perception of the marks of deſign in human works. Moreover, the greater the deſign, and the more difficult we imagine the execution of it to be, the greater pleaſure we receive from ſeeing the performance.

This is the principal ſource of the pleaſures we univerſally receive from *imitations* of all kinds; in all which there is *deſign* and *execution* manifeſt. The pleaſure we receive from the view of a happy imitation, is clearly diſtinguiſhable from the pleaſure which the object itſelf is qualified to give us, notwithſtanding it be neceſſarily

ceſſarily mixed with it. Were they of the ſame nature, the pleaſure we receive from the original would always exceed, however, it would never fall ſhort of, that we receive from the *copy*, becauſe no copy can do more than exactly reſemble the original. But we find that an imitation generally gives a more ſenſible pleaſure to the imagination than an original. The pleaſure muſt, therefore, be of a different kind. It could take from the original no more, nor other qualities than it was itſelf poſſeſſed of. Who is not ſenſible that a good *picture* gives more exquiſite entertainment, particularly to a connoiſſeur, than the ſcene from which it was drawn? A fine landſcape, particularly when it opens all at once, ſtrikes the mind with a lively ſenſe of pleaſure; a good drawing of the ſame landſcape, as far it ſuggeſts the ſame pleaſurable ſenſation, doth the ſame, but muſt do it fainter. The reaſon then why we can take equal pleaſure in gazing upon it, is, that amends is more than made for that faintneſs, by the additional pleaſure it ſuggeſts, from preſenting a view of the *effects of human genius* in executing the imitation.

We may perceive more clearly the nature of this additional pleaſure, if we conſider how it increaſes with every circumſtance attending the imitation that increaſes the difficulty of it. All imitations pleaſe more upon our being informed that they were executed with inconvenient materials and utenſils, by perſons who were very young, or who had little or no inſtruction, &c. Of two pieces of painting, equally good, one ſaid to be done by the maſter, and the other by the ſcholar, that done by the ſcholar would be the moſt gazed at. What elſe but ideas derived from theſe principles could have induced Ketel to throw aſide his pencil, and paint with his fingers; and afterwards, thinking that practice too eaſy, and not ſufficiently wonderful, to confine himſelf to the uſe of his toes?

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Though common ſenſe is far from juſtifying this extravagance, it could not have exiſted without ſome foundation in nature. A landſcape in needle-work engages the attention more than the ſame landſcape, much better executed, in drawing or painting. It is well known that in muſic, the difficulty of execution gives a pleaſure which often bears away the mind from attending to the excellence of the compoſition. And the ſame diſcourſe, delivered *extempore*, will always be heard with more pleaſure than if it were pre-compoſed; or, ſuppoſing it to be pre-compoſed, it will give more pleaſure delivered from the memory than from notes. In moſt of theſe caſes we clearly perceive that it is our admiration of the effects of human genius (which are more wonderful in proportion to the diſadvantages it labours under, and the impediments it hath to remove) that gives the pleaſure which imitation conveys, additional to what it can derive from the object itſelf; becauſe this pleaſure manifeſtly increaſes with the *admiration*.

We may perceive this ſpecies of pleaſure in the pureſt kind, and freeſt from all foreign mixture, in the imitation of objects which are in themſelves not in the leaſt pleaſing, or even diſagreeable, and therefore have no agreeable qualities to communicate, ſuch as are met with in pictures of toads, and various kinds of inſects; of ſcenes in very low life, as perſons of a mean appearance; beggars, for inſtance, clothed in rags, in a ſorry houſe, with wretched furniture, and in every reſpect ſo circumſtanced and employed, that no perſon could look upon the ſcene itſelf with any pleaſure. A picture of ſuch a ſcene as this, well imagined, and drawn to the life, would be valued. In theſe caſes, the diſguſt with which the objects themſelves would naturally inſpire us, is loſt in the pleaſure we receive from the *powers of imitation*.

The ſame obſervation is applicable, in ſome meaſure, to pictures of rocks, precipices, monſters, tempeſts, battles, and the repreſentation of infamous characters and villainies upon the ſtage. Only there may be a mixture of the *ſublime* in ſome of theſe views; and perhaps the very high pleaſure with which tragic ſcenes are received, when they are repreſented upon the ſtage, and the uncommon avidity with which dramatic writings of the tragic kind are read, preferably to the comic, may be owing, in a great meaſure, to this, that the ſtrong ſenſations, excited by ſcenes of terror and compaſſion, are ſo much diminiſhed by a conviction of their being only imaginary, as to fall within the limits of pleaſure: ſince pleaſure hath been defined to conſiſt of ſenſations moderately vigorous, and pain of ſenſations exceeding that degree. Beſides, ideas of difficulties and danger cannot but contribute, in ſome meaſure, to give us pleaſure, by means of the reflection which, in thoſe circumſtances, we unavoidably and every moment make on our own ſecurity.

That the pleaſure we receive from tragical repreſentations is not wholly owing to the views they give us of the marks of genius and deſign in the imitation of ſuch ſcenes, is pretty evident from the reſemblance it bears to the pleaſure which many people take in cock-fighting, bull-baiting, boxing-matches, horſe-races, &c. Theſe ſpectacles rouſe and agitate the mind, but not to a degree exceeding the limits of pleaſure.

It may to ſome appear a paradox, that an imitation may be too perfect to give pleaſure; but it is plainly neceſſary that every imitation bear evident marks of its being an imitation, and not an original, before it can excite, in a ſenſible manner, thoſe peculiar pleaſureable ideas which are annexed to the perception of imitation. A ſtatue coloured, and with the eyes painted, &c. in order

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to make it more nearly reſemble real life, is obſerved by connoiſſeurs to be not near ſo pleaſing as if it were of the natural colour of the ſtone, or other materials, of which it was made. When coloured, it excites an idea which coincides exactly with the idea of a real human perſon, ſuch as we ſee every day. Without that colour, which brings it ſo near to life, it bears evident marks of its being only an imitation, and excites the proper correſponding feelings with vigour. Being told that it is a ſtatue, or even feeling it to be nothing more, is not, in this caſe, it ſeems, ſufficient. A coloured ſtatue, or a well-executed piece of wax-work, has ſo much the appearance of life, that we are ſtruck as with a kind of *horror* to find it otherwiſe, and are affected as we ſhould be at ſeeing living perſons ſuddenly ſtruck dead and motionleſs.

On the other hand, a *picture* being generally in a frame, and upon a ſurface evidently plane, cannot be without marks enow of its not being a reality. A picture, therefore, admits of being coloured, and of every other advantage to make it reſemble life as much as poſſible, without any fear of its not giving us all the pleaſure it might give us as an imitation.

It is, perhaps, poſſible that a tragedy, by being acted to great perfection, may give only the ſame kind of pleaſure that we ſhould receive from the ſame ſcene in real life, and the art of the poet and actors be wholly loſt upon us for the time. What is it we admire in actors, but that command of their words and geſtures, which gives them the appearance of other perſons than they really are; that is, in exhibiting an *imitated* and not a natural character: ſo that if they ſhould, in the courſe of the performance, really forget themſelves (continuing to ſpeak and act in a manner ſuitable to the character they began with aſſuming) the reaſon of our admiration would certainly ceaſe. But if the

ſcenes be ſuch as are in themſelves ſufficiently agreeable or intereſting, and ſuch as did not need, and would be rather hurt by, any foreign ornament, the performance is the more valuable. But in a variety of dialogues, and other things which are exhibited upon the ſtage, it is manifeſt that ſeveral circumſtances, which every moment demonſtrate the ſcene to be no reality, have a good effect. Otherwiſe *proſe* would be univerſally more agreeable than *verſe*, becauſe no perſon ever ſpeaks ſeriouſly in verſe.

It is ſaid that when a player was aſked by a biſhop why *plays* were heard with more attention than *ſermons*, he anſwered, "The reaſon is, that we ſpeak fiction as if it were a reality, "while preachers ſpeak of things real as if they were fiction." But perhaps we may be able, from theſe principles, to give a more juſt idea of the comparative difficulty of their reſpective provinces, and of their different ſucceſs.

Beſides that the theatre, and the ſubjects of plays, contain a thouſand things more engaging to the bulk of ſpectators than the furniture of a church, or the ſubjects of the generality of ſermons, it is really much more difficult to *preach* well, than to *act* well. To an accompliſhed actor a mixture of nature and art is requiſite, which renders what are called imperfections in acting, which are really deviations from nature, neceſſary to his ſucceſs. Should actors behave exactly as the perſons whoſe character they aſſume would have done, all appearance of their *art*, and all their reputation would vaniſh. It is not their buſineſs, therefore, to exhibit a borrowed character exactly, which would perhaps exceed the abilities of any human being, who retained any idea of his own real character, and did not abſolutely forget himſelf, and is what the profeſſed admirers of players do not ſufficiently attend to. They even miſtake the cauſe of their own applauſe: for when they cry

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out that ſuch a piece of acting is *pure nature*, they only mean nature happily *imitated*, and therefore *ſeen* to be imitated, that is, *not pure nature*.

On the other hand, all the words and geſtures of a preacher muſt be *nature* unmixed with any appearance of *art*, which it is impoſſible to conceal from an obſerver of tolerable diſcernment. And yet, ſpeaking in earneſt is not alone ſufficient. In an accompliſhed preacher we expect a *graceful earneſtneſs*. He muſt deliver himſelf as well as if he had prepared every word and geſture, and yet no appearance of *preparation* muſt appear in either. Beſides, he has his *own character* to ſupport, and his own ſentiments and language to deliver; while the actor aſſumes the character, ſentiments, and language of *another*; a conſideration which muſt certainly throw a greater weight of ſolicitude and anxiety upon the former than the latter. And though the former be in itſelf more eaſy, it is required to be *perfect in its kind*; whereas in the latter only a certain nearneſs to perfect imitation muſt be aimed at. I now proceed to note other effects of the ſame general cauſe.

Why is the pleaſure we receive from *verſe*, in any caſe, ſuperior to the pleaſure we ſhould receive from the ſame things ſaid in *proſe*, but becauſe it is of this kind; namely, that which reſults from the perception of the marks of human genius? It is more *difficult* to compoſe in verſe than in proſe. Why, moreover, is *rhyme* more agreeable, as it confeſſedly is, in ſome caſes, than blank verſe? Undoubtedly, not merely from the chiming of the ſame ſound at the end of the lines, but chiefly becauſe to conſtruct words in this manner is more difficult, and ſhows greater art and ſkill: for nothing is more univerſally diſguſting than rhyme, when it is not the effect of art and deſign.

By this principle it may, perhaps, be no very difficult matter to determine the proper uſe of *proſe*, *blank verſe*, and *rhyme*. In conſidering a ſerious ſubject, which wholly engroſſes the mind, we are not at liberty to attend to any other ideas than thoſe which the naked ſcene exhibits. It cannot be ſuppoſed, therefore, that any perſon deſcribing ſuch a ſcene, and properly impreſſed with it, ſhould at the ſame time attend to, and introduce into his deſcription, any other ornaments than thoſe which neceſſarily belonged to it. In thoſe caſes, conſequently, plain proſe, the only language of real ſerious emotions and paſſions, is the only mode of expreſſion that is tolerable. The appearance of *verſe* of any kind, which ſhews a *double attention*, could not be borne.

On the other hand, if the compoſition be not intended to raiſe any very ſerious emotion, but be of ſuch a nature as that it may eaſily leave the mind at liberty to attend to, and reliſh, a variety of different kinds of pleaſures, *verſe*, and even *rhyme*, giving one of theſe *foreign ſpecies of pleaſure*, may give an additional poignancy and reliſh to it. In works of an intermediate nature, namely, ſuch as moderately elevate and affect the mind, without wholly engroſſing it, *blank verſe* may be moſt ſuitable.

It muſt be impoſſible to fix any preciſe limits in this caſe, eſpecially in a thing that is relative to the ſtate of the human mind; which is ſo extremely various, and variable. However, this muſt be allowed, that the more manifeſt ſigns there are of *art* in any compoſition, the more the mind is drawn off from an attention to the ſubject of it, if it do at all taſte the foreign pleaſures which reſult from an attention to thoſe marks of art and deſign; and that there are more of thoſe marks of artful compoſition in blank verſe than in proſe, and more of them in rhyme than in blank verſe.

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In compoſitions in rhyme there is, likewiſe, a great variety, in the *degrees* of art and deſign, according to the number of objects attended to at the ſame time. That which is uſually called *Heroic meaſure* (that is, the five feet Iambic, in which every other line rhymes to the preceding) approaches the neareſt to blank verſe; and the various meaſure of the *Ode*, conſiſting of ſtanzas, recedes farther from it. Accordingly, the practice of our poets ſeems to ſhew that the rhyming heroic is better ſuited to ſerious ſubjects, ſuch as grave hiſtorical narration, than the form of the ode. The meaſure of Spenſer, which was copied from Taſſo, is intirely and juſtly diſuſed in heroic poetry. The ſtanza is, indeed, generally applied to ſublime and ſerious ſubjects, treated in the form of hymns and adapted to contemplation; but that is becauſe the regular diviſion of the ode into ſtanzas is moſt eaſily ſuited to the detached thoughts and ſentiments of which hymns and ſuch compoſitions generally conſiſt; beſides that the ſtructure of the ode makes it peculiarly adapted to muſic. However, intricate ſtanzas do certainly by no means ſuit very ſerious ſubjects. The pleaſure we receive from ſuch complicated marks of genius and deſign are by no means of the ſame *tone*, as we may ſay, with very *ſerious emotions*, though it may ſuit extremely well with thoſe which are of a light and moderate nature.

Upon ſome occaſions more complicated marks of deſign than mere rhyme, and the variation of the length of the verſes can furniſh, are well reliſhed; as in *acroſtics*, and other ſpecies of witty verſification. But becauſe there are very few occaſions which theſe very artful compoſitions ſuit, and they are, therefore, generally ill applied, they are uſually ranked among the ſpecies of *falſe wit*.

It is from the ſource of pleaſure here treated of that *regular bodies* have a more pleaſing appearance than thoſe which are irregular. We ſee marks of deſign and contrivance in the one, and not in the other. If there be any thing in what ſome perſons talk of the relative *perfection of figures*, it muſt depend upon the greater or leſs deſign that is requiſite to form them. Thus, the circle and the ſquare may be conſidered as exceedingly perfect, becauſe they admit of no variety but of greater and leſs, and therefore require more exactneſs and ſkill to draw them; whereas the parallellogram, the rhombus, &c. admit of greater variety, and therefore require leſs exactneſs and ſkill to draw them. In numbers, a progreſſion in a ſimple ratio is pleaſing; but a more complex ratio, if it be properly comprehended, pleaſes more, as being the effect of a greater and more comprehenſive deſign. In examining the productions of nature, likewiſe, the more deſign we diſcover in them, that is, the more we ſee of an intended ſubſerviency of means to an end, the higher doth our pleaſure in contemplating them ariſe.

It is hardly neceſſary to obſerve, with reſpect to imitation of every kind, in painting, poetry, or compoſition in general, that (provided it bear ſufficient marks of its being an imitation) its merit is in proportion to its likeneſs to the original; and that the correctneſs of our taſte in ſuch works of genius muſt be in proportion to our knowledge of the originals. If a child be drawn with the wrinkles of an old man, or an old man with the plumpneſs of a child, we ſay it is abſurd; or if a perſon be repreſented as ſpeaking in a manner that we have no remembrance or idea of a perſon of his character and ſtation ſpeaking, we are diſguſted with the impropriety; and the more, in proportion to our knowledge of the perſon's character or ſtation. If we be unacquainted with the originals, the exactneſs of the imitation

will give us no pleaſure, becauſe it is unknown to us; neither will a defect in the imitation diſguſt, becauſe it is equally unknown.

A regard ought to be had to the known manners, cuſtoms, and prevailing ſentiments of the times in which any thing is repreſented to have happened, as well as to the perſonal propriety and uniformity of character in the ſpeakers themſelves. And though ſuch anachroniſms as theſe be no objection to a perſon's abilities as a writer or a poet, yet they are to his character of a *general ſcholar*; and no perſon ought to undertake to deſcribe any ſcene, unleſs he be acquainted with every thing eſſential to it. Shakeſpeare is frequently guilty of miſtakes of this kind. In the life and death of King John, *canons* are perpetually mentioned as uſed in the times of that monarch. The Baſtard gives him the title of *majeſty*, which the Kings of England had not then aſſumed; and the King is repreſented, in the following ſpeech, as inveighing againſt the Pope, in ſuch a manner as there is no reaſon to ſuppoſe any prince in chriſtendom, in that age, was capable of talking. The fundamental principles of proteſtantiſm were not then ſo well underſtood:

> What earthly name to interrogatories
> Can tax the free breath of a ſacred King?
> Thou can'ſt not, Cardinal, deviſe a name
> So ſlight, unworthy, and ridiculous,
> To charge me to an anſwer, as the Pope.
> Tell him this tale, and from the mouth of England
> Add thus much more, that no Italian prieſt
> Shall tithe or toll in our dominions:
> But as we, under heaven, are ſupreme head;
> So under it, that great ſupremacy

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Where we do reign we will alone uphold,
Without th' aſſiſtance of a mortal hand.
So tell the Pope. All reverence ſet apart
To him and his uſurp'd authority.

K. Philip. Brother of England, you blaſpheme in this.

K. John. Though you, and all the Kings of Chriſtendom,
Are led ſo groſsly by this meddling prieſt,
Dreading the curſe that money may buy out;
And by the merit of vile gold, droſs, duſt,
Purchaſe corrupted pardon of a man,
Who in that ſale ſells pardon from himſelf;
Though you, and all the reſt, ſo groſsly led,
This juggling witchcraft with revenue cheriſh,
Yet I alone, alone, do me oppoſe
Againſt the Pope, and count his friends my foes.

Act III. Scene 3.

Examples of other kinds of proprieties and improprieties in imitations have been given upon various occaſions in the courſe of theſe lectures, ſo that it is needleſs to multiply them in this place.

Let any perſon but recollect his feelings when a muſician ſtops before he has finiſhed his tune; when a bad rhyme, or no rhyme at all, occurs in a poem compoſed in generally good rhyme; or when a perſon, who is reading, makes an unexpected pauſe, and leaves a ſentence unfiniſhed, and he will perceive the force of another inſtance of the aſſociation of ideas, ſimilar to the effect of imitation, the obſervation of which is of conſiderable uſe in criticiſm; namely, that the mind is impatient of the interruption

of a chain of ideas ſtrongly connected, and is pleaſed to ſee every thing carried to its proper concluſion, according to the ideas previouſly formed of it. For this reaſon, a member of a ſentence, unuſually long, or unuſually ſhort, is heard with a ſenſe of pain and diſappointment, and any diſſimilarity of ſtyle in the ſame compoſition offends. A ſhort verſe, in the midſt of a poem conſiſting chiefly of long ones, would diſpleaſe; but a ſhort verſe recurring alternately with ſhort ones, as the pentameter among hexameters; recurring at equal intervals, as the adonic verſe in the ſapphic, doth not diſpleaſe, becauſe it is *expected*; nay, we ſhould feel the want of it very diſagreeably, if it were omitted.

But the ſatisfaction ariſing from the coincidence and agreement of things, with the ideas previouſly exiſting in our minds, is heightened, if, in ſome things, it be not perfectly complete; the *diſſimilarity* in the one caſe forming a pleaſing contraſt with the ſimilarity in the other. For example; though a great interruption in the order of the words that compoſe a ſentence, by parentheſes, be diſagreeable, yet a ſmall deviation from the natural, uſual, and expected order, is agreeable; and though a line that is perfectly proſe would have a moſt diſagreeable effect in a poem, yet we find that a little variation in the feet of our heroic verſe hath a good effect, as a *trochee* for a *ſpondee*, in the following line:

Ārms ănd thĕ mān I ſing, who forc'd by fate,——

Two inſtruments ſounding in uniſon, pleaſe; but two ſounds that are chords to one another, pleaſe more. Sometimes an imperfect chord is preferred to a perfect one, and ſometimes a diſcord is preferred to both.

The expectation and deſire of ſeeing every thing full and complete, according to our ideas of perfection, extends much farther than to the ſtyle of compoſition. It often directs our hopes and fears in the moſt important concerns of life, and even contrary to reaſon and experience. Hence the fears that men formerly had of dying in their grand climacteric; the fear that Iphigenia's brother (according to the account that Ariſtotle gives of an old play) had of being ſacrificed, when he found himſelf in the ſame ſituation in which he believed his ſiſter had been ſacrificed. Hence the apprehenſion of the people of London, that, as they had had an earthquake on the ſame day of two ſucceeding months, and the ſecond more violent than the firſt, they ſhould have a third on the ſame day of the month following, more fatal than either of the former. Hence many rules that common people have with regard to the weather; as that, if it be fair or rainy on ſuch a particular day, it will be fair or rainy ſo much longer. And hence the ſatisfaction they receive from the accompliſhment of a prediction. Rather than the event ſhould not anſwer to it, they would take conſiderable pains to bring it about. Shakeſpeare hath noted this weakneſs in Henry the Fourth.

K. Henry. Doth any name particular belong
Unto that lodging where I firſt did ſwoon?
Warwick. 'Tis call'd Jeruſalem, my noble Lord.
K. Henry. Laud be to God! even there my life muſt end.
It hath been propheſy'd to me, many years,
I ſhould not die but in Jeruſalem;
Which vainly I ſuppoſed the Holy Land.
But bear me to that chamber, there I'll lie:
In that Jeruſalem ſhall Henry die.

Second Part of HENRY IV. Act IV. Scene laſt.

LECTURE XXXI.

Of CLIMAX, *and the Order of Words in a Sentence.*

IN a world conſtituted as this is, a view of a gradual riſe and improvement in things cannot fail to make an agreeable proſpect. The continual obſervation of this furniſhes us with a ſtock of pleaſing ideas, which are conſtantly accumulating, and which are eaſily transferred, by aſſociatiou, upon every thing, either in compoſition, or in any other field of view, which preſents a ſimilar appearance. How agreeable to all perſons is the idea of the days growing longer, of ſpring advancing, and of children growing up to men!

This is one, but not the only cauſe of the remarkably ſtriking effect which a well-conducted *climax* hath in compoſition. When a ſeries of terms riſe, by nearly-equal degrees, above one another in greatneſs and ſtrength, they ſtand in the faireſt ſituation for being *compared* and *contraſted* to one another; by which means the terms mentioned laſt in ſuch a ſucceſſion affect the mind much more ſtrongly than if they had occurred ſingly. Likewiſe, together with the preceding terms, they contribute (as was obſerved befote) to form the *ſublime*.

Beſides, that order of terms which conſtitutes the happieſt climax generally coincides with the *order of time and nature*, in which the things they expreſs really ſtand related to, or are con-

nected with one another. Conſequently, it is agreeable to repeat that coincidence; and it is a painful interruption of a long-eſtabliſhed aſſociation of ideas, to break that order, This we may perceive in the following climax of Cicero: *In urbe luxuries creatur, ex luxuria exiſtat avaritia neceſſe eſt, ex avaritia erumpat audacia, inde omnia ſcelera ac maleficia naſcuntur.* Pro Roſcio. In this paſſage the terms *luxury*, *avarice*, *impudence*, and *licentiouſneſs* riſe regularly above one another, both with regard to their heinouſneſs as vices, and their pernicious effects in the ſtate; and they likewiſe ſucceed one another in the order of time and of cauſe and effect, the preceding article being always the cauſe of the following.

The words *rocks*, *ſeas*, and *ſkies* ſtand in a happy climax in the following paſſage of Pope's Ode on St. Cecilia's day:

So, when the firſt bold veſſel dared the ſeas,
High on the ſtern the Thracian raiſed his ſtrain
While Argo ſaw her kindred trees
Deſcend from Pelion to the main.
Tranſported demi-gods ſtood round,
And men grew heroes at the ſound,
Enflamed with glory's charms.
Each chief his ſeven-fold ſhield diſplay'd,
And half-unſheathed the ſhining blade
And rocks, and ſeas, and ſkies rebound,
To arms, to arms, to arms.

The order of climax not only adds to the ſtrength and ſublimity of ſtyle, it is likewiſe eaſily adapted to heighten the poignancy of wit and humour. Of this Cicero, in his treatiſe de Oratore tells us that Craſſus took a happy advantage, in queſtioning

tioning a witneſs againſt his client. " Perhaps," ſays the orator, " the perſon from whom you heard this was angry when " he ſpoke it." The witneſs making no reply; he adds, " Per- " haps you did not take him right." The witneſs ſtill continuing ſilent; he adds again, " Perhaps you did not hear it " at all."

As all things that can be exhibited in the ſame view, ſo as to be named together in a ſentence, muſt be related to one another, (becauſe in that ſituation they muſt have a like dependence upon ſomething going before, or coming after) and ſince it is impoſſible that things which are really different ſhould have the ſame relations, there muſt always be a reaſon for naming ſome firſt and others laſt, and the diſpoſition of them cannot be quite arbitrary. The order of *cauſe and effect*, of *time or place*, and of *worth*, *dignity*, and *importance*, are of principal influence in this affair. So habitually do we attend to thoſe relations, that a conſiderable offence againſt them, even in common converſation, would be inſtantly perceived, and give a ſenſible diſguſt.

The diſguſt which this inverſion of order occaſions is exactly ſimilar to what we feel when the uſual order of words in a ſentence is altered, or any other grammatical miſtake is made. It *baulks*, as it were, *our expectation*; and the ſentence thus conſtructed doth not coincide with our ideas of perfection formed by previous aſſociations of ideas, which was explained before. Beſides, if this inverſion of order gave no ſenſible pain, the diſpoſition of things which conſtitutes a climax is ſo agreeable, that it is a pity it ſhould be neglected, when it preſents itſelf without our ſeeking for it.

The order of *time* is obſerved in the following ſeries from Swift:

" It

" It is a ſhame for an Engliſh lady not to reliſh ſuch diſcourſes, " not to improve by them, and endeavour, by reading and in- " formation, to have her ſhare in thoſe entertainments."

A regard to relative weight and importance may be obſerved in the following ſentence of the ſame author:

" The books read at ſchool and colleges are full of incitements " to virtue and diſcouragements from vice, and drawn from the " wiſeſt reaſons, the ſtrongeſt motives, and the moſt influencing " examples."

The order of *cauſe and effect* is conſpicuous in ſuch phraſes as theſe: *She was in the bloom of youth and beauty*; *Old age and infirmities came upon him*, &c. Sometimes the effect may precede the cauſe; but this order is not generally quite ſo natural. *Joy ſitting in every face, content in every heart.* BOLINGBROKE. Though, in deſcription, as in this caſe, there may be a propriety in mentioning the effect which is viſible firſt, and the cauſe which is inviſible afterwards.

In this ſentence of the laſt-mentioned author—*The genuine effect of eſteem, confidence, and affection*, the term *confidence* is miſplaced; becauſe confidence is the reſult of eſteem and affection, and therefore ought to be named after them. But the arrangement of the terms in the following ſentence is much more faulty:

" No king, who is not, in the true meaning of the word, a " patriot, can govern Britain with eaſe, ſecurity, honour, dig- " nity, or indeed with ſufficient power and ſtrength."

The capital fault in this ſentence is, that after a gradual riſe in the ideas, from *eaſe* to *dignity*, the writer goes back to an article

profeſſedly below them all, when he concludes the aſcending climax with the words, " *or indeed with ſufficient power and ſtrength.*" Every term introduced as this is, ought to be the laſt of a deſcending ſeries. In the next place, *ſecurity* ought to have preceded *eaſe*, for the ſame reaſon that he hath made both ſecurity and eaſe to precede *honour* and *dignity*. Laſtly, I do not ſee a ſufficient diſtinction between *ſecurity*, and *ſufficient power and ſtrength*.

I have now enumerated the principal ſources of pleaſure which enter into works of genius and imagination; and, for the ſake of illuſtration, have given, under each head, a ſelect number of examples, from the moſt celebrated authors, of paſſages which derive their merit from each of them. I ſhall now give a view of the whole in a very ſhort compaſs.

Every thing that hath a ſtriking or pleaſing effect in compoſition, muſt either *draw out and exerciſe our faculties*, or elſe, by the principle of aſſociation, muſt *transfer from foreign objects ideas that tend to improve the ſenſe*; the principal of which are *views of human ſentiments*, of the *effects of the human genius*, and of a *riſe and improvement* in things.

If it be thought that ſome other ingredients contribute to render a diſcourſe engaging, I apprehend it will be found, upon reflection, that thoſe advantages belong to the *ſubject* of a diſcourſe, and are by no means in the choice of a compoſer: whereas the beauties that have been enumerated and explained in theſe lectures, are ſuch as depend upon the *compoſition*, and therefore ſuch as may be neglected and overlooked by a compoſer. If any perſon ſhould imagine that the *moral ſenſe*, the *ſenſe of honour*, of *benevolence*, and of *devotion*, ought to have been allowed ſome influence

influence in works of genius and imagination; it is acknowledged that the ſubjects of compoſition may pleaſe, by reaſon of their exhibiting ſcenes adapted to gratify thoſe ſenſes. But then we ought, for the ſame reaſon, not to have excluded the external ſenſes, or any faculty whereby we receive pleaſure; becauſe it may be ſaid, with reſpect to them all, that ideas may be preſented in a diſcourſe or compoſition, which could have had no power to pleaſe or to affect us but in conſequence of our having ſuch ſenſes. It is in reality, for the reaſon above mentioned, equally foreign to the buſineſs of *criticiſm*, to take notice of any of them, any farther than they are neceſſarily connected with the pleaſures of the imagination.

LECTURE

LECTURE XXXII.

Of PERSPICUITY *in Style.*

IT may not be amiſs to conclude this account of what it is that makes ſtyle *pleaſing*, with a few obſervations on what tends to make it *perſpicuous*; eſpecially as, in fact, this property is the more eſſential of the two. For, certainly, the firſt care of a judicious writer will be to make his meaning eaſily underſtood, and therefore to keep his ſtyle free from ambiguity.

A ſentence muſt be ambiguous when it is impoſſible to determine, from the ſtructure of it, to which antecedent a relative refers, or to what principal clauſe of a ſentence a circumſtance introduced into it belongs. In the following ſentence from Middleton, it doth not appear whether *miracles* or *battles* be the antecedent to the relative *which*.

" They have alſo many churches and public monuments erected " in teſtimony of ſuch miracles, viz. of ſaints and angels, fighting " for them in their battles, which, though always as ridiculous"—

The conſtruction would direct us to *battles*, but the ſenſe to *miracles*.

The circumſtance [with great care and diligence] in the following ſentence is not placed where it is apparent, at firſt ſight, to what it belongs.

" This morning, when one of Lady Lizard's daughters was " looking over ſome hoods and ribbands, brought by her tire- " woman, with great care and diligence, I employed no leſs in " examining the box which contained them." GUARDIAN.

Theſe ambiguities will be prevented, if, in a caſe like the former, the relative be always placed immediately after its proper antecedent; and, in the latter, if the circumſtance be immediately ſubjoined to that clauſe of a ſentence to which it belongs, provided it never be placed between two clauſes to which it may equally belong. It is not a ſufficient vindication of paſſages which are left ambiguous for want of attending to theſe particulars, that the *ſenſe* will determine to which the relative or the circumſtance refers: for the ſtructure of a ſentence ought to be ſuch, as to leave the hearer or reader no trouble to find out the meaning, by comparing one thing with another.

It favours perſpicuity, and procures every member of a ſentence the degree of attention that is due to it, when the incidental circumſtances of an affirmation are introduced pretty early in a ſentence, and the principal ideas are reſerved to the laſt; for were thoſe circumſtances placed after the principal idea, they would either have no attention at all paid to them, or they would take from that which is due to the principal idea; and, in either caſe, a ſentence conſtructed in that manner is flat and languid. The circumſtances attending Mr. Woolſton's recantation, are well introduced in the following ſentence:

" At Saint Bride's church, in Fleet-ſtreet, Mr. Woolſton (who " wrote againſt the miracles of our Saviour) in the utmoſt terrors " of conſcience, made a public recantation."

But

But in the next, the clauſe [in the ſixth book of the Æneid] is aukwardly introduced:

" Virgil, who hath caſt the whole ſyſtem of Platonic philoſo-
" phy, ſo far as it relates to the ſoul of man, into beautiful al-
" legories, in the ſixth book of his Æneid, gives us the puniſh-
" ment," &c.——

If it be thought proper to crowd a number of circumſtances into one ſentence, it is adviſeable not to place them all together, but to intermix them with the principal members of the ſentence.

There may be one inconvenience in reſerving the principal members of a ſentence to the laſt, that if any thing which precedes it be abſolutely unintelligible without it, and pretty remote from it, it will be difficult for the reader to connect in his mind thoſe disjointed members, ſo as to make the ſenſe eaſy. The neceſſity for inverſion in blank verſe frequently obliges the writers of it to make the reader wait for any ſenſe at all, through the whole of a pretty long ſentence; as Milton hath done in the beginning of Paradiſe Loſt:

Of man's firſt diſobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree, whoſe mortal taſte
Brought death into the world and all our woe,
With loſs of Eden; till one greater man
Reſtore us, and regain the bliſsful ſeat,
Sing heav'nly muſe.———

The name of the perſon we are ſpeaking to is introduced *with the moſt reſpect* in the beginning of the ſpeech, but it is generally introduced in a more *eaſy and familiar manner* after the firſt or

ſecond clauſe of a ſentence, or even later. Of both theſe obſervations we have a happy example in Milton:

> Oh, father, what intends thy hand, ſhe cried,
> Againſt thy only ſon? What Fury, oh ſon,
> Poſſeſſes thee, to bend that mortal dart
> Againſt thy father's head.
>
> PARADISE LOST, Book II. Line 727.

The only objection to this paſſage is, that the haſte the ſpeaker may reaſonably be ſuppoſed to be in, would more naturally throw her words into too much diſorder, to preſerve ſo minute a diſtinction between the manner of accoſting a ſon and a father.

It is an offence againſt perſpicuity when the conſtruction of different clauſes in a ſentence is unneceſſarily varied. This reſembles changing the ſcene, and placing objects in different points of light, which tends to embarraſs a reader. The Greek and Latin claſſics were too negligent of this, and, indeed, many other helps to perſpicuity.

Thus Livy:

"Id jugum, ſicut Apennini dorſo Italia dividitur, ita mediam "Greciam deremit."——

And Cicero:

"Honos alit artes, omneſque incenduntur ad ſtudia gloriâ; "jacentque ea ſemper quæ apud quoſque improbantur."

Whether a *ſimilarity* or *contrariety* be intended to be exhibited in things, it is of advantage that they ſhould have a *ſimilar ſituation*

tion in the ſentence. For, ſince the ideas both of ſimilarity and contrariety are relative, and perceived by a compariſon, the more obvious and eaſy is the compariſon, the more ſenſible and ſtriking are the ideas reſulting from it. So that if we ſtudy perſpicuity, we ought to make the greateſt uniformity poſſible in the ſtructure of thoſe members of a ſentence that have any correſpondence in their meaning. Even negative and affirmative copulatives do not follow one another without ſome confuſion of ideas; as in Horace:

Nec horret iratum mare, forumque vetat.

The term *productions* doth not ſufficiently correſpond to *miniſters* in the following ſentence of Swift:

"I have obſerved, of late, the ſtyle of ſome great miniſters, "very much to exceed that of any other productions."

Perhaps the latter part of the following ſentence from the Spectator had better have been made to tally more nearly with the former:

"The wiſe man is happy when he gains his own approba- "tion; the fool, when he recommends himſelf to the applauſe "of thoſe about him."

Very often, indeed, writers plainly ſtudy to vary the form of expreſſion in two correſponding members of a ſentence. This, certainly, ſhews a greater command of language, and in ſhort ſentences, where every thing elſe is uniform, may have no bad effect; as in the following of Mr Addiſon:

" A friend exaggerates a man's virtues, an enemy inflames " his crimes."

The omiſſion or redundancy of articles, or copulatives, though it may be made without any material prejudice to the ſenſe, ought not, however, to be made at random; becauſe this circumſtance, when conducted with judgment, may contribute to indicate ſome particulars in the ſituation of a writer's mind, which it is of ſome moment to attend to, as the knowledge of them may make his meaning more obvious. For example; it is convenient to make as little ſeparation, by the article, or other words, as poſſible between terms, the ideas belonging to which are repreſented as united; but if they be ſpoken of as disjoined, the words had better be placed at a greater diſtance. Speaking of the two ſuppoſed conſtituent parts of human nature as compoſing one being we ſhould always ſay, *the ſoul and body*; treating of their different properties, we ſhould naturally ſay, *the ſoul and the body*.

The omiſſion of the copulative, when ſeveral things are named in ſucceſſion, expreſſes hurry and impetuoſity; a redundancy of them, on the other hand, expreſſes deliberation, and a deſire to have each particular of the ſeries of terms carefully attended to. A copulative would have intirely ſpoiled Cæſar's laconic account of his expedition to Pontus: *Veni, vidi, vici*; whereas a redundancy of them is of advantage in the following expreſſion of Cicero: *Me pre cæteris et colit, et obſervat, et diligit.*

Poſſibly, the reaſon why the omiſſion of a copulative is lively and animating may be, becauſe the repetition of the members of a ſentence in an unconnected manner reſembles an interrupted ſucceſſion of ſounds; which, conſiſting of ſeveral changes from one

one ſtate to another, rouſes the attention more than an uniform continued ſound. Or it may be enough to ſay, that it produces its effect by ſurprizing, in conſequence of its being unuſual and unexpected. The repetition of this copulative before every member of a ſeries of terms draws the attention to each more ſtrongly, becauſe it makes every term appear to be the *laſt*, for which we always reſerve a greater ſhare of our attention.

If we judge of ſtyle by the effect it hath upon the mind of the hearer, we ſhall not always condemn the uſe of *ſynonymous words*, or ſuch as are nearly ſo (perhaps there are none perfectly ſynonymous) or even the *repetition* of the ſame word, any more than we ſhould univerſally condemn a periphraſis. Both may contribute to give a clearer and ſtronger idea of a perſon's meaning than any ſingle words could do. Moreover, we have the example of our moſt chaſte and correct writers for this liberty. Thus Swift:

"It would be endleſs to run over the ſeveral defects of ſtyle "among us. I ſhall therefore ſay nothing of the *mean* and "the *paltry* (which are uſually attended by the fuſtian); "much leſs of the *ſlovenly* or *indecent*."

A regard to perſpicuity will direct us rather to multiply ſentences, than crowd into the ſame ſentence things which have no relation to one another. As Burnet, in giving Lord Sunderland's character: "His own notions were always good; but he "was a man of great expence."

Every paragraph ought certainly to be independent, in grammatical conſtruction at leaſt, of any other; and yet Mr Lawſon, in his Lectures on Oratory, frequently begins a paragraph with a relative, the antecedent of which is in the preceding paragraph;

as at page 276: *Which reaſoning*, &c.—This might eaſily have been rectified by uſing *This* inſtead of *Which*.

Sometimes the reader is embarraſſed by a ſentence which he haſtily condemns as ungrammatical, when not the principles of grammar, but an attention to common ſenſe only, can rectify it. Thus when Swift ſays——————*and cleanlineſs, qualities ſo oppoſite to thoſe animals*; the fault is not in the grammar, but the ſenſe: for *qualities* can be oppoſed only to *qualities*. The following ſentence, likewiſe, of Mr. Sheridan is faulty; not becauſe it is ungrammatical, but becauſe it is abſurd to ſay that the *attempt* was impoſſible, though the *ſucceſs* might.

"This is but a ſmall ſpecimen of the irregularities to be found "in the ſtate of our written language; yet it may ſerve to ſhew "how different, nay impoſſible, the attempt muſt be to acquire "a knowledge of the true pronunciation of the Engliſh; unleſs "learners be furniſhed with a proper clue to guide them through "this labyrinth."

LECTURE

LECTURE XXXIII.

Of the Reſemblance between SOUND *and* SENSE.

HAVING conſidered words as they ſerve to convey the *ſenſe*, I come now to conſider the properties of them as mere *ſounds*, or as they affect the external ear only.

Speech conſiſts of ſounds divided by a great variety of *intervals*. All ideas, therefore, either of real ſounds, or of intervals, and conſequently all ideas analogous to thoſe of ſounds and intervals, admit of a natural expreſſion by words: that is, the words may not be mere *arbitrary* ſigns of ſuch ideas, but bear a real *reſemblance* to them; ſo that a perſon, without being previouſly acquainted with the meaning of the words, might be made ſenſible of it, by the pronunciation only: or, at leaſt, if he could not perceive the *particular ideas* they denoted without an explanation, he might be *affected* by the ſound of the words only, in a manner ſimilar to what he would have been by the ſentiment.

That mere ſounds are capable of this kind of expreſſion, is evident from the well-known power of muſic, which, according to the different ſpecies of it which are employed, is capable of introducing very different ſtates of mind. And indeed, ſince theſe ſtates of mind may afterwards, by aſſociation, introduce particular ideas, the ideas themſelves may, with propriety enough,

be ſaid to be excited by the power of muſic, that is, of mere ſound.

All the properties of ſounds, beſides thoſe which depend upon their eſſential differences (as conſiſting of particular combinations of vowels and conſonants) are the greater *eaſe* or *difficulty* of pronouncing them, and the *longer* or *ſhorter time* which the diſtinct pronunciation of them requires; which properties ariſe from the forementioned radical differences.

Articulate ſounds may reſemble thoſe which are inarticulate, becauſe the former are often copied from the latter; as the *bleating* of the ſheep, the *lowing* of the ox, the *roaring* of the lion, the *clangor* of arms, &c. It is by this advantage that Pope deſcribes the falling of trees, in the following paſſage, which ſo happily correſponds to the ſenſe:

——— deep-echoing groan the thickets brown,
Then ruſtling, crackling, craſhing, thunder down.

Milton's deſcription of the ſound made by the opening of hell-gates is equally happy, on the ſame account:

——— ——— On a ſudden open fly,
With impetuous recoil and jarring ſound,
Th' infernal doors, and on their hinges grate
Harſh thunder, that the loweſt bottom ſhook
Of Erebus.

A ſentence conſtructed ſo as not to be pronounced without difficulty (which, by the way, it requires very little ingenuity to do, in our language) may very naturally repreſent any effort of labour and difficulty. Thus Milton hath well deſcribed Satan ſtruggling through chaos:

So

So he with difficulty and labour hard,
Mov'd on, with difficulty and labour he.

Mr. Pope hath not been quite ſo happy in his profeſſed imitation of Ajax's effort to throw a rock, and of the expreſſion of that effort in words:

When Ajax ſtrives ſome rock's vaſt weight to throw,
The line too labours, and the words move ſlow.

The latter of theſe lines, in particular, is by no means of more difficult pronunciation than the generality of Engliſh verſes. It runs much ſmoother, and more eaſily, than his deſcription of the gentle flow of a current:

And the ſmooth ſtream in ſmoother numbers flows.

But this miſcarriage is not owing primarily to the poet, but to the language, in which every poſſible advantage was not taken of all the properties of ſound. This is alſo the caſe in another particular.

Nothing is more obvious than that ſhort ſyllables may aptly repreſent *ſpeed*, and long ſyllables *ſlowneſs*, and that quickneſs and ſlowneſs are analogous to a variety of other mental conceptions, which, by this means, might likewiſe be expreſſed by ſounds. But, unfortunately, the ſtructure of moſt languages is ſuch as to take little or no advantage of this property of ſound, any more than of the former. In no language, perhaps, are the ſyllables of the words which expreſs *ſwiftneſs*, upon the whole, ſhorter than thoſe of words which expreſs *ſlowneſs*. In Latin, we find the penultima of *velox* and *feſtino* unnaturally long, while the penultima of *mora* and *piger* is ſhort, as alſo thoſe of *labor*

and *opus*, which is an unfortunate circumſtance for the following often-quoted line of Virgil:

Hic lăbor, hoc ŏpus eſt.

On this account Pope's deſcription of Camilla's *ſwiftneſs* (which Engliſh word, by the way, is far from correſponding to the idea it conveys) is very unfortunate:

Not ſo when ſwift Camilla ſcours the plain,
Flies o'er th' unbending corn, and ſkims along the main.

His own ſucceſs might have taught him that an Alexandrine verſe is more proper to expreſs ſlowneſs and heavineſs than ſpeed:

A needleſs Alexandrine ends the ſong,
Which, like a wounded ſnake, drags its ſlow length along.

However, the univerſal admiration with which, till very lately, every body read that paragraph of the *Eſſay on Criticiſm*, from which theſe extracts are made, ſhews us how naturally we tranſfer the properties of *ideas* upon the *words* which expreſs them. Hence it is eaſy to *imagine* a reſemblance of the ſound to the ſenſe in almoſt every thing. But ſince this is wholly the work of the reader's imagination, a writer doth not need to give himſelf trouble about it. Thoſe who underſtand the language will *imagine* the correſpondence, and it will hardly ever be tried by the only fair teſt, the *ear of a foreigner* (or rather the *eye*, for if it were read, he would be impoſed upon) whether the correſpondence be any thing more than imaginary.

The *pauſes* or *intervals* of ſound a writer hath more command of, as they are, in a great meaſure, independent of the caprice

of language. Indeed, greater advantage may be taken of this property of ſpeech to make the ſound an echo to the ſenſe, than of the mere ſound of the words themſelves. In particular, *intervals* are peculiarly adapted to expreſs a variety of affections of the mind. For it is manifeſt that the breaks or reſts we make in our voice, the length or ſhortneſs of our ſentences, and the like, vary with the ſtate of the mind with which we deliver ourſelves upon any occaſion. For inſtance, when the mind is agitated, the voice is interrupted, and a man expreſſes himſelf in ſhort and broken ſentences. A ſoliloquy, alſo, is expreſſed in a more disjointed manner than a converſation equally calm. In ſhort, every train of thought, and every circumſtance attending it, hath its own peculiar *diviſions*; and therefore if the pauſes of a ſentence be diſpoſed in ſuch a manner as to correſpond to the intervals of thought, the ſound will be a juſt echo to the ſenſe, and this independent of the peculiar characters of the words themſelves.

By the artful diſpoſition of the pauſes of a ſentence, Mr. Pope hath deſcribed the catching of a butterfly, in a manner which gives us a lively idea of the action:

I ſaw and ſtarted from its vernal bower
The riſing game, and chaced from flower to flower.
It fled, I follow'd; now in hope, now pain.
It ſtop'd, I ſtop'd; it moved, I moved again.
At laſt it fix'd. 'Twas on what plant it pleaſed,
And where it fix'd the beauteous bird I ſeized.

DUNCIAD, B. IV. v. 425.

A full

A full pauſe in an unuſual place very aptly repreſents the ſtopping of a ſtone, after an impetuous courſe down a hill, in the following paſſage in Pope's tranſlation of Homer:

> From ſteep to ſteep the rolling ruin bounds,
> At ev'ry ſhock the crackling wood reſounds.
> Still gath'ring force, it ſmokes, and, urged amain,
> Whirls, leaps, and thunders down impetuous to the plain;
> Then ſtops. So Hector. Their whole force he proved,
> Reſiſtleſs when he raged, and when he ſtopp'd, unmoved.

The whole of this paſſage, particularly the deſcription of the rolling of the ſtone down the hill, is a happy example of deſcriptive imitation.

The frequent pauſes of meditation and ſoliloquy are happily imitated by Shakeſpeare upon many occaſions, and particularly in Hamlet's meditation on death:

> To be, or not to be—that is the queſtion.
> Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to ſuffer
> The ſtings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
> Or to take arms againſt a ſea of troubles,
> And by oppoſing, end them. To die, to ſleep—
> No more—and by a ſleep to ſay we end
> The heart-ach, and a thouſand nat'ral ſhocks
> That fleſh is heir to. 'Tis a conſummation
> Devoutly to be wiſh'd—to die, to ſleep—
> To ſleep—perchance to dream. Ay, there's the rub—
> For in that ſleep of death what dreams may come,
> When we have ſhuffled off this mortal coil,
> Muſt give us pauſe—

A great variety of juſt expreſſion of ſenſe by ſound, or at leaſt intervals of ſound, may be obſerved in various parts of Pope's Ode on St. Cecilia's Day; particularly at the beginning, where he deſcribes ſeveral inſtruments of muſic:

Deſcend, ye Nine, deſcend and ſing,
The breathing inſtruments inſpire;
Wake into voice each ſilent ſtring,
And ſweep the ſounding lyre.
In a ſadly pleaſing ſtrain
Let the warbling lute complain;
Let the loud trumpet ſound,
Till the roofs all around
The ſhrill echoes rebound.
While in more lengthen'd notes and ſlow
The deep, majeſtic, ſolemn organs blow.
Hark the numbers ſoft and clear
Gently ſteal upon the ear;
Now louder, and yet louder riſe,
And fill with ſpreading ſounds the ſkies.
Exulting in triumph now ſwell the bold notes,
In broken air trembling the wild muſic floats;
Till, by degrees, remote and ſmall,
The ſtrains decay,
And melt away,
In a dying, dying fall.

And afterwards, when he deſcribes the death of Orpheus:

But ſoon, too ſoon, the lover turns his eyes.
Again ſhe falls, again ſhe dies, ſhe dies.
How wilt thou now the fatal ſiſters move?
No crime was thine, if 'twas no crime to love.

Now

Now under hanging mountains,
Beſide the fall of fountains,
Or where Hebrus wanders,
Rolling in meanders,
All alone,
Unheard, unknown,
He makes his moan,
And calls her ghoſt,
For ever, ever, ever loſt.
Now with furies ſurrounded,
Deſpairing, confounded,
He trembles, he glows
Amidſt Rhodope's ſnows:
See, wild as the winds, o'er the deſart he flies —
Hark—Hæmus reſounds with the Bacchanals cries—
———Ah ſee—he dies.

From reading the former of theſe paſſages, in particular, it muſt be apparent how much it is in the power of *pronunciation* to aſſiſt and help out this expreſſion of ſenſe by ſound and intervals of ſound; and becauſe, if we feel the ſentiment, we unavoidably do give the language all the aſſiſtance we can from pronunciation, the powers of *written language* have been ſuppoſed to be as extenſive as thoſe of *language* and *pronunciation* together. The obſervation of the different manner in which the words *great* and *little* are pronounced, according to the *degree of the quality* we intend to expreſs, may ſuffice to ſhew us both how naturally we endeavour to favour the ſenſe by the ſound, and alſo how far we are able to do it. The peculiar beauty, particularly, of the former of the two paſſages quoted from Pope may be loſt by an injudicious pronunciation. Alſo the words

fal'n,

fall'n, fall'n, fall'n, fall'n, in Dryden's *Feaſt of Alexander*, require to be pronounced with a tone of voice growing continually more and more languid, to preſerve the beauty of the paſſage in which they are introduced. Indeed no perſon, who reads the poem with any feeling and taſte, can avoid doing it. There are many ideas and turns of thought which a *ſpeaker* may imitate very ſucceſsfully, when a *writer* (unleſs languages had been conſtructed in a manner very different from what they are) is not able to contribute much to the ſucceſs of the imitation.

LECTURE XXXIV.

Of HARMONY *in* VERSE.

ALL ſpeech naturally divides itſelf into *long* and *ſhort ſyllables*. Whatever language we ſpeak, or whether it be *quantity* or *accent* that we attend to in it, we pronounce ſome ſyllables with more rapidity than others; and the art of verſification univerſally conſiſts in the diſpoſition of the long or ſhort ſyllables, according to ſome rule. In ſome kinds of verſe, indeed, there is more latitude than in others; but an utter inattention to the length of the ſyllables would quite deſtroy the harmony of any verſification in the world.

The regular diſpoſition of the long and ſhort ſyllables neceſſarily divides every verſe into certain diſtinct portions, or *feet*, and the harmony of a verſe is moſt diſtinctly perceived when theſe portions or feet are kept as diſtinct as poſſible; becauſe then the regular diſpoſition of the long and ſhort ſyllables, in which the eſſence of verſe conſiſts, is moſt apparent. To keep theſe diviſions of verſe quite diſtinct (which the mind, according to an obſervation lately made, naturally inclines to do, in order to *perfect* the harmony) a momentary pauſe muſt be made after each of them, and this pauſe will be peculiarly eaſy and natural, if ſuch diviſion, or foot, cloſe with a long ſyllable.

In order to have any perception of the harmony of verſe, and to feel the pleaſure we receive from it, unmixed with that which we receive from other beauties of poetry, we muſt diſpoſe *unmeaning ſyllables*, or ſuch as have no other properties than *length* or *ſhortneſs*, in metrical order, and obſerve how we are affected by the pronunciation of them. By this method we ſhall alſo perceive the peculiar beauty of the verſification in uſe in any country, independent of any advantages it may derive from the peculiar *properties of the language*, or the *art of the poet*. For the ſake of brevity, I ſhall here apply this method to Engliſh heroic verſe only, uſing the ſyllables that the ingenious Mr. Maſon contrived for this purpoſe; viz. *tum* for the long ſyllable and *ti* for the ſhort one. The following line then will be the general ſtandard of Engliſh Iambic verſes:

Tĭtūm | tĭtūm || tĭ tūm | tĭ tūm | tĭ tūm.

Let any perſon only pronounce theſe ſyllables at his leiſure, and he muſt perceive a diſpoſition to pauſe a little after every long ſyllable, and moſt of all after the ſecond foot, leaving the latter part of the verſe longer than the former; by which means it hath the additional beauty of a *climax*. Accordingly, it will be found by experience that thoſe verſes, *ſeparately taken*, are the moſt muſical, in which the words are ſo diſpoſed, that thoſe pauſes ſhall be the moſt diſtinctly perceived; that is, where the diviſion made by the words and the ſenſe coincides with the metrical pauſe. To this, no doubt, is owing, in a great meaſure, the remarkable harmony of that ſtanza of Denham's, which Dryden propoſes as a paradox to be explained by the wits of his age:

Tho' deep, yet clear; || tho' gentle, yet not dull:
Strong without rage; || without o'erflowing, full.

Anciently, I believe, in all nations, mankind were ſo captivated with the charms of verſe, that, in reciting poetry, no regard was paid to any thing but the metrical pauſe; which made the pronunciation of verſe a kind of *ſinging* or *chanting:* and accordingly, we never read of *poems* being *read*, but always of their being *ſung* by them. Nor ſhall we wonder at this, if we conſider that, even in our own age, all perſons who have not been inſtructed in the true art of pronunciation (which is governed wholly by the *ſenſe*) naturally pronounce verſe in the ſame manner, and quite differently from their manner of pronouncing proſe; ſo that it generally requires a good deal of pains to correct that vicious habit. Even among perſons of a liberal education, we find ſome lean more to the pauſe of the *metre*, and others more to the pauſe of the *ſenſe*; and there are no perſons, not even thoſe who contend the moſt ſtrenuouſly that verſe ought to be pronounced exactly like proſe, but diſtinguiſh the metrical pauſe as much as a regard to the ſenſe will admit. Indeed, if we have a juſt taſte for *harmony*, we ſhall perceive that a little interruption of the metrical pauſe by the diviſion of the ſenſe hath no diſagreeable effect, *muſically conſidered*, as it contributes to throw an agreeable *variety* into the ſtructure of verſe.

If we pay any regard to the ſenſe, we muſt make no pauſe in the middle of a word, or between two words which together preſent only one idea, and ſeparately are of no ſignification; as between prepoſitions, or adjectives, and their ſubſtantives, which are as inſeparable in pronunciation as if they were ſingle words. The greater is the coincidence of the metrical pauſe with the pauſe of the ſenſe, and the more diſtinguiſhable is verſe from proſe: and verſes grow leſs and leſs diſtinguiſhable as a regard to the ſenſe throws the pauſe farther and farther from its natural

place. If the metrical pauſe be excluded intirely, the verſe, notwithſtanding the regular diſtribution of the long and ſhort ſyllables, will not be diſtinguiſhable from proſe, nor paſs for a verſe, except among others.

This a judicious ear will be able to obſerve in a compariſon of the following verſes in *Pope's Eſſay on Man*; in which the pauſes are very various. I have marked the proper pauſe to be made in the pronunciation, which is always as near to the metrical pauſe (namely, after the ſecond long ſyllable in the line) as a regard to the ſenſe will admit:

All nature is but art || unknown to thee:
All chance, || direction, which thou can'ſt not ſee:
All diſcord, || harmony not underſtood;
All partial evil, || univerſal good.
And ſpite of pride, || in erring reaſon's ſpite,
One truth is clear; || whatever is is right.

In theſe verſes, the pauſe which falls neareſt to the beginning of the verſe, is after the ſecond ſyllable, which is rarely graceful; and that which falls neareſt to the end is after the ſixth ſyllable. Sometimes the pauſe may fall, and not ungracefully, one ſyllable later, as in the following:

Some place the bliſs in action, || ſome in eaſe.

If the pauſe fall earlier or later than theſe, it has a bad effect upon the harmony of the verſe, unleſs it anſwer the purpoſe of making the ſound an echo to the ſenſe, as in this:

Celeſtial voices to the midnight air
Sole, || or reſponſive to each other's note.

The

The following verſes, by the cloſe coherence of the words in grammatical conſtruction, admit of no metrical pauſe, at leaſt none that is ſufficiently ſtriking:

Shoots far into the boſom of dim night,
Oft leaving what is natural and fit.

It is only little more than the *tranſpoſition of the words* that gives the next line an air different from that of proſe:

The God who darts around the world his rays.
POPE'S HOMER.

If the words be reſtored to their natural order, though the *meaſure* of verſe will be preſerved, the *effect* of it will be wholly loſt:

The God who darts his rays around the world.

For this reaſon *polyſyllables* are, for the moſt part, unhappily refuſed admittance into the moſt muſical Engliſh verſes, viz. becauſe they can hardly be ſituated where they will not occupy the moſt convenient place for the principal pauſe; and it is evident they muſt neceſſarily occupy the place of an inferior pauſe, at leaſt. On this account, though theſe verſes may contribute to throw an agreeable variety into a poem, they ſeldom ſound muſically when pronounced ſingly. The following are rather too proſaic:

A noble ſuperfluity it craves.
In magnanimity of mind reſolved.

But, if polyſyllabic words can be ſo diſpoſed as not to interfere with the principal pauſe, they have a very good effect, on account of

of their accent being ſo diſtinguiſhable. Let the melody of the following lines be attended to:

——————— Him th' Almighty Power
Hurl'd headlong, flaming from th' etherial ſky,
With hideous ruin and combuſtion, down
To bottomleſs perdition; there to dwell
In adamantine chains and penal fire,
Who durſt defy th' Omnipotent to arms.

On the other hand, Engliſh verſes, conſiſting wholly of *monoſyllables*, have ſeldom a ſtriking effect, becauſe they are not, in general, ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable into long and ſhort. As it is only the *accent* which determines the length of ſyllables in our language, the *quantity* of all words which have no accent muſt be arbitrary; and accordingly we do pronounce them long or ſhort at pleaſure. Unleſs, therefore, there be *accented words* intermixed with monoſyllables, there is nothing to direct the pronunciation of them, and without ſome determinate difference in the length of the ſyllables, the metre vaniſhes. The following lines may ſerve as examples of this obſervation:

The God that made both air, and earth, and heaven
Nor the deep tract of hell. Say firſt what cauſe
To caſt him out from heaven with all his hoſt

Notwithſtanding the meaſure of the greater part of our monoſyllables is arbitrary, and therefore they generally do neither good nor harm in a verſe; yet ſome of them are ſo *eaſy*, and ſome ſo *difficult* to pronounce, that a regard to *quantity*, properly ſo called, neceſſarily ſubſtitutes itſelf in the place of accent. Monoſyllables, the quantity of which is remarkably different,

may,

may, when properly diſpoſed, make very muſical verſes; or, diſpoſed improperly, they may greatly injure the melody. The following are very harmonious verſes, though (except the laſt) they conſiſt wholly of monoſyllables:

Arms and the man I ſing, who forc'd by fate
I truſt in thee, and know in whom I truſt
For which we bear to live, nor fear to die
Aſk of the learn'd the way; the learn'd are blind;
This bids to ſerve, and that to ſhun mankind.

This next verſe has no harmony, becauſe the monoſyllable *the*, in the place of a long ſyllable, is not capable of being pronounced long:

This nymph, to the deſtruction of mankind

If the pauſe in the middle of a line cannot be excluded without a loſs of the harmony, much leſs can the ſtill greater pauſe at the end of a line be excluded without that inconvenience. No two verſes, therefore, ought to be ſo cloſely connected in grammatical conſtruction, as that a juſt pronunciation of them ſhall leave no pauſe between them. Nevertheleſs, Milton hath often offended againſt this rule, as in the following examples:

What thanks ſufficient, or what recompence
Equal have I to render thee, divine
Hiſtorian. Book VIII. l. 5, 6.

——— Unleſs an age too late, or cold
Climate, or years damp my intended wing.
Book IX. l. 44.

Inveſted

Inveſted with bright rays, jocund to run
Her longitude thro' heaven's high-road: the grey
Dawn, and the pleiades before him danced.

Book VII. l. 373.

Milton, however, had the example of the Greek and Roman poets to miſlead him, who often cloſe verſes in the middle of a word; and yet the nature of an *hexameter verſe* (the cloſe of which hath ſo remarkably uniform and peculiar a cadence) makes a pauſe at the end of it much more neceſſary than in our *Iambic verſes*, in which the ſame diſpoſition of ſyllables which cloſes a verſe, uſually begins the next. Engliſh verſes, of the length of our heroics, may run into one another, ſo that it ſhall hardly be perceived where one ends and another begins, but it may always be perceived where an hexameter ends. Univerſally, a pauſe in the ſenſe ought to be made to coincide with the metrical pauſe, and to be in proportion to the quantity or diſtinctneſs of that pauſe. A regard to this one rule will direct that the ſenſe come nearer to a cloſe at the principal pauſe than at the inferior pauſes of the ſame verſe, at the end of an hexameter than of an Iambic verſe, at the end of a couplet or rhyme than of blank verſe, and at the end of a ſtanza than of a ſingle couplet; becauſe, in the latter of all theſe caſes, there is a more ſenſible pauſe in the metre than in the former: yet, in violation of this rule, we ſometimes ſee no pauſe made at the end of a couplet, or even of a ſtanza of Engliſh verſe; and the liberty of drawing on the ſenſe from one blank verſe to another hath been greatly abuſed.

A very few examples will ſhow the importance of attending to the metrical pauſe in the diſpoſition of words in Latin as well as

Engliſh verſe. The coincidence of the metrical pauſe with that of the words, makes the following of Virgil exceedingly harmonious:

Tityre tu patulæ recubans ſub tegmine fagi
Ludere quæ vellem calamo permeſit agreſti
Eurydicen toto referebant flumine ripæ.

A want of this coincidence makes this next, of Ennius, very unharmonious:

Romæ mænia terruit impiger Hannibal armis.

Who could have imagined that the two following verſes could have the ſame meaſure, and that the diſpoſition of the pauſe only could make ſo great a difference in the harmony:

Ad talos ſtola demiſſa, et circumdata palla. HORACE.

Placatumque nitet diffuſo lumine cœlum. LUCRETIUS.

Sometimes, inſtead of one principal pauſe, there may be two equal pauſes, at nearly equal diſtances from the middle of the verſe, as in the following of Dr. Young:

From darkneſs | teeming darkneſs | where I lay.

If the principal pauſe immediately ſucceed a long ſyllable, it may be obſerved to be more *vigorous*; if a ſhort ſyllable be wanting to finiſh a word, the effect is more *languid*. If the chief pauſe at the end of a verſe be ſucceeded by a ſhort ſyllable, it is wholly unfit to expreſs grandeur and ſublimity, and is beſt adapted to jocoſe ſubjects. It is impoſſible to read a line thus conſtructed, and not perceive this effect; for inſtance, the following of Dryden:

Then

Then all for women, painting, rhyming, drinking,
Beſides ten thouſand freaks, that died in thinking.

In many of the verſes quoted above, it muſt have been apparent that a trochee at the beginning of a verſe hath even a good effect. It is *enlivening*, as in the following of Philips:

Happy the man, who, free from care and ſtrife

For the ſame reaſon, a trochee is leaſt diſagreeable after the principal pauſe; becauſe after that we, as it were, begin again. Thus the following verſes, though admitting a trochee, as it is after the principal pauſe, are not wholly void of harmony:

Had they prevail'd || dārknĕſs had cloſed our days,
And death and ſilence had forbid his praiſe.

Hov'ring on wing || ūndĕr the cope of hell.

The foot which ſucceeds the principal pauſe in the following line of Pope, is rather a trochee than a ſpondee, and yet doth not, perhaps, contribute to the intended heavineſs of the line:

And, like a wounded ſnake, || drāgs hĭs ſlow length along.

Notwithſtanding a perfect uniformity in the meaſure of verſe is univerſally tireſome in a long poem, and variety is generally agreeable; yet, when there is any correſpondence in the ſenſe of two lines, the moſt perfect uniformity in the cadence is the moſt agreeable, as in theſe of Mr. Pope:

Bright as the ſun, || her eyes the gazers ſtrike;
And, like the ſun, || they gaze on all alike.

And alſo in theſe:

Warms in the ſun, || refreſhes in the breeze,
Glows in the ſtars, || and bloſſoms in the trees.
Lives thro' all life, || extends thro' all extent,
Spreads undivided, || operates unſpent.

The chief advantage of blank verſe, in point of harmony, is, that, not being divided into couplets, there is no neceſſity for, or expectation of a pauſe in the ſenſe at the end of any particular verſe; but the ſenſe may be continued, without any interruption, to almoſt any length that is thought proper. Other differences of blank verſe and rhyme were conſidered upon a former occaſion.

LECTURE

LECTURE XXXV.

Of HARMONY *in* PROSE.

THE harmony of *proſe* doth not depend upon any regular return of long or ſhort ſyllables, for that would conſtitute it *verſe*, but is conſiſtent with any diſpoſition of long and ſhort ſyllables that is eaſy to pronounce, and at the ſame time favours the ſenſe. Very many long ſyllables coming together make a ſtyle rough and heavy; and many ſhort ſyllables have likewiſe a diſagreeable effect, becauſe there is nothing to ſupport the voice, and for want of that it is apt to hurry on, and embarraſs itſelf. For this reaſon, people who are inclined to ſtammer (as I know by experience) find great difficulty in pronouncing many ſhort ſyllables together. There are too many ſhort ſyllables together in the following ſentence:

" This doctrine I apprehend to be erroněoŭs, ănd ŏf ă pĕrni-
" cious tendency."

Thoſe ſingle words are the moſt agreeable to the ear, in which the long and ſhort ſyllables are the moſt remarkably diſtinguiſhable, becauſe they contain the greateſt variety of ſound. This excellence we perceive in many polyſyllables, as *rapidity*, *impetuoſity*, *independent*, &c.

Pauſes

Pauſes muſt be made in reading proſe as well as verſe; and ſince the voice muſt reſt, it is convenient that proviſion be made for its reſting at proper intervals. Since neither in verſe, or proſe, ought thoſe words to be ſeparated by the leaſt interruption of ſound, which together preſent but *one idea*, it is proper that, at leaſt, words ſo cloſely connected ſhould not be ſo many, as that it would be difficult to pronounce them in a breath. Moreover, ſince the ſyllables preceding the pauſe are more diſtinctly heard, and more attended to than any others, it is peculiarly neceſſary that their natural and mechanical effect upon the mind ſhould be conſidered by a compoſer. A pauſe preceded by a long ſyllable is always *vigorous*, and preceded by a ſhort ſyllable *feeble*. If the long ſyllable be preceded by other long ſyllables, it is *ſolemn*, if by ſhort ones, *lively*. On the other hand, if a ſhort ſyllable preceding a pauſe (which is in itſelf feeble) be itſelf preceded by a long one, it makes a cloſe eāſy and grāceful. No perſon, who hath any notion of the analogy there is between intellectual ideas and thoſe of ſenſe (which has been ſo often mentioned and explained in the courſe of theſe lectures) can be at a loſs to account for the propriety of theſe diſtinctions. However, let facts ſpeak for themſelves.

The pauſes in our tranſlation of the firſt verſes of the book of Geneſis, are chiefly preceded by long ſyllables, and I appeal to the reader if they are not manly and vigorous:

" In the beginning | God created | the heavens | and the " earth; || and the earth | was without form | and void; || and " darkneſs | was upon the face | of the deep ||."

The laſt pauſe of the following ſentence of Bolingbroke is weak and bad:

" If the heart of a prince be not corrupt, theſe truths will find " an eaſy ingreſſion through the underſtănding tŏ ĭt."

BOLINGBROKE.

This next ſentence is graceful:

" Wherever I find a great deal of gratitude in a pōor măn, | I " take it for grāntĕd | there would be as much generōsĭty | if " he were a rīch măn |."

And the cloſe of this is ſolemn:

" I ſeldom ſee a noble building, or any great piece of magni- " ficence and pomp, but I think how little is all this to ſatisfy " the ambition, or to fill the idea of an ĭmmōrtāl ſōul."

A ſentence is beautifully conſtructed when there is a climax in the length of the words; and a period, when there is a climax in the length of the clauſes that compoſe it. Something of this beauty may be perceived in the following ſentence:

" Many men have been capable of doing a wiſe thing, more a " cunning thing, but very few a generous thing."

When things are either compared or contraſted, it is beautiful to have every thing in the ſentence ſo ſimilar, as that even the names of them ſhould begin with the ſame letter. Of this take the following example:

" The peacock, in all his pride, doth not diſplay half the co- " lour that appears in the garments of a Britiſh Lady, when ſhe " is dreſſed either for a *ball* or a *birth-day*."

SPECTATOR, No. 265.

My

My life's companion and my boſom friend,
One *faith*, one *fame*, one *fate* ſhall both attend.

DRYDEN'S TRANSLATION OF THE ÆNEID.

In any other caſe, however, many words that are near one another cannot begin with the ſame letter without having a diſagreeable effect; and a ſimilar ſound in two neighbouring words, which are no otherwiſe related to one another, is peculiarly offenſive; as the following of Maſon:

" Many things that *deſerve* to be *obſerved* on this ſubject"—

When a word is found out of its uſual place and connection, though the ſenſe be quite obvious, our ears are offended as with a diſagreeable ſound: but this is rather a part of an obſervation made upon another occaſion. I ſhall, however, in this place, ſubjoin a few examples of it:

" I have, *indeed*, not found among any part of mankind"—

RAMBLER, No. 38.

" Theſe, therefore, we muſt principally hunt out, but, above " all, preſerve a laudable prolixity, preſenting the whole and " every ſide *at once* of an image to view."

ART OF SINKING.

" A man was obliged to produce all the wealth of his mind " to view, and he was rated to the ſum he produced: no one " could *therefore* paſs for rich who was not ſo."

SHERIDAN'S LECTURES.

I do not think I can cloſe theſe obſervations on the harmony of ſtyle in proſe and verſe, better than with adviſing, that a *ſecondary*

attention only to be paid to them. Let your primary regards be always to the *ſenſe* and to *perſpicuity*; and in every competition between harmony and theſe more valuable objects, if no methods can be found to reconcile them, let the harmony be ſacrificed without heſitation. Propriety of ſentiment and expreſſion will better cover a defect of harmony, than the harmony will cover a defect of propriety.

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